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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Peer, Time, and Risk Preferences
by
Seung-Keun Martinez
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Charles Sprenger, Chair
This dissertation is composed of three papers on distinct topics, each studying a different
aspect of decision making. In chapter 1, we study why, even without material incentives for
coordination or learning, social interactions influence individual decision making. Identifying
why conformity arises absent explicit incentives faces the challenge that any rationalizing theory
must rely on unobservable preferences or beliefs. Therefore, empirical distinction requires
theories that make predictions beyond the basic dynamic of conformity. To that end, we propose
and test a theory of self signaling in peer effects. The model generates (partial) conformity as a
response to how others’ choices inform one’s own self-image. The mechanism of self-signaling
for peer effects delivers unique, falsifiable predictions that we test experimentally. The theory
xi
predicts that the anticipation of learning others’ choices and the garbling of information on
others’ choices will both deeply influence behavior. In two real-effort lab experiments we not
only find treatment effects closely in line with the model’s unique predictions, but also document
the importance of self image in social comparisons.
In chapter 2, we attempt to identify present-biased procrastination in tax filing behavior.
Our exercise uses dynamic discrete choice techniques to develop a counterfactual benchmark
for filing behavior under the assumption of exponential discounting. Deviations between this
counterfactual benchmark and actual behavior provide potential ‘missing-mass’ evidence of
present bias. In a sample of around 22,000 low-income tax filers we demonstrate substantial
deviations between exponentially-predicted and realized behavior, particularly as the tax deadline
approaches. Present-biased preferences not only provide qualitatively better in-sample fit than ex-
ponential discounting, but also have improved out-of-sample predictive power for responsiveness
of filing times to the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act recovery payments. Additional experimental
data from around 1100 individuals demonstrates a link between experimentally measured present
bias and deviations from exponential discounting in tax filing behavior.
In chapter 3, we provide a universal condition for rationalizability by risk-averse expected
utility preference in a demand-based framework with multiple commodities. Our test can be
viewed as a natural counterpart of a classical test of expected utility, due to Fishburn (1975), in a
demand setting.
xii
Chapter 1
Social Comparisons in Peer Effects
The importance of social information in individual decision making is well documented.
Not only do individuals learn from their peers when making decisions over new and unfamiliar
opportunities (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Duflo and Saez, 2002; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Dahl,
Løken and Mogstad, 2014), but they also converge to behavioral conformity in the work place
(Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010) and in the classroom (Hoxby,
2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Bursztyn, Egorov and Jensen, 2017). While material
incentives for coordination or reliance on social information for uncertainty resolution can
explain some instances of social conformity (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Banerjee, 1992; Foster
and Rosenzweig, 1995), previous research demonstrates the importance of social influence that
is not predicted by neo-classical theories (Frey and Meier, 2004; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Goette,
Huffman and Meier, 2006; Alpizar, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Mas and Moretti,
2009; Shang and Croson, 2009; Chen et al., 2010).
Distinguishing between plausible mechanisms for conformity in the absence of explicit
incentives faces a natural challenge. If incentives are unobservable, any rationalizing theory will
necessarily rely on unobservable preferences or beliefs. For example, a common explanation
for such peer effects is adherence to social norms. These theories are typically driven by the
stigma of deviating from a socially prescribed action (Akerlof, 1980; Jones, 1984; Akerlof and
1
Kranton, 2000) or by individuals pooling at a common action to signal an optimal social type
(Bernheim, 1994).1 While we may be able to observe individuals make similar choices, it is
difficult to observe whether they do so specifically because it is expected of them. Therefore,
theories of peer effects are empirically distinguishable only if they differ in their predictions
beyond the basic dynamic of conformity begetting further conformity. In this project we propose
and experimentally test a theory of (partial) social conformity in the absence of a socially optimal
action. Our model produces a novel prediction on how decision makers will alter their choices in
anticipation of learning the choices of others. Further, we introduce a theoretical foundation and
experimental test for self image as a mechanism underlying peer effects.
Our theory posits that individuals have an intrinsic desire to judge and evaluate them-
selves. That is, each person would like to perceive himself positively—for example, as diligent,
intelligent, and charitable. However, individuals often lack a direct or objective means of self
evaluation. Instead, they rely on their history of actions as a noisy signal of their attributes. This
theory requires no predetermined socially optimal action. Rather, self-image is increasing in the
performance of a costly action. Under these assumptions an individual faces intrinsic incentives
to manipulate his personal image through his actions. Further, signal extraction is improved
when he observes others performing similar tasks—i.e. social comparisons allow him to better
understand the image implications of his own choices.
We find that if self image is increasing in one’s own performance and decreasing in peer
performance, then diminishing marginal utility over self image will produce positive peer effects.
Intuitively, concave image utility implies the shame of learning you are the lowest social type is
greater than the pleasure of learning you are the highest social type. As such, individuals are
content following the majority. More concretely, consider a group of employees working on an
unfamiliar task under a fixed-wage spot contract that offers no incentives for collusion on effort.2
Why would an employee condition his own output on the observed output of a peer? Suppose
1Bernheim and Exley (2015) explore an alternative explanation for social conformity that establishes preference
mechanisms that drive instances of social conformity. Our project explores a belief mechanism.
2Previous experiments have documented peer effects under such conditions (Falk and Ichino, 2006).
2
that each employee wishes to perceive himself as hard-working but is unsure how to judge his
performance. If each employee draws comparisons with peer output to better understand whether
his output suggests diligence or laziness, then our theory establishes that a group of employees
will conform in output when each individual abhors being the laziest group member more than
he enjoys being the most diligent.
Modeling social comparisons as self signaling offers novel predictions beyond the basic
dynamic of conformity. In particular, our model predicts individuals will make more costly
but more image-enhancing choices in anticipation of social information. In the context of our
previous example, suppose that no one observes his coworkers’ donations before he chooses
his own donation. In our model, a donor’s potential marginal utility loss from learning all his
coworkers gave more than him is greater than the potential utility gain of learning he gave more
than his coworkers. Therefore, each donor hedges against bad news and gives more if he knows
we will eventually learn his coworkers’ donations.
The experiments in this project corroborate our theory’s prediction on self-image-
produced conformity. The first experiment uses the model’s social information anticipation
prediction to test the relevance of self image in peer effects. Specifically, we test whether
individuals are willing to transcribe more blurry images of text in exchange for charitable do-
nations if they know they will learn the distribution of previous participant choices than when
they know they will remain uninformed. Importantly, all participants commit to how many of
these transcriptions they are willing to complete prior to learning any information on how their
decisions compare to the decisions of others. Both those who will and will not be shown the
distribution of others’ decisions must predict where their decision lies in the distribution of all
previous choices. Subjects are also informed of exactly what the experimenter observes–the full
anonymous distribution of all participant choices–in both treatment and baseline. Therefore, we
ensure that any treatment effect is driven entirely by each participant’s anticipation of learning
how his choice compares to the decisions of others and not by what anyone else learns.3 In accor-
3To that end, subjects did not learn the choices of others in their sessions, and subjects in both treatment
3
dance with our theory’s predictions, we find that participants are willing to do more tasks when
they anticipate learning how their decisions compare to the decisions of previous participants
The second experiment tests whether a noisier signal mitigates peer effects by statistically
garbling the information peer behavior provides. Documenting that decision makers are less
responsive to less precise signals is an important result of this project. Our theory relies
on individuals reacting to their expectations of peer behavior to better understand the image
implications of their own choices. For this theory to be plausible, not only must the basic
dynamics of conformity hold, but participants must be sensitive to the receipt of a statistically
refined signal on peer choices and unresponsive to an uninformative signal on peer choices.
The economic scope of peer influence is vast. Previous work has documented that people’s
uptake of retirement savings programs, charitable giving, effort at work, managerial strategies,
decisions to invest in financial instruments, and participation in paternal leave are causally related
to the observed decisions of their peers (Duflo and Saez, 2002; Frey and Meier, 2004; Mas and
Moretti, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010; Shue, 2013; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Dahl,
Løken and Mogstad, 2014), and that students’ academic achievements covary with those whom
they share a classroom or dormitory (Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003). A
careful investigation of how self-signaling and social comparisons may drive social conformity
could not only contribute to our understanding of the existing empirical and theoretical literature,
but also provide researchers and policy makers with greater predictive power over when peer
effects are likely to exist in unexplored environments.
Section 1.1 presents a simple model of social comparisons and explains the intuition
behind our results. Section 1.2 details our experimental design, and section 1.3 discusses the
results of our experiment. Finally, section 1.4 concludes and discusses possible future work on
this topic.
and baseline are informed that the anonymous distribution of previous participant choices may be used in future
experiment sessions.
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1.1 A Theory of Social Comparisons
In this section, we present a simple model of self image and social comparisons. This
model serves two primary purposes. First, we use this model to deliver sufficient conditions
for conformity. Second, the model produces a testable prediction on how individuals will make
self-image-relevant choices in anticipation of learning the choices of others.
Our first results states that if an individual experiences positive image returns in the
performance of a costly action and and negative image returns in the observation of higher peer
performance, then diminishing marginal utility over self image will produce convergence in
group behavior. To see this, suppose that individual 1 takes a costly action a1 and observes the
costly action of individual 2, a2. Define an image function I(a1,a2) for individual 1 such that I
is increasing in a1 and decreasing in a2: ∂ I∂a1 > 0 >
∂ I
∂a2
. Lastly, let person 1 experience utility U
over image I. For example, a1 and a2 may represent charitable donations. I(a1,a2) is agent 1’s
perception of his own altruism when he compares his gift to the gift of agent 2. U(I) is then the
utility agent 1 experiences over how altruistic he believes himself to be.
Actions a1 and a2 incur costs C(a1) and C(a2). Where C′ > 0 and C′′ ≥ 0. Naturally,
agent 1 will choose a1 by equating marginal image utility to the marginal cost of activity. Under
these assumptions agent 1 will choose higher a1 in response to higher a2 if image utility U is
increasing and concave.
The geometric intuition behind our first result is shown in shown in figure 1.1. Let
a2 + h > a2, and, for simplicity, assume that the image function I is linear. Under these con-
ditions we have that U ′(I(a1,a2 + h)) ∂ I∂a1 > U
′(I(a1,a2)) ∂ I∂a1 for all a1 due to the strict con-
cavity of U . Therefore, since the cost function C(a1) is not dependent on a2, we have that
argmaxa1U(I(a1,a2 + h))−C(a1) > argmaxa1U(I(a1,a2))−C(a1). In other words, person 1
chooses more costly a1 in response to a more costly choice of a2 because the marginal image
utility of activity at I(a1,a2+h) is higher than the marginal image utility at I(a1,a2).
Importantly, our model also predicts that self signaling will induce decision makers to
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U ′(I(a1,a2+h))
U ′(I(a1,a2))
I(a1,a2+h) I(a1,a2)
I
U(I)
Figure 1.1: Concavity Induced Peer Effects
choose more costly actions in anticipation of learning how their choices compare to the decisions
of others. This prediction crucially relies on the assumption that utility over self image is strictly
increasing and diminishingly concave – i.e. U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0 and U ′′′ > 0.
The intuition behind this result is similar to that of precautionary savings under prudent
expected utility risk preferences. Recall that under expected utility preferences, the prudent
decision maker saves more money today in response to an increase in future income uncertainty.
That is, prudent expected utility preferences predict that an individual will choose to save against
a possible future negative income shock. Our model of self image makes a similar prediction on
how individuals will make choices in anticipation of learning the choices of others. In our model,
the revelation of future social information causes a mean-preserving spread of one’s future self
image. The decision maker will then work harder today to bolster his self image to hedge against
a possible negative image shock tomorrow.
Formally, suppose that agent 1 makes his choice a1 knowing that agent 2 has already
made her choice. Let ai ∈ [0,A], and suppose that agent 1 holds a prior over agent 2’s, a2 ∼ F2.
Where we assume F2 differentiable. Then we will show, that agent 1 will make a more costly
and image-enhancing choice in anticipation of learning whether a1 > a2 or a1 < a2.
The mechanism behind this result is shown in figure 1.2. Let I(a1,E[a2]) be agent 1’s
6
image when he does not learn agent 2’s choice. Let I(a1,E[a2|a1 < a2]) be agent 1’s image if
he learns a1 < a2. Similarly, let I(a1,E[a2|a1 > a2]) be agent 1’s image if he learns that agent 2
chose a less costly action. Then the optimization problem in which agent 1 anticipates learning
whether a1 ≶ a2, but only after he makes his decision, is maxa1Pr(a1 < a2|a1)U
(
I(a1,E[a2|a1 <
a2])
)
+(1−Pr(a1 < a2|a1))U
(
I(a1,E[a2|a1 > a2])
)−C(a1). Notice that promise of learning
whether a1 ≶ a2 introduces a mean preserving spread to agent 1’s image.4 Since we assume
that U ′′′ > 0, by Jensen’s inequality we have that Pr(a1 < a2|a1)U ′(I(a1,E[a2|a1 < a2]))+(1−
Pr(a1 < a2|a1))U ′(I(a1,E[a2|a1 > a2]))>U ′(I(a1,E[a2|a1 > a2])) for all a1.
As such,
argmaxa1Pr(a1 < a2|a1)U(I(a1,E[a2|a1 < a2]))+
(1−Pr(a1 < a2|a1))U(I(a1,E[a2|a1 > a2]))−C(a1)> argmaxa1U(I(a1,E[a2|a1 > a2]))−C(a1)
That is, the decision maker will choose a more costly task when he knows that he will
learn how his choice compares to the choices of others than when he is to remain ignorant to
others choices. This occurs because convexity in marginal image utility implies that the potential
opportunity cost of choosing too low of an action when a1 < a2 outweighs the opportunity cost
of choosing too high of an action when a1 > a2.
4Pr(a1 < a2|a1)
∫ a1
0
A2 f2(A2)
Pr(a1<a2|a1)dA2 +(1−Pr(a1 < a2|a1))
∫ A
a1
A2 f2(A2)
(1−Pr(a1<a2|a1))dA2 =
∫ A
0 A2 f2(A2)dA2 by defi-
nition, and we assumed that I is linear.
7
U ′(I(a1,E[a2])
P<U ′(I<)+Pr>U ′(I>)
I(a1,E[a2|a2 < a1]) I(a1,E[a2]) I(a1,E[a2|a2 > a1]) I
U ′(I)
Where I< = I(a1,E[a2|a2 < a1]), I> = I(a1,E[a2|a2 > a1]), P> = Pr(a1 > a2), and P< = Pr(a1 < a2)
Figure 1.2: Social Information Anticipation
1.2 Experimental Design
We conducted two experiments to directly test the predictions of our theory. The first
experiment tested the relevance of self image in social comparisons, and the second experiment
tested the relevance of signal extraction. In both experiments participants chose the maximum
number of real-effort tasks they were willing to complete in exchange for a donation to charity.
All experiment sessions were conducted at the University of California, San Diego Department
of Economics. Subjects completed the experiment on individual computer terminals. Privacy
screens were installed on each computer and barriers were placed between every subject. All
participants were current undergraduates at UC San Diego. Each subject was paid 15 dollars for
his or her participation, and experiment sessions took approximately 50 minutes. Treatments
were varied across sessions for a between-subjects design. Recruitment for each session was
done by emailing a random sample of UCSD undergraduates. The first experiment contained nine
to fourteen subjects per session, and the second experiment contained eight to twelve subjects
per session.
Section 1.2.1 explains the real-effort task choice. Section 1.2.2 details the self-image
experiment, and section 1.2.3 describes the test for signal extraction.
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1.2.1 The Task Choice
In both experiments, participants were asked to select the maximum number of real-effort
tasks they were willing to complete in exchange for donations to the Afghan Dental Relief
Project.5 The ADRP is a charitable organization that provides free dental services and dental
health education to the poorest families and individuals in Kabul, Afghanistan. 100% of the
donations that were generated from the experiment were used to purchase dental supplies for
ADRP’s free dental clinic. We collaborated with the ADRP because it is a deserving and
relatively unknown charity. The founder, Dr. James Rolfe, agreed to monitor gifts made to the
charity during the course of our experiment. Dr. Rolfe reports that no gifts were made to the
ADRP that could have been given by a UCSD undergraduate.6
The real-effort task was to transcribe captchas.7 Captchas are distorted images of a
sequence of letters commonly used by website developers to distinguish between human users
and bots. The task was deliberately made to be more frustrating and tedious than typical website
captchas. We wanted subjects to experience increasing marginal costs in their task performances.
Our captchas consisted of capital and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters. Only
correctly transcribed captchas were considered completed tasks. Subjects were given three
chances per randomly assigned captcha, and they could not skip an assigned captcha except by
deliberately entering three incorrect responses.8 The typical participant was able to correctly
transcribe 1-out-of-every-5 captchas. An example of the task is show in Figure 1.3.9
In the self-image experiment subjects selected the maximum number of tasks they were
5We elicited willingness to do real-effort tasks in exchange for donations to charity, as opposed to eliciting
willingness to give money, so that we could measure how willingness to give one’s time and effort changes with the
size of the donation.
6Specifically, all donations made to the ADRP during the course of our experiment came from us, the experi-
menters, or from members of Dr. Rolfe’s local Santa Barbara community.
7Captchas were generated using the Python module Claptcha, available here:
https://github.com/kuszaj/claptcha. All use of this module is in accordance with the license outlined at
the previous link. The font used for captchas was “Mom’s Typewriter,” an open-source font available here:
https://www.dafont.com/moms-typewriter.font.
8All captchas were randomly assigned out of a bank of 1000 captcha images.
9The correct transcription of the shown captcha is “4LBMwW?E”
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Figure 1.3: Example Task
willing to complete in exchange for donations of $2, $5, $10, $15, and $20. Each subject
chose between 0 and 50 tasks for each possible donation amount. We ensured the incentive
compatibility of this decision by randomly assigning each subject a donation and task amount
after they had completed making their decisions. If the assigned number of tasks was equal to
or fewer than the maximum number they were willing to do for their assigned donation, they
completed their assigned number of tasks and we gave the assigned donation to the ADRP. For
example, suppose that for a donation of $15 a participant chose to do at most 30 tasks. If he
were randomly assigned $15 and 20 tasks, then he completed 20 tasks and $15 was given to the
Afghan Dental Relief Project. On the other hand, if he was randomly assigned $15 and 40 tasks,
then he did 0 tasks and no donation was given to the ADRP. After completing their assigned
number of tasks, subjects were all paid the same participation fee as they exited the lab. Subjects
were offered the same choice in the signal-extraction experiment. However, only a donation
of $20 was possible. Therefore, subjects in the signal-extraction experiment only made one
decision while subjects in the self-image experiment made five.10
We wanted all participants to make an informed choice on how many tasks they were
willing to complete in exchange for a donation to charity. Therefore, all subjects read a news
article about the ADRP and attempted to transcribe five sample captchas prior to their deci-
sions. Additionally, subjects received instruction and comprehension testing about the incentive
10Each subject was assigned a donation amount by drawing a ball out of a jar. Each ball had a dollar amount and
three-digit code written on it. The codes ensured that no subject could choose to work for a donation amount that
they were not assigned. A random number generator then assigned each subject a number of tasks (between 0 and
50). Both randomization devices were fair – every donation and task combination had an equal probability of being
assigned.
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compatible task choice. We wanted to prevent contemporaneous peer effects in our experiment.
Therefore, individuals never observed the decisions of others in their own session, nor did they
observe the randomly assigned donations or task amounts of other participants in their session.
Lastly, we wanted to measure how many captchas participants wanted to complete, not how
many they thought they could complete within a specific time interval. Therefore, subjects were
given as much time as they needed to complete their tasks.
Notes: This is the decision screen for participants in the self-image experiment.
Figure 1.4: Decision Screen
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1.2.2 Self Signaling and Social Comparisons
The first experiment tested our theory’s prediction that individuals will choose more
costly actions in anticipation of social information. In the context of our experiment, our theory
predicted that individuals would be willing to complete more captchas in anticipation of learning
how their choices compared to the choices of previous participants. We used this prediction to
identify the role of self image in social comparisons.
In both treatment and baseline, participants chose the maximum number of captchas they
were willing to complete in exchange for donations of $2, $5, $10, $15, and $20—as described
in section 1.2.1. In conjunction with their choices, subjects were also asked to predict the percent
of all previous participants that were willing to complete more tasks than them for each of
their decisions. This decision is depicted in Figure 1.4. As Figure 1.4 shows, subjects selected
the maximum number of tasks they were willing to complete and guessed whether 95%, 75%,
50%, 25%, or 0% of all previous participants were willing to do more tasks them. For example,
suppose that for a donation of $10 dollars an individual chose to do a maximum of 12 tasks.
Further suppose that this person thought that at least 50%, but fewer than 75%, of all previous
participants were willing to do more than 12 tasks for a $10 donation. This person was then
instructed to indicate that he believes that at least 50% of all previous experiment participants
were willing to do more tasks than him for a $10 donation.11
In treatment sessions, participants were given sealed envelopes that they opened after
submitting their decisions and distributional guesses. These envelopes contained the true 5th,
25th, 50th, 25th, and 100th percentiles for task choice by donation amount. Treatment participants
then submitted the correct answers for what percent of previous participants were willing to do
more tasks than them for each possible donation.
All choices were recorded anonymously. No subject choice, assigned donation, or
assigned task amount was revealed to others in their sessions. All subjects were aware that
11These guesses were not incentivized to preclude subjects from tailoring their choices to their guesses so as
receive higher payment—for example, picking corners on their choices for more accurate guesses.
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exactly 50% of all experiments session would learn the distribution of previous participant
choices. Further, while only treatment subjects ultimately learned the percentiles of previous
participant choices, we deliberately asked all participants to consider how their choices compare
to the choices of all previous participants. By doing so, we made subjects in both baseline and
treatment consider how their choices may compare to the choices of others. Further, we ensured
all experiment subjects were aware that the experimenter will observe the full anonymous
distribution of participant choices. Since the experimenter’s information set is identical in
treatment and baseline, any difference in subject behavior is solely due to subjects anticipating
what they themselves will learn.12
1.2.3 Signal Extraction and Peer-Group Formation
All of the predicted dynamics of our proposed theory rely on signal extraction. Therefore,
peer effects are predicted to arise only if group behavior provides a sufficiently refined signal. In
the context of our experiment, our theory states that decision makers may refer to others’ choices
to better understand whether their own choices reveal selfishness or task difficulty. As such, we
use statistically garbled and refined social information to directly test the relevance of statistical
reasoning in social comparisons.
Recall that, participants in this experiment chose the maximum number of captchas they
were willing to complete in exchange for a $20 donation to the ADRP. Prior to their decision, each
person was shown both of the following statements on the choices of all previous participants.
1. More than 50% of all previous participants were willing to complete at least 20 tasks for a
12We were also concerned that if only treatment subjects were aware that their anonymous choices may be
revealed in future sessions, then social image could still be a confounding factor. Similarly, there is a second order
equilibrium concern that if all subjects in the baseline thought all previous participants were also in the baseline–and
all treatment participants thought all previous participants were in the treatment–then subjects in the treatment
may have had higher beliefs about what previous participants chose to do. However, we preclude these possible
concerns by explaining to subjects in both treatment and baseline that 50% of all experiment sessions receive
social information and 50% do not. At no point do we reveal how many sessions have taken place or how many
remain. Therefore, all subjects were uniformly in the dark about the probability that their choices will inform future
revelations of social information.
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donation of $20.
2. Less than 25% of all previous participants were willing to complete at least 20 tasks for a
donation of $20.
Prior to making their own choices each subject also received a signal on which of these statements
was true. They received this signal by drawing one of sixteen available envelopes at random.
In the baseline, 50% (8-of-16) envelopes contained the true statement, while in treatment 94%
(15-of-16) envelopes contained the true statement.13 Clearly, previous participant choices do not
depend on the drawn statement of any current participant. Therefore, all that changes between
treatment and baseline is the underlying probability of drawing a true or false signal. After
reading their signals and choosing how many tasks they were willing to complete, subjects also
indicated which signal they believed to be true.14
Signal extraction has a specific hypothesis in this context. Baseline subjects should
understand that variation in the obtained signal is pure noise15, and their task choices and beliefs
should be independent of the obtained signal. Furthermore, if subjects are sensitive to statistically
refined peer data, treatment participants who receive the high signal should choose to do more
tasks than all baseline participants. If both hypotheses hold true, then treatment participants
who receive the high signal should also choose to do more tasks than baseline participants who
receive the high signal.
1.3 Results
Section 1.3.1 corroborates our theory’s prediction that individuals will choose more
costly actions to bolster self image in anticipation of social information. Section 1.3.2 supports
the relevance of image signal extraction in our experiment.
13The high signal – signal 1 – is the true signal.
14Subjects were not informed that they would be asked which signal they believed until after they made their
decisions.
15Recall that all subjects were aware of both possible signals prior to drawing a signal.
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1.3.1 Self-Image Results
Figure 1.5 plots the average task choice by donation amount of those in the baseline and
anticipation treatments. Those in the anticipation treatment were, on average, willing to complete
more captchas than those in the baseline. We also observe that task choice is increasing in the
donation amount16 and that the treatment effect increases in the donation amount.
Notes: This figure plots the average number of tasks subjects were willing to complete for each possible donation.
In concordance with self signaling, subjects choose to do more tasks if they anticipate learning how their choices
compare to the choices of previous participants. This effect is increasing in the value of the gift to charity. Standard
errors are shown in brackets.
Figure 1.5: Mean Task Choice by Donation
Table 1.1 presents these results via estimation of the following regressions:
yi,d = α0+α1Donationi,d +α2Treati+ εi,d (1.1)
1694% of all participants displayed within-subject monotonicity in task choice across the donation amounts.
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yi,d = β0+β1Donationi,d +β2Treati+β3Treati×Donationi,d + εi,d (1.2)
where yi,d is the maximum number of tasks subject i was willing to complete for donation d.
Regression (1.2) is more informative.17 From this regression we can see that for every additional
$5 donated to the ADRP, baseline participants were willing to do an additional four tasks while
treatment participants were willing to do an additional five tasks. This result, significant at the
5% level, is useful for two principle reasons. First, strict monotonicity in task performance
over donation size demonstrates the costliness of captcha transcription. Secondly, we find no
evidence of any fixed treatment effect—the estimation of β2 is indistinguishable from 0. Rather,
the anticipatory image effect is entirely tied to the size of the gift given to the ADRP. This result
is accommodated by our model. A nominal gift of $2 gives little reason to hedge against bad
news by making more costly choices. However, subjects choose to do 20% more tasks when
the gift is $15 or $20. In other words, anticipatory image concerns only exist when sufficient
charitable stakes are attached to an otherwise vacuous task.
1.3.2 Signal Extraction Results
In accordance with our theory, we find that participants’ choices are highly sensitive to the
receipt of a statistically refined signal and unresponsive to a fully garbled signal. Recall that our
theory requires that baseline choices should be independent of the obtained signal. Furthermore,
treatment participants who receive the high signal should also choose to do more tasks than
baseline participants who receive either signal. We focus on the high signal in treatment because
it is the true signal and, therefore, the signal that we are statistically powered to evaluate. Figure
17Appendix Table A.1 confirms that the linearly interacted regression is the correct specification. The cor-
responding regression for Table A.1 is yi,d = δ0 +∑d∈{2,5,10,15,20} δ1,d1i,donation=d +∑d∈{2,5,10,15,20} δ2,dTreati×
1i,donation=d + εi,d . From this regression we can not only see that task choices and the treatment effect are increasing
in the donation, but also that a linear approximation of these effects fits well. For example, regression (1.2) predicts
that the total average treatment effect for donations of $15 and $20 will be 3 and 4 tasks while the indicator
regression finds the effects to be 3 and 4.5 tasks.
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Table 1.1: Effect of Treatment on Tasks
Allocation
DV: Task Choice
(1) (2)
Donation 0.903∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.064)
Treatment 2.417∗ 0.296
(1.452) (1.152)
Treat × Donation 0.204∗∗
(0.089)
Constant 4.367∗∗∗ 5.413∗∗∗
(0.928) (0.817)
R-Squared 0.208 0.211
Subjects 219 219
Observations 1095 1095
Notes: This table quantifies the results shown in
Figure 1.5. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
subject level, are presented in parentheses. There
are 108 participants in the treatment and 111 in the
baseline.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1.6 shows that baseline participant choices differ by a statistically insignificant two tasks between
low and high signals. However, subjects who received the true signal with 15/16 probability
chose, on average, 5.5 more tasks than those who received the high signal in baseline, and an
average of 5.8 more tasks than all subjects in the baseline. These results are quantified in Table
1.2.
Additionally, we find that 53% of individuals believe signals received in baseline, while
87% of individuals believe signals received in treatment.18 Notably, individual beliefs are highly
predictive of task choice. We find that those who believe the high signal is true are willing to
do an average of 12 more tasks than those who believe the low signal. As appendix Table A.2
shows, this result holds true controlling for signal and treatment.
Lastly, we examine the distributional shift in task choice from baseline to treatment.
18This difference is significant at the 1% level. See appendix Table A.7. Beliefs by signal and treatment are
shown in Figure 1.7.
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Notes: This figure plots the average number of tasks subjects were willing to complete in exchange for a $20
donation by treatment and signal. The high signal stated that more than 50% of previous participants were willing
to complete at least 20 tasks while the low signal stated less than 25% were willing to complete 20 tasks. In
concordance with image signal extraction, subjects chose to do significantly more tasks when they receive the high
signal in treatment – where there is a 15/16 chance of receiving the true signal – than in the baseline – where there
is an 8/16 chance of receiving the true signal. Brackets represent standard errors.
Figure 1.6: Average Tasks Choice by Signal, Treatment
The figures and tables we refer to in this analysis can be found in the appendix. Assuming
monotonicity, Figure A.1 shows that the treatment effect is delivered by those who would have
otherwise chosen to do fewer than 20 tasks in the baseline. This is reflected in Tables A.3 and A.4.
Table A.3 demonstrates that 73% of treatment participants choose to do at least 20 tasks while
only 52% of baseline participants choose to do 20 or more tasks. Further, quantile regression
results in Tables A.4 and A.5 show that those below the median chose do to significantly more
tasks in response to the treatment, while those above the median do not. Through the lens of our
theory, these results, in conjunction with the results shown in Table A.2, suggest that those who
choose to do fewer than 20 tasks in the baseline do so under the belief that most others made
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the same decision. However, in the treatment, the refined signal corrects their beliefs and they
choose to complete more captchas.19
Our theory relies on signal extraction as the mechanism underlying behavioral changes
following the receipt of social information. Thus, establishing that signal extraction occurs in
practice is vital to demonstrating the viability of our theory as predictive of behavior resulting
from social interactions. Not only should the receipt of more reliable social information alter
behavior, but it should alter individuals’ underlying beliefs which induce this change in behavior.
The results outlined above show that the receipt of a refined signal affects both beliefs and
actions. Further, our results suggest that those individuals whose beliefs change are those that
drive changes in average behavior across treatments.
Table 1.2: Task Choice by Received Signal
DV: Task Choice
(1) (2)
Both Signals High Signal
Treatment 5.847∗∗ 5.511∗
(2.347) (3.129)
Constant 18.062∗∗∗ 19.097∗∗∗
(1.686) (2.616)
R-Squared 0.050 0.040
Observations 119 82
Notes: Column 1 regresses task choice on treatment for
all those in the experiment. Column 2 restricts the same
regression to only those who received the high signal.
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
19A plausible alternative story is that moral wiggle room/wishful thinking leads those who do fewer tasks to
believe that everyone else also did few tasks. However, this story cannot explain why a more refined signal would
correct deliberately chosen beliefs. Such a story would have to incorporate the dynamics of signal extraction wherein
wishful thinking is easier to abide by when the received social information is less precise.
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Notes: This figure plots the proportion of subjects who believed that more than 50% of previous participants
were willing to complete at least 20 tasks by treatment and signal. In concordance with image signal extraction,
participant beliefs are highly dependent on their signals in treatment, where there was a 15/16 chance of observing
the true signal, and unresponsive in baseline where there was a 8/16 chance of observing the true signal. Brackets
represent standard errors.
Figure 1.7: Distribution of Beliefs by Signal, Treatment
1.4 Conclusion
The economic importance of social interactions is well documented. However, there
remain open questions at the core of understanding social pressure (Bursztyn and Jensen,
2017). This project complements existing theories of social conformity by theoretically and
experimentally examining a justification for peer effects absent norms or stigmas. To that end,
we demonstrate that if individuals rely on their own choices as well as social comparisons to
form their self image, they will often mimic the behavior of their peers. With no norm to follow,
(partial) social conformity arises if decision makers are more afraid of learning that they are of
low social type than they are eager to prove that they are of high social type.
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We are able to empirically distinguish our rationalization of peer effects from others
through novel a prediction on the anticipation of social information. Our model predicts that
individuals will make more costly and image-positive choices in anticipation of social information.
We test this prediction in a series of lab experiments. In accordance with our theory, experiment
participants choose costlier actions in anticipation of social information.
Lastly, a potentially relevant literature documents an important relationship between
uncertainty and self-serving preferences (Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009; Exley, 2016). Excuse-driven preferences may exacerbate the effect of perceived signal
interference in image signaling. Therefore, exploring this relationship may provide better
predictive power over the environmental conditions and policy interventions that will catalyze or
mitigate social conformity. Lastly, our theory can be naturally extended to yield predictions on
when individuals will seek or avoid information. Such predictions could potentially be used to
understand when social information is deemed harmful, beneficial, or irrelevant to one’s own
image. Such a research agenda has potentially broad implications for work-place, school, and
social practices and may provide greater predictive power on how to shape peer influence across
diverse social contexts.
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Chapter 2
Procrastination in the Field: Evidence
from Tax-Filing
2.1 Introduction
Present-biased preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001) are crit-
ical for understanding deviations from the neo-classical benchmark of exponentially discounted
utility (Samuelson, 1937; Koopmans, 1960). Prominent anomalies such as self-control problems,
the demand for commitment devices, and procrastination in task performance revolve around the
tension between long-term plans and short-term temptations inherent to these models.
Identifying present-biased preferences from field data faces a natural challenge. Though
the forces of short-term temptations may be observed in behavior, researchers will rarely have
access to data on long-term plans. It is potentially for this reason that the body of evidence in
support of present-biased preferences comes largely from laboratory study.1 When field data are
used, evidence of present bias is generally calibrational, based on behavior alone; suggesting
1Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) provide a detailed review of the experimental literature. The
overwhelming majority of such studies employ choices over time-dated monetary payments. There exist important
critiques of this literature related to the fungibility of money. Only a few studies employ measures of consumption
to investigate present bias. See Sprenger (2015) for recent discussion of this literature.
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either that implausibly high levels of exponential discounting would be required to rationalize
an observed data set (see, e.g., Fang and Silverman, 2009; Shapiro, 2005); or that exponential
discounting provides substantially worse fit than a present-biased alternative (see, e.g., Laibson
et al., 2017). One notable exception to this tradition is DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), who
use the distinction between reported plans and observed gym attendance to make inference on
present bias.2
This paper explores present-biased preferences in field data focusing on the often-
discussed problem of procrastination in tax-filing (Slemrod et al., 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999).3 Linking techniques from structural estimation of dynamic discrete choice (Hotz
and Miller, 1993; Arcidiciano and Ellickson, 2011) to empirical strategies from public finance
(Chetty et al., 2011), we propose a ‘missing mass’ method identifying deviations from exponen-
tial discounting. The counterfactual plan of action under exponential discounting is constructed
from the dynamic discrete choice model and contrasted with true behavior, delivering the critical
comparison between plan and behavior. Present-biased procrastination predicts that true filing
close to the tax deadline will exceed counterfactual exponential filing.
Differentiating procrastination from optimal delay is notoriously difficult in settings like
tax filing. First, if costs of filing are stochastic, one should expect to see increased filing close
to the deadline as the option value of future filing diminishes (Slemrod et al., 1997).4 Hence,
increased filing close to the deadline is not sufficient to identify procrastination, a point which
2It should be noted, however, that reported plans in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) come from a different
sample of individuals than most of their observed behavior. Data on reported plans suffer from a general problem
of incentive compatibility: the researcher cannot know if a self-report is what the agent truly believes, and if she
attempts to incentivize this report, then the agent may appear to follow through on their plans only to collect the
incentive. Perhaps for this reason a strand of literature has developed sidestepping the necessity of having both
plan and behavior by providing smoking-gun evidence of sophisticated present bias in the form of commitment
demand (see, e.g., Ashraf, Karlan and Yin, 2006; Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002; Bisin and Hyndman, 2014; Kaur,
Kremer and Mullainathan, 2010; Gine, Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Mahajan and Tarozzi, 2011). Laibson (2015)
provides a recent discussion on the calibrational plausibility of commitment demand in the presence of uncertainty
and commitment costs, indicating that commitment may be the exception rather than the rule in many settings.
3Slemrod et al. (1997) coined the phrase ‘April 15th Syndrome’. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) use tax filing
as their leading example of procrastination predicted by dynamic inconsistency.
4Slemrod et al. (1997) explicitly notes the potential importance of stochastic costs in rationalizing the observed
distribution of filing behavior including both heterogeneity and late filing. Though the authors term late filing
behavior ‘procrastination’ they note explicitly that their rationalization is dynamically consistent.
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calls into question a number of studies that infer present bias from delay alone (e.g., Brown
and Previtero, 2014; Brown, Farrell and Weisbenner, 2016; Frakes and Wasserman, 2016). This
project overcomes this issue by explicitly recognizing stochastic costs in the construction of both
our exponential benchmark and our present-biased alternative. Second, behavioral models of
present bias make use of additional parameters beyond the exponential discounting formulation.
Hence, improved in-sample fit for the behavioral model should largely be expected, precluding
strong inference on this basis. This project overcomes this issue by linking our estimates with
both responses to changing filing incentives and experimental measures of time preferences to
provide out-of-sample tests for our estimated models. Third, in the specific context of tax-filing,
Internal Revenue Service data generally only provides the date which the tax return is processed
and not the date of filing (Slemrod et al., 1997; Benzarti, 2015), generating a non-standard
measurement error problem for the timing of behavior.5 This project overcomes this issue by
using precise data on tax return initiation.
In a sample of 22,526 low-income tax filers in the City of Boston from 2005 to 2008,
we identify a substantial missing mass in filing behavior relative to an exponential benchmark.
Despite a high degree of estimated impatience under exponential discounting, we document a
wide deviation between actual and predicted filing probabilities as the end of the tax season
approaches. These deviations deliver a missing mass of around 80% additional tax filers relative
to the exponential benchmark in the last seven days prior to the deadline.
We interpret our missing mass as evidence of present-biased procrastination in filing and
5Slemrod et al. (1997) use the 1998 Internal Revenue Service Individual Model File of 95,000 tax returns for the
1988 tax year appended with the date assigned by the IRS Service Center upon receipt. Reference is subsequently
made to the date of processing throughout the text and more than than 25% of returns occur in the second half of
April (April 17th was the deadline in 1989). Note is made of the potential for IRS delays in assigning dates for
returns received during ‘the last-minute surge of filings in April’ (p.698). Slemrod et al. (1997) make use of the
1979-1988 Statistics of Income Panel to conduct longitudinal analysis. The process date is not available in this panel
so they use the week at which the return was posted to the IRS Individual Master File and note that the median
posting is beyond the tax filing deadline, but that substantial correlation exists between the posting weeks and the
process dates. Benzarti (2015) also makes use of the Statistics of Income Panel posting dates and relates them to
itemized deductions. As alluded to by Slemrod et al. (1997), a non-standard measurement error problem may be
generated if one wishes to use IRS process or posting dates as a proxy for filing times. The correlation between
filing dates and process dates is likely influenced by the number of filers. Hence, the concordance between the true
measure and the proxy changes through time and is likely worst close to the deadline.
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bolster this interpretation with three pieces of evidence. First, the data can be rationalized with a
relatively small degree of present bias close to recent empirical estimates. This gives calibrational
support to our interpretation. Second, within our sample period lies the 2008 Economic Stimulus
Act, which generated plausibly exogenous variation in filing benefits for 2008 Stimulus Payment
recipients.6 If individuals were as impatient as our exponential estimates imply, they should
exhibit no response to these additional filing benefits.7 In contrast, difference-in-difference
estimates suggest stimulus recipients file around 2 days earlier under the stimulus, a sensitivity
that is well predicted out-of-sample by our estimated degree of present bias. Third, we have access
to a sub-sample of 1114 individuals who completed incentivized time preference experiments in
2007 and 2008. This sample allows us to link experimental measures of present bias to deviations
from exponential discounting in tax filing behavior. The gap between exponentially-predicted
and actual filing behavior correlates strongly with our experimental measures. Present-biased
subjects file disproportionately later than exponential prediction relative to other experimental
subjects, and this difference is most pronounced towards the end of the tax filing season.
The methods implemented and the results obtained in this paper contribute to several
strands of literature in behavioral economics and the broader field.
First, our methods identify behavioral anomalies in field behavior by relying on structural
estimation of a specific, neoclassical model to construct the counterfactual benchmark. A
growing body of empirical projects identify behavioral forces using measures of missing mass
relative to a traditional atheoretic benchmark such as a smooth or unchanging distribution of
behavior (see, e.g., Rees-Jones, 2013; Benzarti, 2015; Allen et al., Forthcoming). Use of such
minimally parametric counterfactuals is ideal for examining the adherence of behavior to a class
of similar smooth theories or where the benchmark theory requires only such minimal restrictions.
6It should be noted that the timing of the 2008 Stimulus Payments did not depend on the timing of tax-filing.
However, in the advertisement of the program, the IRS clearly conveyed linkages between tax filing timing and
Stimulus Payment receipt. See section 2.2 for discussion and details.
7The 2008 Economic Stimulus Act generated additional payments on the order of $300- $600 for many families.
The IRS conveyed that these payments would be received several weeks after the filers normal refund. With our
estimated extreme impatience such additional later benefits are discounted almost to zero. See section 4.3 for further
detail.
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In many cases, however, researchers may be interested in using missing mass methods to reject
a single model of behavior rather than a class thereof, or generating a test of a more nuanced
model prediction. Using structural techniques to guide counterfactual construction can help to
generate tight tests of underlying models in such cases. The specific dynamic discrete choice
techniques implemented for our problem are readily portable to other intertemporal problems
where researchers may be interested in potential deviations from exponential discounting.8
Second, and related to the point above, once a single counterfactual model of behavior
is rejected, many candidate theories may arise to ‘rationalize’ the missing mass. As carefully
demonstrated by Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2016) for the case of bunching estimators,
different candidate theories could make dramatically different predictions for responsiveness
to key policy variables. Assessing the predictive validity of our favored candidate theory by
examining responsiveness to the exogenous changes in filing incentives induced by the 2008
Stimulus Payments is a key contribution of this paper. Such out-of-sample steps are particularly
important to take if candidate theories are behavioral, as appeal to additional free parameters
in behavioral models will generally deliver greater in-sample fit. We are aware of no such
out-of-sample tests in the prior literature for present-biased preferences. DellaVigna et al.
(Forthcoming) provides one recent demonstration of the value of such exercises for behavioral
models of reference dependence in the context of job search.9
8One recent example of such a setting is Heffetz, O’Donoghue and Schneider (2016), who investigate delay in
payment of parking tickets in New York. The authors demonstrate a sharp increase in the hazard rate of payment
around a first penalty deadline. They also show a sensitivity of behavior to changed notification policy. The authors
interpret the data as evidence of forgetting, and note the plausibility of present bias but the challenge of identifying
such time preferences in their setting. Our method for estimating present bias outlined in section 4.2 (with some
adjustments for multiple deadlines and assumptions about the role of notifications) may be helpfully applied.
Additionally, projects such as Brown and Previtero (2014); Brown, Farrell and Weisbenner (2016) and Frakes and
Wasserman (2016), which infer present bias from delay alone, could potentially yield sharper conclusions with the
implementation of such methods.
9DellaVigna et al. (Forthcoming) examine exit from unemployment under reference-dependent preferences
and show their preferred model not only rationalizes job finding hazard rates better than a standard model but also
provides improved prediction for responsiveness to changes in the structure of unemployment insurance benefits.
DellaVigna et al. (Forthcoming) also include a second behavioral parameter beyond reference dependence in the
form of present bias. Their objective in doing so is to consider a more broad model accounting both for patterns of
asset accumulation and job search. Present bias in their setting acts in a very similar way to extreme impatience, and
hence, serves primarily a calibrational role. However, the outlined estimation strategy is of general value. Indeed,
their assumption full naivete for this exercise inspired our own. See section 4.2 for detail.
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Third, we use experimental measures of time preferences to validate our interpretation
of present bias in tax filing. Importantly, our experimental measures come from choices over
time-dated monetary payments. A growing discussion in the behavioral literature has questioned
the use of such measures given the fungibility of money (Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris,
Laibson and Schuldt, 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger,
2015; Carvalho, Meier and Wang, 20016; Dean and Sautmann, 2016). Given the low income
of our sample and the plausibility of liquidity constraints, in our setting there may be reason
to believe experimental responses are driven by true preferences rather than arbitrage.10 Our
findings demonstrate such plausible informativeness given that our measures relate to apparent
procrastination in filing behavior. This also complements the recent contributions of Mahajan and
Tarozzi (2011), who show that experimentally elicited preference measures can be productively
incorporated into structural approaches in this domain.11
Fourth, our paper delivers potentially policy relevant measures of present bias for the
population in question. With credible estimates of such preferences, we can identify not only
those individuals who are likely to have procrastinated in their tax filing, but also conduct
welfare analysis for a number of potential policy interventions. Among these analyses is an
evaluation of the recently enacted Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015,
which embargoed the entire refund of Earned Income Tax Credit recipients until February 15th
for the 2017 tax filing season. We evaluate such measures under both exponential discounting
and present-biased preferences, providing an input to evaluating elements of tax policy that have,
10Our data give us some opportunity to examine the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of expected
income. In survey response, we find an average MPC of around 0.75. This relatively high MPC echoes findings
such as Souleles (1999), who documents a quarterly MPC out of refunds of around 0.65 on average, though largely
spent on durables. Our subjects overwhelmingly report intending to spend on bill and debt payment as well as
non-durables, with only fifteen percent of respondents report intentions of spending in such categories as paying for
a home, car, home-improvements or school. See Table 1 for detail.
11Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) incorporate experimental measures for time inconsistency, beliefs about disease
infection, and purchase and treatment decisions for insecticide treated bednets to estimate the extent of present bias
and ‘sophistication’ thereof. In their setting the experimental measures are used directly in estimation, while in
ours they are used for validation ex-post. One point noted by Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) is that in their case the
experimental measures themselves wind up having limited predictive power for estimates of present bias that result
from their structural exercise.
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to our knowledge, not yet received attention.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the data and the experimental proce-
dures. Section 3 then presents our empirical design and the construction of our missing mass
measures. Section 4 presents results, and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data
Our exercise makes use of three key data sources: 1) tax filing data from the City
of Boston, Massachusetts; 2) variation in tax refunds due to the 2008 Stimulus Act; and 3)
experimental measures of time preferences from tax filers in 2007 and 2008.
2.2.1 Tax Filing Data
The data in this paper comes from 22 Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) sites in
Boston, Massachusetts from the years 2005 to 2008. VITA sites are organized by the City of
Boston and the Boston Tax Help Coalition. VITA sites provide free tax preparation assistance
to low-to-moderate income households in specific neighborhoods in order to help them claim
valuable tax credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Boston’s VITA sites began
in 2001 and continue to present. As of the 2015 tax filing season there were 27 VITA sites
in operation around the city, processing a total of 12,940 returns and securing around $22.8
million in refunds of which $8.6 million were EITC payments (see bostontaxhelp.org for current
information and details).
VITA sites generally open in mid-January and close at the tax filing deadline around April
15. Most sites have specific days and hours of operation, though some are open by appointment
only. Potential filers are encouraged to bring all required documentation (photo ID, W2 forms,
1099 forms, etc.) to the VITA site. Sites have an in-take coordinator who provides filers with
a check-list of required documents. Filers are usually processed on a first-come, first-served
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basis and waiting times at popular sites can be substantial during busy periods. Upon reaching
the front of the queue, the tax-filer meets with a volunteer preparer, the return is entered, and
subsequently filed with the Internal Revenue Service electronically.
In 2005 and 2006 we have access to the date the return was electronically filed, while
in 2007 and 2008 we have both the date the return was initiated and the date the return was
filed. Around 80% of returns in our final sample are filed within two days of initiation in 2007
and 2008, delivering a close correspondence between when returns are initiated and when they
are electronically sent to the IRS. As the deadline approaches, the correspondence grows, with
around 90% of returns filed within two days of initiation during the last week of the tax season.12
Critical for the present study, we are able to observe the full return information including the
date each return was initiated and/or electronically filed, whether any refund would be received
via direct deposit or paper check, and the size of federal refunds.
From 2005 to 2008 a total of 32,641 tax returns were initiated at VITA sites. Of these,
26,040 (87.6%) were filed electronically with documented acceptance by the IRS in our data.13
To have the most precise measure possible for when individuals decide to file, we use the
electronic filing date from 2005-2006 and the initiation date from 2007-2008 as our measured
filing date. We recognize that the 2005-2006 filing times may slightly overstate the timing of
tax filing relative to 2007-2008, and so also provide all estimates using only the latter years for
which precisely measured initiation data are available14.
We restrict the sample along several other dimensions for our study of procrastination.
First, we remove 212 (0.8%) individuals who have filing dates after the filing deadline. Second,
we focus on only the 11 weeks prior to the deadline such that the majority of subjects can be
12The mean (median) filing lag for 2007 and 2008 is 2.3 (0) days, and in the last week of the tax season the mean
(median) filing lag is 0.8 (0) days.
1328,606 returns were ever sent to the IRS. Of these 2215 (7.7%) returns have a documented rejection. Though
many of these returns were subsequently filed and accepted, our data have the initial electronic filing date overwritten
by the subsequent filing. For a further 352 (1.2%) returns, we have no documented acceptance. We are hesitant to
use these data as we are unsure either of the first filing date or of when, if ever, a refund was received.
14To to this end, we reproduce our primary estimation results, shown in table 2.2, with only 2007 data. The
results can be found in appendix table B.2
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expected to have received their primary tax documents such as W2s.15 This eliminates 621
(2.4%) observations. Third, we focus only on subjects with weakly positive refunds, eliminating
a further 1457 (5.6%) filers.16 Fourth, we eliminate 1174 (4.5%) individuals with zero dollars
of taxable income and zero dollars of refund. Such individuals would not generally need to file
taxes, but do so likely because of the 2008 Stimulus Payments which provided rebates to such
filers.17 Fifth, a small number of subjects, 65 in total, appear to file on Sundays when VITA sites
are generally closed and no electronic filing should be possible. We believe these special cases
correspond to appointments or VITA site workers filing on their own behalf and, hence, drop
these observations as well. In total, these restrictions eliminate 13.5% of observations leaving a
usable sample of 22,526 individual tax filings.
Table 2.1, Panel A presents summary statistics for our sample across the four years of
our study. Tax filers are around 38 years old, earn around $17,000 in adjusted gross income,
and receive sizable federal refunds of around $1,400. Tax filers have slightly more than half
a dependent, and around 10% of subjects receive unemployment benefits in any given year.
In addition to the above measured socio-demographics which are captured directly from tax
returns, VITA sites also ask tax-filers to complete a socio-demographic survey to identify gender,
race, and education levels. Response rates for these questions vary from 77% to 78%. Panel B
demonstrates that conditional on responding, the majority of tax filers report they are female,
African-American, and without college experience.
Table 2.1, Panel C presents two important time related variables: the number of days until
the filing deadline and whether or not a tax-filer opts to receive their refund by direct deposit.
In order to identify the number of days until the tax filing deadline we subtract the deadline
15Our empirical exercise will require individuals to project whether individuals with similar characteristics will
file in the next period. Including the relatively sparse data outside of 11 weeks, generates some missing or extreme
projections.
16Because or tax filers have relatively low incomes, they generally receive substantial proportional refunds
associated with the EITC and other tax credits. Our empirical exercise estimates an optimal stopping problem with
costs of filing and refund benefits. We do not explicitly model the kink in incentives associated with filing beyond
the deadline and incurring a tax penalty if one has a negative refunds. With negative refunds, individuals will have
incentives primarily to file close to the deadline.
17Indeed, 906 of 1174 (77.2%) individuals who fall into this category are observed in 2008.
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date from the filing date. On average filing occurs 44 days before the tax filing deadline with
substantial heterogeneity. Individuals who receive their refund by direct deposit can expect to
receive their refund substantially earlier than those who do not. Given that only 40% of our
sample opts for direct deposit, this presents potentially important cross-sectional variation in the
timing of refund receipts.18
Our estimation strategy attempts to estimate preferences from the timing of tax filing and
refund receipt. A critical question is what tax refunds are used for. Prior estimates of marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) from tax refunds show that as much as 65% of each dollar of
refund is consumed within a quarter, and, for liquidity constrained individuals, refund receipt
leads to substantial increases in non-durable consumption (Souleles, 1999). Recognition of such
high MPCs and the plausibility of liquidity constraints is important in our sample as our baseline
estimation strategy implicitly assumes that the timing of refund receipts perfectly correlates with
the timing of consumption.19 In Table 2.1, Panel D we examine the self-reported intentions of
refund use for responding individuals. First, individuals were asked which of 16 non-exclusive
categories their refund would be used for.20 Eighty percent of respondents who reported at least
one category reported intending to use the refund to pay bills or debts21, and twenty-eight percent
of respondents reported a non-durable category such as buying groceries or going shopping22.
Fifteen percent of subjects reported a durable category such as purchasing a car or home23.
Twenty-four percent of subjects reported a savings category such as saving for a home or a rainy
18Each year (through 2012) the IRS provided tax-filers with a refund cycle linking electronic filing and acceptance
dates to dates when direct deposits would be sent and paper checks would be mailed. In general, accepted returns
are batched by week and paper checks are mailed one week after direct deposits are sent. For our baseline estimate
we ignore the discontinuities in refund receipt induced by this batching protocol as it is unlikely that tax-filers
in our sample would have access to such information. Additionally, the data do not appear to reflect the batch
discontinuities with individuals bunching close to batch endpoints.
19In section 4.1.1 we relax this assumption, assuming the refund is consumed over a one-month horizon.
20The categories were: ‘Buy Groceries’, ‘Pay Bills’, ‘Pay Back Debts’, ‘Pay Old Taxes’, ‘Go on Vacation’,
‘Go Shopping’, ‘Buy a Home’, ‘Save for a Home’ ‘Pay Medical Bills’, ‘Buy a Car’, ‘Save for a Car’, ‘Pay Child
Expenses’, ‘Pay for School’, ‘Save for School’, ‘Save for a Rainy Day’, and ‘Home Improvement’.
21The relevant choices in this category are ‘Pay Bills’, ‘Pay Back Debts’, ‘Pay Old Taxes’, ‘Pay Medical Bills’,
and ‘Pay Child Expenses’.
22The relevant choices in this category are ‘Buy Groceries’, ‘Go on Vacation’, and ‘Go Shopping’.
23The relevant choices in this category are ‘Buy a Home’, ‘Buy a Car’, ‘Pay for School’, and ‘Home Improve-
ment’.
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day24. That the majority of refunds were intended for consumption is echoed in respondents
self-reported savings intentions. Individuals were asked what percentage of their refund they
intended to save in one of five categories.25 The mean self-reported savings percentage is around
24%, indicating an intended MPC out of refund of around 0.75. Further, that 80% of respondents
report intending to use refunds for payment of bills or debts indicates limited access to liquidity.
2.2.2 Economic Stimulus Act 2008
A key component of our exercise attempts to predict sensitivity of filing behavior to the
exogenous change in filing incentives provided by the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. Under
the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (H.R. 5140) passed on February 7, 2008, tax filers earning
less that $75,000 ($150,000 for joint filers) received ‘Recovery Rebates’ between $300 and
$1200, depending on filing status and income levels. The Stimulus Payments were announced in
February 2008. In practice, these payments were generally disbursed between late April and July
of 2008 depending on the social security number of the tax filer. In 2008, 90% of the filers we
observe qualified to receive Stimulus Payments. Appendix Figure B.1 presents the histogram of
Stimulus Payments calculated from individual tax return data.26
Prima-facie, the 2008 Stimulus Payments, whose values were based on predetermined
income and demographics, could provide for exogenous variation in refund sizes and give
potential for difference-in-difference investigation across recipients and non-recipients. However,
the timing of tax-filing had no true impact on the receipt of the Stimulus Payments and hence
did not truly influence the intertemporal tradeoffs. Nonetheless, it is not clear that tax filers
24The relevant choices in this category are ‘Save for a Home’, ‘Save for a Car’, ‘Save for School’, and ‘Save for
a Rainy Day’.
25The categories were: ‘0%’, ‘<10%’, ‘10-25%’, ‘25-50%’, and ‘>50%’. We take the midpoint of the interval
implied by response (bottom coded for ‘0%’ responses), as the self-reported savings intention.
26The 2008 stimulus rebate took two forms. The first was allocated according to filing status, tax liability,
adjusted gross income, and number of dependents. The second was allocated according to filing status, number of
dependents, adjusted gross income, social security, and other qualifying income. The first type was phased in and
out according to AGI. Each individual received the larger of the two rebates. The exact formula is detailed in the
“Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of H.R. 5140.” Using each individual’s 1040A data we calculated
their rebates with python script.
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at VITA sites, or anyone else for that matter, were aware of this point. The initial February
2008 announcement did not clarify that the timing of Stimulus Payments was decoupled from
dates of tax-filing, but noted only that the payments would begin being made in May of 2008.27
Furthermore, the IRS’ documentation of the Stimulus Payments may have created the impression
that Stimulus Payment timing was linked to filing dates. Filers examining the Frequently Asked
Questions website related to the Stimulus Payment asking ‘When will I receive my Stimulus
Payment?’ were told28:
Processing times for tax returns and Stimulus Payments vary. If you are getting
a regular tax refund, the IRS will send you that refund first. Normally, your
Stimulus Payment will follow one to two weeks later.
Such information likely gave filers the impression of a tight link between filing times and
Stimulus Payment receipt. Hence, the 2008 Stimulus Payments generated plausibly exogenous
variation in the benefits of filing. In Section 2.4.2 we use the 2008 Stimulus Payment data
and attempt to predict responsiveness to these changing filing incentives under our estimated
preferences out-of-sample.
2.2.3 Experimentally Elicited Time Preferences
For a subsample of tax filers, we have independent measures of time preferences elicited
using experimental methods. In 2007 and 2008 at one VITA site, in Roxbury, MA, we conducted
incentivized intertemporal choice experiments throughout the tax filing season. These data are
discussed in detail in Meier and Sprenger (2015), which analyzes stability of elicited preferences
at the aggregate and individual level.29 A total of 1902 individuals in our sample received
27Appendix B.5 reproduces the IRS announcement. Additionally, the actual process of payment was not
described in the technical description of the Stimulus Payments. Appendix B.6 reproduces the relevant portions of
the technical explanation of the revenue provisions of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.
28See https://www.irs.gov/uac/Economic-Stimulus-Payment-Q&As:-When-Will-I-Get-the-Payment%3F for
details. This website was updated in July 2008 likely to reflect the volume of payment to date.
29Meier and Sprenger (2015) demonstrate stable choice profiles and corresponding parameter estimates at both
levels and a one-year correlation in behavior of around 0.5. Instability in experimental choice is largely orthogonal
from demographics or changes in financial situation.
34
tax-filing assistance in 2007 and 2008 at the Roxbury VITA site. Of these, 1,794 filed their
taxes on one of the days the experiment was conducted and were eligible to participate. In both
years VITA site intake material included identical, incentive-compatible choice experiments
to elicit time preferences. The choice experiments were presented on a single colored sheet
of paper and were turned in at the end of tax-filing for potential payments (see below). The
experimental paradigm is presented as Appendix B.7. 1296 individuals, (72.5%) elected to
participate. Appendix Table B.1 presents observable characteristics of our experimental subjects
and compares them to the observables of non-participating subjects at the Roxbury VITA site.
Experimental subjects appear similar on observables to non-participating subjects.
Individual time preferences are elicited using identical incentivized multiple price lists in
both 2007 and 2008 (for similar approaches to elicit time preferences, see Coller and Williams,
1999; Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002; McClure et al., 2004; Dohmen et al., 2006; Tanaka,
Camerer and Nguyen, 2010; Burks et al., 2009; Benjamin, Choi and Strickland, 2010; Ifcher
and Zarghamee, 2011). Individuals were given three multiple price lists and asked to make
a total of 22 choices between a smaller reward, X, in period t and a larger reward, Y > X , in
period t+ τ > t. We keep Y constant at $50 and vary X from $49 to $14 in three time frames.
In Time Frame 1, t is the present, t = 0, and τ is one month. In Time Frame 2, t is the present,
and τ is six months. In Time Frame 3, t is six months from the study date, and τ is again one
month. The order of the three time frames was randomized. Appendix B.7 provides the full set
of choices.
In order to provide an incentive for truthful choice, 10 percent of individuals were
randomly paid one of their 22 choices (for comparable methodologies and discussions, see, e.g.,
Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002). This was done with a raffle ticket, which subjects took at
the end of their tax filing and which indicated which choice, if any, would result in payment.
To ensure credibility of the payments, we filled out money orders for the winning amounts on
the spot in the presence of the participants, put them in labeled, pre-stamped envelopes and
sealed the envelopes. The payment was guaranteed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
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and individuals were informed that they could always return to the head of the VITA site (the
community center director) where the experiment was run to report any problems receiving the
payments. Money orders were sent by mail to the winner’s home address on the same day as
the experiment if t = 0, or in one, six, or seven months, depending on the winner’s choice. All
payments were sent by mail to equate the transaction costs of sooner and later payments. The
details of the payment procedure of the choice experiments were kept the same in the two years
and participants were fully informed about the method of payment.
The multiple price list design yields 22 individual-level decisions between smaller, sooner
payments X and larger, later payments Y . We term the series of decisions between X and Y a
choice profile. We make one restriction on admissible choice profiles: that the choices satisfy
monotonicity within a price list.30 Roughly 86% of our sample, or 1114 individuals satisfy this
restriction
In order to identify present bias from the observed choice profiles, we examine choices
made in Time Frame 1 (t = 0,τ = 1), and Time Frame 3 (t = 6,τ = 1). Let X∗1 be the smallest
value of X for which an individual chooses X over Y in Time Frame 1, and let X∗3 be the smallest
value of X for which an individual chooses X over Y in Time Frame 3. An individual is coded as
Present-Biased if X∗1 < X
∗
3 , having expressed more patience over six vs. seven months than over
today vs. one month. Similar measures for identifying time preferences from experimental data
have been employed by Coller and Williams (1999); Harrison et al. (2005); McClure et al. (2004);
Dohmen et al. (2006); Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010); Burks et al. (2009); Benjamin, Choi
and Strickland (2010); Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011); Meier and Sprenger (2010). Of our 1114
subjects, 360 (32%) are classified as Present-Biased.31
30That is, individuals do not choose X over Y and Y over X ′ if X ′ < X . This restriction is equivalent to focusing
on individuals with unique monotonic switch points and individuals without any switch points in each price list. The
level of non-monotonicity obtained in our data compares favorably to the level obtained in other multiple price list
experiments with college students, where around 10% of individuals have non-unique switch points (Holt and Laury,
2002) and is substantially below some field observations where as many as 50% of individuals exhibit non-unique
switch points (Jacobson and Petrie, 2009). For non-monotonic subjects we are unable to have a complete record
of their choices as we measure only their first switch point and whether they switched more than once. Price list
analysis often either enforces a single switch point (Harrison et al., 2005) or eliminates such observations.
31111 (10%) of subjects are classified as Future-Biased with X∗1 > X
∗
3 . The remaining 643 subjects (58%) exhibit
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In Section 2.4.3, we link this experimental measure of present bias to deviations from
exponential discounting in tax filing behavior.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We construct and estimate optimal stopping models for the timing of tax filing based
on the techniques from dynamic discrete choice. Estimates are generated for both exponential
discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting and counterfactual distributions for predicted filing
patterns can be contrasted with actual filing behavior. Our methodology and notation borrows
heavily from the formulations of Hotz and Miller (1993); Arcidiciano and Ellickson (2011). For
space considerations, Appendix B.2 provides a more detailed presentation than that provided
here.
2.3.1 Tax Filing as Exponential Dynamic Discrete Choice
An individual’s decision to file taxes can be viewed as an optimal stopping problem. In
each period before the filing deadline, the individual decides whether to incur a realized cost and
receive the benefit of sooner receipt of their refund, or to wait to file on a future date. Though
all individuals in our sample receive positive refunds, and hence face no penalty for late filing,
we assume the costs of filing become sufficiently high once the VITA sites close such that no
individual ever desires or forecasts filing after the deadline.32
There are N individual tax filers, indexed by i. Time is discrete, indexed by t, with T
denoting the period of the tax deadline. In each period, tax filers take actions ait . They either
decide to postpone filing (ait = 0) or to file (ait = 1). Let fit denote the individual’s filing status
in period t such that fit = 1 if the individual has not yet filed by period t−1 and fit = 0 if the
individual has filed by period t−1. We assume that each individual will receive a positive refund,
X∗1 = X
∗
3 consistent with exponential discounting.
32In principle, individuals with positive refunds have three years to file and claim their refunds from the IRS.
After three years, the funds become the property of the United States Treasury.
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bi, constant through time and known to the researcher and the filer. This refund is to be received
in a fixed number of periods, k, after filing. The state variables known to the researcher are
xit = ( fit ,bi), which is is Markov.
We assume that costs of filing have both a fixed and an idiosyncratic component. The
fixed costs of filing are denoted by c and the time-varying idiosyncratic shocks are denoted by
εit . These shocks are contemporaneously observed by the filer but unobserved to the researcher.
These shocks may depend on the choice of filing and hence we write ε(ait). We assume ε(ait) is
independent and identically distributed over time with pdf g(ε(ait)). This is an unknown state
variable.
Filer utility is additively separable. The utility of filing in period t is
δ kbi− c+ ε(1)
when ait = 1 and fit = 1. The variable δ k is a k period exponential discount factor homogeneous
in the population of filers. Utility is ε(0) if ait = 0 and fit = 1. As such, the flow utility can be
written
u(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait) = ait fit(δ kbi− c)+ εit(ait).
With these flow utilities, the filer maximizes the present discounted value of filing-related utilities
by choosing α∗i , a set of decision rules for all possible realizations of observed and unobserved
state variables in each time period. That is,
α∗i = arg maxαiEαi
T
∑
t=1
δ t−1[u(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait)].
In Appendix B.2, we implement the methodology of Hotz and Miller (1993); Arcidiciano and
Ellickson (2011) with εit(ait) drawn from the Type-1 extreme value distribution to construct the
likelihood function for and exponential discounter’s filing in a given period, ait = 1it , conditional
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on not having filed yet fit = 1 as
pδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi)=
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pδ (ai,t+1 = 1| fi,t+1 = 1,bi))
] .
The decision maker trades off the discounted consideration of receiving their refund one day
earlier against the discounted considerations of paying their filing costs a day earlier and their
forecast that they actually will file the next period, pδ (ai,t+1 = 1| fi,t+1 = 1,bi). One important
observation from Hotz and Miller (1993) is that under rational expectations the one period ahead
conditional choice probability can simply be calculated from the data. Given the simplicity
of our problem — finite time, simple state space and transition probabilities — one can also
simply construct these beliefs at a given parameter constellations, (δ ,c) in each iteration of the
estimation routine.
Note that we only need to consider those periods up until the time when the person files.
Once they file, the utility consequences of filing are eliminated and the likelihood contribution
is zero for such observations. Let Di be the filing date of a given individual. The grand log
likelihood is written as
L =
N
∑
i=1
[
Di
∑
t=1
ln[pδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi)]
]
. (2.2)
Identification
From the likelihood of (1), we wish to estimate the parameters δ and c. It is worth
noting that exercises of this form suffer generically from identification problems (Rust, 1994).
The underlying issue is that monotonic transformations of the instantaneous utility function
will yield identical choice rules and hence identical likelihoods. Normalizations and functional
form assumptions are often invoked to deliver credible estimates of remaining parameters. One
frequent normalization is to assume a specific one period discount factor (Bajari, Benkard and
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Levin, 2007; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).33
Our environment differs in a compelling way from most exercises in that filing costs and
benefits are not experienced in the same period. The fact that k > 0 delivers the opportunity to
estimate both δ and c from the data. Naturally, this is in the presence of our additional functional
form assumptions and normalizing post-filing payoffs to zero.
To understand the intuition of how k > 0 allows us to estimate both δ and c lets consider
the filling probabilities in time periods T −2 and T −1. Recall that the likelihood for filing in
any given period is
pt =
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)b− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pt+1)
] , (2.3)
where pt , pt+1 are the probabilities of filing in period t and t + 1 conditional on not
having filed beforehand. In the final period, T , all individuals file, pT = 1; ln(pT ) = 0, and so
the penultimate period filing,
pT−1 =
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)b− (δ −1)c] ,
is driven only by the core incentives of discounted costs and benefits,[
(δ k+1−δ k)b− (δ −1)c]. Two individuals with parameter combinations (δ ,c) 6= (δ˜ , c˜) such
that
[
(δ k+1−δ k)b− (δ −1)c] = [(δ˜ k+1− δ˜ k)b− (δ˜ −1)c˜] = Q, will have the same penulti-
mate period filing probabilities. However, moving back one more period reveals the intuition
behind the identification. Though these two individuals have the same penultimate period
probability, from the perspective of T −2 they assess this future probability differently,
33The identification of the discount factor in dynamic discrete choice settings has received substantial theoretical
attention. Several potential paths forward have been proposed that are not reliant of functional form for identification.
One is using variation that changes transition probabilities but do not change contemporaneous utilities (Magnac
and Thesmar, 2002). This technique has been usefully applied by Fang and Wang (2015) and Mahajan and Tarozzi
(2011) not just for identifying the discount factor, but also for present bias. We are not aware of a variable that can
serve such a purpose in our setting.
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pT−2(δ ,c) =
1
1+ exp [Q−δ ln(pT−1)] 6=
1
1+ exp
[
Q− δ˜ ln(pT−1)
] = pT−2(δ˜ , c˜).
In particular, if 1 > δ > δ˜ then pT−2(δ ,c) < pT−2(δ˜ , c˜). That is, the more patient
individual appreciates the likelihood of future filing more and is less likely to file at period T −2.
More generally speaking, how do different parameter combinations of (δ ,c) effect the
evolution of pT−t through each period T − t? We know from the above that pT−1 is determined
by the core incentives of discounted costs and benefits,
[
(δ k+1−δ k)b− (δ −1)c]. Furthermore,
in Appendix B.3.1 we show that pL = limt→∞ pT−t > 0 and that
(1− pL)pδ−1L = p−1T−1−1.
That is, while core incentives determine the penultimate period filing probability and
the option value it embodies, the weighting of this option value by δ determines the limit.
Additionally, in Appendix B.3.2 we demonstrate that distinct pairs of discounting and cost
parameters can produce identical filing probabilities on at most one time prior to day T .34
Therefore, we know that for (δ ,c) 6= (δ˜ , c˜) such that pT−1 = p˜T−1 if δ > δ˜ , then pL < p˜L and
pT−t < p˜T−t for all t > 1.35
2.3.2 Estimating Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
In our setting, the methodology of dynamic discrete choice can be augmented to estimate
present-biased preferences. We assume quasi-hyperbolic β −δ discounting of the form proposed
34In Appendix B.3.3, we also detail this point via simulation. We show in (δ ,c) space that level sets of
conditional filing probabilities for multiple periods tightly overlap when k = 0, indicating that many parameter
constellations lead to the same probabilistic choice behavior. When k > 0, these level sets separate, implying
differential intertemporal pattens of probabilistic behavior for different parameter combinations. Of additional note
is that for different values of k > 0, the same parameters lead to (at times notably) different filing probabilities.
Hence, differential direct deposit use, which generates differences in k, delivers additional identifying variation.
35This follows from equation (2) and the fact that if pT−t < p˜T−t and δ > δ˜ , then −δ ln(pT−t)>−δ˜ ln(p˜T−t).
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by Laibson (1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). An individual is assumed to discount between
the present and a future period with discount factor βδ , but discount between any two future
periods with discount factor, δ alone. If β < 1 the individual is ‘present-biased’, while if β = 1,
the individual behaves as an exponential discounter.36 The quasi-hyperbolic model elegantly
delivers deviations from exponential discounting such as self-control problems, procrastination
being one potential manifestation. Because such models feature inconsistencies between long
run plans and short run behavior, they require the researcher to provide a formulation of the
individual’s beliefs about their own predilection to be present-biased in the future. For our
analysis we make the analytically tractable, but admittedly extreme, assumption that individuals
are naive with respect to their present bias. That is, they believe that in the future they will
behave as if β = 1. This assumption is used and the simplification it generates for analysis
of consumption-savings decisions is discussed in Laibson et al. (2017) and DellaVigna et al.
(Forthcoming).37 Our naive present-biased likelihood formulation extends these prior efforts to
dynamic discrete choice, providing a purposefully simple method for estimating present bias in
such settings.
Incorporating present bias into our estimation procedure requires several steps. First, as
noted above, our exponential formulation assumes rational expectations. A naive present-biased
individual deviates from rational expectations in the sense that he believes his filing behavior will
follow the path of an exponential discounter rather than the true path. As such the true, rational
expectations filing probability p(1it |1it ,bi) does not reflect this decisionmaker’s belief. However,
the assumption of naivete proves useful in this environment. For a given δ and c, one can solve
for the path of beliefs via backwards induction as
pn(ait = 1| fit = 1,bi) = 11+ exp[(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pn(ai,t+1 = 1| fi,t+1 = 1,bi))]
36Additionally, the case of β > 1 is termed ‘future-biased’.
37It should be noted, however, the assumption of full naivete would be inconsistent with the literature on
commitment demand described in footnote 2.
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and pn(ai,T = 1| fi,T = 1,bi) = 1. With pn(ai,t+1 = 1| fi,t+1 = 1,bi) as the forecasted future
behavior, we can then estimate β via maximum likelihood under the assumed value of δ and
c using similar methods as 2.3.1.38 The likelihood contribution for the critical case of fit = 1
becomes
pβδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi)
=
1
1+ exp
[
β (δ k+1−δ k)bi− (βδ −1)c−βδ ln(pn(ai,t+1 = 1| fi,t+1 = 1,bi))
] .
In effect, the estimator replaces the rational expectations beliefs inherent to our exponential
construction with naive beliefs, and then estimates present bias using these systematically
miscalibrated forecasts.
2.3.3 Constructing Counterfactuals
Maximum likelihood estimation of the above dynamic discrete logits provide parameter
estimates for exponential discounting and the costs of filing, δˆ and cˆ, and, in the case of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting a present bias parameter, βˆ . With these parameters in hand one can
construct the counterfactual distribution of filing behavior through backwards induction at the
estimated values. For example, under exponential discounting one solves for
pˆδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi)=
1
1+ exp
[
(δˆ k+1− δˆ k)bi− (δˆ −1)cˆ− δˆ ln(pˆδ (ai,t+1 = 1| fi,t+1 = 1,bi))
] ,
38The derivation of this expression is presented in Appendix B.4
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with pˆδ (aiT = 1| fiT = 1,bi) = 1. The first natural counterfactual distributions for behavior are
the average fitted conditional filing probability,
pˆδ (at = 1| ft = 1) =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
pˆδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi)
pˆβδ (at = 1| ft = 1) =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
pˆβδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi).
These counterfactual distributions could be compared to their empirical analog, p˜(at = 1| ft = 1),
for all periods until period T −1.39
From the conditional filing probabilities, one can construct additional counterfactuals for
other aspects of filing behavior. First, one can construct the probability of filing unconditional on
the contemporaneous filing status, fit , as
qˆδ (ait = 1|bi) = pˆδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi) Πt−1s=0(1− pˆδ (ais = 1| fis = 1,bi)),
qˆβδ (ait = 1|bi) = pˆβδ (ait = 1| fit = 1,bi) Πt−1s=0(1− pˆβδ (ais = 1| fis = 1,bi)).
Then one can construct the number and percentage of filers at t (e.g., ∑Ni=1 qˆδ (ait = 1|bi) and
100
N ∑
N
i=1 qˆδ (ait = 1|bi) under exponential discounting). Additional useful constructs are the
expected average refund value at t,
bˆδ ,t =
∑Ni=1 qˆδ (ait = 1|bi)×bi
∑Ni=1 qˆδ (ait = 1|bi)
,
bˆβδ ,t =
∑Ni=1 qˆβδ (ait = 1|bi)×bi
∑Ni=1 qˆβδ (ait = 1|bi)
,
39In period T , the filing probability is assumed to be 1 and all remaining individuals will file by construction.
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and the expected filing date for individual i,
tˆ∗δ ,i =
T
∑
t=0
qˆδ (ait = 1|bi)× t,
tˆ∗βδ ,i =
T
∑
t=0
qˆβδ (ait = 1|bi)× t.
These values, as well, can be compared to their empirical analogs.
2.4 Results
We present the results in four steps: First, we present baseline estimates of exponential
discounting and missing mass deviations therefrom. Second, we present estimates of present-
biased preferences, rationalizing the deviations from exponential discounting in filing behavior
at reasonable parameter values. We also briefly discuss a number of alternative specifications
retaining exponential discounting that fail to credibly account for the observed filing patterns.
Third, we use the 2008 Stimulus Act to examine the out-of-sample validity of our estimated
present-biased model for predicting sensitivities of filing times to changes in filing incentives.
Fourth, in a sub-sample of around 1100 subjects we link deviations from exponential discounting
in filing behavior to experimental measures of present bias to provide further validation for our
behavioral interpretation of the data.
2.4.1 Exponential (δ ) Discounting, Quasi-Hyperbolic (β -δ ) Discounting,
and Excess Mass
Figure 2.1 presents histograms of filing behavior in each year from 2005 to 2008. The
figure shows that a large proportion of individuals file early in the tax filing season, with the
numbers declining until approximately day 50. From day 50 to the end of the season a pronounced
increase in filing is observed. Roughly 9% of filers arrive at VITA sites in the last seven days of
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Figure 2.1: Filing Times and Refund Values
operation each year. Also presented in Figure 2.1 is the average refund value among filers each
day. The average value of refunds declines regularly from the beginning of the tax filing season
to the end.
Our estimation techniques link refund values, filing times, and the timing of refund
receipts via structural models of dynamic discrete choice. A critical component of this procedure
is the forecasted future conditional filing probabilities arrived at via rational expectations. In
the first approach, we construct bin estimates for conditional filing probabilities in each year
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using deciles of refund values.40 For each year, on each day VITA sites are open, in each
decile of refund value, we calculate the empirical proportion of individuals who have yet to
file who file on that day. A total of 4589 bins are constructed delivering corresponding bin
estimates for conditional filing probabilities, p˜(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi). In the second approach, we
calculate the stream of forecasts, and hence pˆ(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi), in each iteration of the likelihood
maximization.
Table 2.2: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
βˆ 1 1 0.857 0.865
- - (0.011) (0.011)
δˆ 0.536 0.530 0.99999 0.999993
(0.003) (0.007) - (0.040)
cˆ 3.341 3.40 3.459 3.025
(0.017) (0.001) (0.062) (0.082)
# Observations 1,010,387 1,038,245 1,038,245 1,038,245
Log-Likelihood -65402.38 -67565.92 -65950.99 -65918.86
Notes: Column 1 provides maximum likelihood estimates for δ and cost of filing
with observed filing probabilities (β = 1 assumed). Column 2 provides estimates for
δ and cost with simultaneous forecasts. Column 3 estimates β and cost with simul-
taneous forecasts (δ fixed). Column 4 estimates β , δ and cost with simultaneous
forecasts. δ is estimated as δ = 11+eφ in columns 2, and 4. In columns 2 and 4 the
standard error for φ is reported.
Table 2.2, columns (1) and (2) present aggregate parameter values based on these two
techniques under the assumption of exponential discounting using the data from 2005 to 2007.
The data from 2008 and out-of-sample analysis of the 2008 Stimulus Payments are presented
in section 2.4.2. In column (1) we estimate both the discount factor, δ , and filing cost, c,
40One minor hurdle to creating such values is that VITA sites are closed on holidays and Sundays. We address
this by altering our measure of time to reflect only those days where the VITA sites are open each year. A total
of 65 days in the tax filing season remain. Note that recognizing a change in the effective timing of choices also
requires us to change the intertemporal tradeoffs built in to our estimator. Recall from section B.2.1 that we are able
to assume that the terminal option is taken in the next period. To account for days that the VITA sites are closed
on Sundays and holidays we simply assume that the next period is two periods away resulting in the conditional
probability p(1it |1it ,bi) = 11+exp[(δ k+2−δ k)b−(δ 2−1)c−δ 2ln(p(1i,t+2|1i,t+2,bi))] .
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finding an average filing cost of cˆ = 3.341 and a discount factor of δˆ = 0.536.41 In column (2),
with forecasts pˆ(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi) generated in each iteration of the likelihood, we find virtually
identical results.
In order to capture empirical regularities of not disproportionately filing early, individuals
must substantially discount their filing benefits. Hence, receiving a sizable refund in several
weeks’ time can be outweighed by modest filing costs. Estimates of discount factors in the range
observed from Table 2.2, columns (1) and (2) imply discount rates far below empirical rates of
interest. When such extreme impatience is required to rationalize empirical behavior in field
settings, researchers often appeal to calibrational arguments to reject exponential discounting
(Fang and Silverman, 2009; Shapiro, 2005). In contrast, in experimental settings it is not unusual
to identify individual discount rates in the hundreds of percents per year (see, e.g., Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). Our exercise takes the exponential estimates as a valid
benchmark and examines the adherence of true intertemporal patterns of filing to predicted
behavior under the estimated exponential model.
Figure 2.2 presents predicted and actual filing behavior for 2005-2007. In Panel A,
we examine average predicted and actual conditional filing probabilities. The dashed line
represents the exponential prediction, pˆδ (at = 1| ft = 1), using the estimates from from Table
2.2, column (2). Predicted and actual conditional filing probabilities correspond closely early
in the filing season, but diverge as the tax deadline approaches. On the final two days, the true
filing probability exceeds pˆδ (at = 1| ft = 1) by around 30 percentage points.42 The exponential
41As discussed in section 2.3.1, our discount factor has two sources of identification. The first comes from the
formulation of the problem, yielding differences between the timing of costs and benefits. Without k > 0, separate
estimation of δ and c would be impossible. In Appendix Table B.4, we reconduct the analysis of Table 2.2 with the
assumption of k = 0 for all filers. These estimates show the hallmarks of identification problems with flat likelihoods,
sensitivity to starting values and, at times, failed convergence. The second comes from the timing impacts of direct
deposit. In Appendix Table B.5 and B.6, we provide separate estimates for individuals with and without direct
deposit, showing qualitatively similar, though substantially less precise estimates across the two groups.
42It is important to note that the presented counterfactual distribution is an in-sample prediction. Exercises of
missing mass generally leave out a region of interest for estimation. As the focus of our project is procrastination,
our primary region of interest is the last seven days of the tax-filing season. In Appendix A.1, we reconduct our
estimation removing the last seven days of the tax filing season (Table B.7). As one might expect, misprediction at
the end of the tax filing season increases substantially when the last seven days are excluded from estimation. In
order to provide more conservative estimates for missing mass we use the full data set for estimation.
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Notes: Panel A: 2005-2007 real conditional filing probabilities, p˜(1t |1t), predicted time-consistent filing probabilities,
pˆδ (1t |1t), and predicted present-biased filing probabilities, pˆβδ (1t |1t), throughout the tax season with t = 64
corresponding to the day before the tax deadline. Panel B: 2005-2007 real unconditional filing probabilities,
q˜(1t |1t), predicted time-consistent unconditional filing probabilities, qˆδ (1t |1t), and predicted time-inconsistent
unconditional filing probabilities, qˆβδ (1t |1t). Panel C: Observed average daily refund values and predicted average
daily refund for time-consistent and present biased models. All predicted values generated from exponential
discounting with δˆ = 0.530 and cˆ = 3.40 (Table 2.2, column (2)) and from quasi-hyperbolic discounting with
βˆ = 0.865, δˆ = 0.999993 and cˆ = 3.025 (Table 2.2, column (4)).
Figure 2.2: Predicted and Actual Filing Behavior
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counterfactual dramatically underpredicts filing probabilities at the end of the tax season.43
Figure 2.2, Panels B and C present daily filing percentages and average refund values
for the days of VITA site operation, and also provide corresponding model predictions. Dashed
lines in both panels correspond to the exponential predictions 100N ∑
N
i=1 qˆδ (at = 1|bi) and bˆδ ,t ,
respectively. The estimated exponential model over-predicts the percentage of individuals
who file early in the season, with substantial under-prediction as the tax deadline approaches.
Interestingly, because the model predicts so few people will file during the middle of the tax
season, it provides a slight overestimate for the number of filers the day before the deadline.
Panel C also highlights that the aggregate estimates predict less sensitivity of filing times to
refund values than exists in the data. This result is sensible: given the high degree of impatience,
dissimilar refund values have quite similar discounted implications.44
Table 2.3, Panel A presents estimates of excess mass relative to the exponential benchmark
for both conditional and unconditional filing probabilities.45 On average, from T −7 to T −1,
p˜(at = 1| ft = 1) exceeds pˆδ (at = 1| ft = 1) by nearly 16%-age points. Implementing the
bootstrap procedure of Efron and Tibshirani (1994), we find the difference between observed and
predicted behavior to be highly significant. Stated in unconditional terms, from T −7 to T −1
an average of 0.65% of filers are predicted to arrive each day, while 1.18% actually do. This
equates to around 82% more filers than expected by our counterfactual exponential predictions.
43In Appendix Figure B.2, we present an alternate counterfactual, ˆˆp(1t |1t), based on the empirical one-period
ahead conditional filing probabilities as opposed to backwards induction. Such a counterfactual makes use of
the true one-period ahead behavior, rather than the model’s prediction and hence delivers a much less smooth
counterfactual distribution. Relative to this benchmark, as well, substantial missing mass is observed.
44In Appendix Figures B.3 and B.4, we reconstruct Figure 2.2 separately for individuals who receive their refund
by paper check versus direct deposit. This figure demonstrates that the 60% of individuals receiving paper check are
predicted to have virtually constant refund values throughout the tax season. For such a high degree of impatience
almost all values of refunds are discounted to a common base of zero. The model fit for direct deposit refund
recipients is substantially better.
45To construct these tests we use a standard stratified bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). Our bootstrap
proceeds in four stages. First, stratifying by year, we independently resample the data set 500 times, constructing
each time the one period ahead conditional filing probability bin estimates for the given sample. Second, we
implement our maximum likelihood estimation on each sample. This yields 500 estimates of δˆ and cˆ. Third, using
these estimates we generate 500 counterfactual distributions for filing behavior. Fourth, we take the difference
between the resampled observed filing behavior and counterfactual filing behavior. This yields a distribution of 500
missing mass estimates upon which statistical tests can be implemented.
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Table 2.3: Excess Mass Results
Excess Conditional Probability Excess Unconditional Probability
p˜(at = 1| ft = 1)− pˆ(at = 1| ft = 1) q˜(at = 1| ft = 1)− qˆ(at = 1| ft = 1)
Panel A: Exponential Predictions:
T −1 : T −7 Average 0.157*** 0.0053***
(0.004) (0.0002)
Panel B: Quasi-Hyperbolic Predictions:
T −1 : T −7 Average 0.0218*** 0.0018***
(0.002) (0.0004)
Notes: Estimates of excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and
the excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t), over the seven
days prior to the tax deadline. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses from
500 bootstrap samples.
The data compellingly reject the estimated model of exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.530
and cˆ = 3.40.46
The results of Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3 demonstrate substantial deviations between
actual behavior and predictions based on exponential discounting. Table 2.2, columns (3) and
(4) present estimates of quasi-hyperbolic discounting using the method described in section
2.3.2. In column (3) we fix δ = 0.99999 and estimate present bias, β and costs, c. Costs are
estimated to be close to the prior estimates, cˆ= 3.46, and present bias is estimated to be βˆ = 0.86.
Interestingly, this value of present bias is close to recent empirical estimates for present bias
from intertemporal effort choices (Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger, 2015; Augenblick and
Rabin, 2016).47 In column (4), we conduct the same analysis estimating δ within the likelihood,
and reach quite similar conclusions.48
Allowing for present bias dramatically alters the extent of excess mass at the end of the
tax filing season. In Figure 2.2, we conduct predictions for conditional filing, unconditional filing,
46Figure 6, Panel A presents the inconsistency between exponentially predicted and actual values in a comple-
mentary way. Using predicted and actual filing days, it demonstrates that from 2005 to 2007 the estimated values,
δˆ = 0.530 and cˆ = 3.40, lead to predicted filing times that are 2 to 4 days earlier, on average, than actual filing
times.
47Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015) estimate β = 0.88 and Augenblick and Rabin (2016) estimte
β = 0.83 from intertemporal effort choices.
48Explanation of challenges for starting values.
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and estimated refund values over time for the estimates of Table 2.2 , column (3). The solid lines
in each panel represent these estimates. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting with a relatively modest
degree of present bias, β = 0.86, matches intertemporal patterns in conditional and unconditional
filing probabilities as well as the evolution of refund values through time.49 Table 2.3 contrasts
the excess mass identified under exponential discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The
average excess conditional filing probability in the final week reduces by around 85% under
the quasi-hyperbolic formulation, while the excess unconditional filing probability reduces by
around two-thirds. Reasonable parameter values of present bias, close to other recent estimates,
provide a credible account for empirical filing behavior.
The results to here indicate that our formulation of exponential discounting fails to match
key intertemporal patterns in filing behavior, while quasi-hyperbolic discounting provides a much
more coherent account of the data. Because the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model appeals
to an additional degree of freedom, its improved fit should be expected. A natural question is
whether alternate degrees of freedom, retaining the exponential formulation, can also provide a
high degree of in-sample fit. In Appendix B.1, we evaluate a number of exercises investigating
such degrees of freedom in the form of extreme costs, extreme shocks, and heterogeneity in
discounting and costs along observables. In each case, key patterns of filing behavior remain
unaccounted for. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that improved in-sample fit for the behavioral
model relative to the neoclassical benchmark proves only the value of that specific degree of
freedom and does not constitute a test of the model. In the next sections, we move out-of-sample
to provide the required tests.
49In Appendix Figures B.6 and B.7 we reconstruct Figure 2.2 separately for individuals who receive their refund
by paper check versus direct deposit. This figure demonstrates that the behavior of both paper check and direct
deposit refund recipients is well matched by the aggregate estimates, with sensitivity in filing times to refund values
predicted for both groups.
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2.4.2 Response to Changing Incentives: 2008 Stimulus Payments
Rationalizing behavior in-sample with β − δ discounting is important, but does not
constitute a stringent test of present-biased preferences. Given that the behavioral model adds
a parameter to the standard exponential formulation, one should not be overly surprised by its
improved fit. Here, we examine responses to the exogenous changes in filing incentives imposed
by the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 to provide an out-of-sample validation for our behavioral
interpretation.
In Figure 2.3, we provide a difference-in-difference investigation of whether receiving a
2008 Stimulus Payment induced earlier filing. Using the parameters of the 2008 Stimulus Act,
we calculate (without adjusting for inflation) the value of each individual’s potential Stimulus
Payment for 2005, 2006, and 2007. We present mean filing dates (solid lines in both panels) for
individuals who would and would not receive Stimulus Payments from 2005 to 2008. In years
prior to 2008, those with and without potential Stimulus Payments follow very similar trends
with potential recipients filing earlier.50 In 2008, the trends diverge. Those without Stimulus
Payments in 2008 continue to file later in the tax season, while those with Stimulus Payments
file earlier.
Given the apparent response to the 2008 Stimulus Payments, a natural question is how
well 2008 filing behavior is predicted both in general and with respect to the sensitivity of filing
to Stimulus Payments. For both our estimated benchmark model of exponential discounting,
Table 2.2, column (1), and present bias, Table 2.2, column (3), we can predict each individual’s
conditional filing probability in 2008, pˆδ (1it |1it ,bi) and pˆβδ (1it |1it ,bi), respectively. Similarly,
we can construct expected filing days, tˆ∗δ ,i and tˆ
∗
βδ ,i.
51 Hence, we can examine whether our
estimates reliably reproduce the patterns in filing behavior in general and the apparent sensitivity
to Stimulus Payments.
50The earlier filing of potential recipients is likely due to the Stimulus Payment’s income threshholds and the
larger proportional refunds for lower-income individuals in the sample.
51These values take into account for each individual not only their standard refund, but also their projected 2008
Stimulus Payment. In order to develop this projection, we assume that the Stimulus Payment will be received 14
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Along with true filing times, in Figure 2.3 we present (dotted lines) mean predicted filing
times under exponential and β −δ discounting, respectively. These predictions are in-sample for
2005-2007 and out-of-sample for 2008. Echoing our missing mass analysis, Panel A demonstrates
that the exponential model’s predicted filing times are two to four days earlier than true filing
times during the in-sample period. Importantly, because of the extreme estimated degree of
impatience under exponential discounting, the model predicts effectively no responsiveness to
the changing incentives generated by the 2008 Stimulus Payments. In contrast, the estimated
model of present bias both matches the difference between potential recipients and non-recipients
from 2005-2007 and closely predicts the observed sensitivity to stimulus receipt.
Table 2.4 shows the results of Figure 2.3 in more detail. Column (1) provides corre-
sponding regression analysis of the true day of filing, t∗i . The results show that receiving a
Stimulus Payment in 2008 (coefficient of variable Interaction) induced tax filers to arrive 1.92
(s.e. = 0.98) days earlier.52 Adding control variables in columns (2) and (3) does not change
the results dramatically. Potential stimulus recipients file earlier in the years 2005 to 2007 and
disproportionately so in 2008, the year of the stimulus.
Table 2.4, columns (4)-(9) provide predicted difference-in-difference estimates for the
exponential and β −δ predictions – corresponding to the dotted lines in Figure 2.3. In contrast
to the exponential predictions of columns (4)-(6), columns (7)-(9) demonstrate that β − δ
discounting delivers a plausible account both of the average filing times and of the sensitivity
of filing times to the 2008 Stimulus Payments. The predicted mean response to the stimulus
of 2.34 (s.e. = 0.10) days in column (7) under β − δ preferences closely matches the true
sensitivity of around 2 days. Appendix Figures B.8 and B.9 reproduce the Figures 2 and 5 for
days after the refund. For example for exponential discounting,
pˆ(1it |1it ,bi) = 1
1+ exp
[
(δˆ k+1− δˆ k)b+(δˆ k+14+1− δˆ k+14)r− (δˆ −1)cˆ− δˆ ln(pˆ(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))
] ,
where r is the Stimulus Payment, with pˆ(1iT |1iT ,bi) = 1.
52Appendix Table B.8 provides a placebo test, turning on the Stimulus Payments in 2007 as opposed to 2008.
Null effects of Stimulus Payments are observed, supporting the view that earlier filing dates for payment recipients
in 2008 are truly due to the Stimulus Payment and not other factors.
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Panel A: Exponential Prediction (tˆ∗) Panel B: Present-Biased Prediction (tˆ∗βδ )
Notes: Mean filing dates, t∗, for potential stimulus recipients (diamonds) and non-recipients (circles) from 2005 to
2008. Panel A: predicted filing date, tˆ∗, from exponential discounting for stimulus recipients and non-recipients with
δˆ = 0.536 and cˆ = 3.341, from Table 2.2, column (1). Predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007 and out-of-sample
for 2008, the year of the Stimulus Payments. Panel B: predicted filing date, tˆ∗βδ , from quasi-hyperbolic discounting
with δ = 0.99999, c = 3 and β = 0.92, from Table 2.2, column (4). Predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007 and
out-of-sample for 2008, the year of the Stimulus Payments.
Figure 2.3: Filing Dates, Stimulus Payments, and Out-of-Sample Predictions
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filing probabilities and refund values in 2008 under the two models, again showing improved
out-of-sample prediction for present bias.
Table 2.4: Predicted and Actual Difference-in-Difference Effect of Stimulus Payments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. t∗i tˆi∗ tˆ∗i,βδ
Observed Filing Day Exponential Predicted Filing Day β -δ Predicted Filing Day
1Stimulus Payment > 0 -3.731*** -1.079* -0.797 -2.044*** 0.690*** 0.782*** -4.852*** -0.229*** -0.155***
(0.545) (0.574) (0.593) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.064) (0.020) (0.017)
1Year = 2008 1.682* 1.781* 1.744* 0.031 0.119 0.114 -0.036 0.056 0.048
(0.944) (0.945) (0.943) (0.022) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.041) (0.034)
Interaction -1.919* -1.647* -1.766* -0.299*** -0.073 -0.062 -2.346*** -2.136*** -2.154***
(0.983) (0.982) (0.981) (0.056) (0.080) (0.079) (0.103) (0.044) (0.037)
Constant 30.722*** 31.619*** 31.618*** 25.766*** 26.664*** 26.691*** 31.408*** 32.009*** 32.008***
(0.520) (0.523) (0.527) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.005) (0.008)
# Observations 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525 22525
Control Set 1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control Set 2 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression for difference-in-difference effect of Stimulus Payment. Columns (1-3): Dependent variable is actual filing day, t∗. Columns
(4-6): Dependent variable is predicted filing day, tˆ∗ under exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.536 and cˆ = 3.341, from Table 2.2, column (1). Columns (7-9): Dependent
variable is predicted filing day, tˆ∗βδ , from quasi-hyperbolic discounting with δ = 0.99999, c = 3 and β = 0.92, from Table 2.2, column (4). Columns (4-6) and (7-9)
predictions are in-sample for 2005-2007 and out-of-sample for 2008, the year of the Stimulus Payments. Standard errors in parentheses.
Control Set 1: Refund, AGI, Direct Deposit Status.
Control Set 2: Number of Dependents, Taxable Income, Earned Income, Social Security Benefits, Filing Status Binaries (2008 stimulus act determinants).
Levels of significance: *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
2.4.3 Experimental Present Bias and Tax Filing Behavior
In addition to examining out-of-sample predictive power for β − δ in filing behavior,
our environment provides independent means for identifying present-biased preferences. As
described in detail in section 2.2.3, we elicited time preferences experimentally for a subsample
of around 1100 individuals in 2007 and 2008.
For each experimental subject we can link their experimental measure of present bias,
Present Biasedi, to their individually fitted pattern of exponential conditional filing probabilities,
pˆ(1it |1it ,bi), and their exponential expected filing date, tˆi∗.53 Figure 2.4, presents real and
53In order to construct the predicted conditional filing probabilities in-sample for each individual, we re-estimate
the baseline exponential model of Table 2.2, column (1) including the 2008 data (and the Stimulus Payments).
The corresponding parameter values are effectively unchanged from those reported in Table 2.2, column (1) with
δˆ = 0.527 and cˆ = 3.295. From these estimates we construct the counterfactual pˆ(1it |1it ,bi) for each individual via
backwards induction.
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predicted conditional filing probabilities separately for present-biased and not present-biased
subjects. Because our experiment is conducted at only one VITA site, which was not open every
day of the tax season, a number of days have no individuals filing. Hence, Figure 2.4 provides 5
day running averages beginning at the tax deadline and moving backwards.54
Different patterns of mis-prediction are apparent across present-biased and non present-
biased subjects. Though predicted conditional filing probabilities are similar across the two
groups, real behavior is markedly different. Present-biased subjects file with higher probability
close to the filing deadline and provide greater deviations between predicted and actual behavior
than their non present-biased counterparts.
Table 2.5 provides corresponding analysis. In column (1), we regress predicted expo-
nential conditional filing probabilities, pˆt(1it |1it ,bi), on the day of the tax season, an indicator
for Present Biased, and their interaction. Present-biased subjects do not differ in terms of their
predicted filing dates at any part of the tax season. In column (2), we present an identical regres-
sion with true conditional filing probabilities, p˜(1it |1it ,bi), as dependent variable. Present-biased
subjects indeed file with lower probability at the beginning of the tax season and with greater
probability at the end of the tax season. In column (3), we present regressions with the difference,
p˜(1it |1it ,bi)− pˆ(1it |1it ,bi), as dependent variable. Present-biased subjects are found to file with
lower probability than expected early in the tax filing season and with higher probability than
expected late in the tax filing season. Columns (4)-(6) repeat this analysis with the exponentially
predicted and actual filing times, tˆi∗ and t∗i , as dependent variables. Experimentally measured
present bias is predictive of filing later in the tax season and filing later than the exponential
model prediction. Table 2.5 demonstrates the plausibility of interpreting our measures of missing
mass as evidence of procrastination. Experimental measures of present bias are tightly linked to
the exponential model’s mis-prediction of filing behavior close to the tax deadline.
54The unsmoothed figure is provided in Appendix A.1 Figure B.10 and presents qualitatively similar, albeit
noisier results.
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Notes: 2007-2008 predicted and real conditional filing probabilities, pˆ(1t |1t) and p˜(1t |1t), throughout the tax season
with t = 64 corresponding to the day before the tax deadline. Panel A: Present-Biased Subjects (n= 360). Panel B:
Not Present-Biased Subjects (n= 754) All predicted values generated from exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.527
and cˆ = 3.295. Data smoothed with 5 day running average.
Figure 2.4: Predicted and Actual Filing Probabilities by Present Bias
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Table 2.5: Present Bias and Deviations from Exponential Prediction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional Filing Probability Filing Day
Dependent Variable: Predicted Observed Difference Predicted Observed Difference
pˆt(1it |1it ,bi) p˜(1it |1it ,bi) p˜(1it |1it ,bi)− pˆt(1it |1it ,bi) tˆi∗ t∗i t∗i − tˆi∗
Present Biased (=1) 0.0002 -0.0081*** -0.0083*** -0.0121 2.5545** 2.5666**
(0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.1687) (1.1365) (1.1156)
Present Biased x Day 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0003** - - -
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Day 0.0000 0.0011*** 0.0011*** - - -
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0372*** 0.0072*** -0.0300*** 23.5255*** 31.1844*** 7.6588***
(0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0987) (0.6722) (0.6556)
R-Squared 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.005
# Filers 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
# Observations 36736 36736 36736 1114 1114 1114
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression for relationship between experimental measure of present bias, predicted and actual filing behavior. Columns (1)
through (3): Dependent variables constructed from exponentially predicted and observed conditional filing probabilities, pˆt(1it |1it ,bi) and p˜(1it |1it ,bi).
Columns (4) through (6): Dependent variables constructed from predicted and observed filing times: tˆi∗ and t∗i . Predicted values constructed under
exponential discounting with δˆ = 0.527 and cˆ = 3.295. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual in columns (1) through (3), robust in
columns (4) through (6).
Levels of significance: *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Procrastination is a critical deviation between long term plans and short term behavior,
inconsistent with the neoclassical formulation of exponential discounting. Recognizing the
challenges of identifying behavioral models of such deviations in field data, this paper presents a
way to potentially identify present-biased procrastination. Combining methods from structural
estimation of dynamic discrete choice and inference from missing mass, we show a way in which
deviations from a specific model of exponential discounting can be measured. We compare real-
ized tax-filing behavior to counterfactual estimates from an optimal stopping problem developed
under the assumption of exponential discounting. In a sample of around 22,000 low-income tax
filers, realized and exponentially-predicted distributions of filing probabilities differ dramatically
as the tax deadline approaches. The existence and location of the missing mass in tax filing
behavior is consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting with a moderate degree of present bias.
This interpretation of present bias is bolstered by out-of-sample prediction for the sensitivity
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of filing times to the 2008 stimulus payments, and incentivized experimental measures of time
preferences.
The results presented here rely on linkages across a diverse set of prior research and may,
similarly, have implications across a range of fields. First, the paper shows that using structural
estimation to develop counterfactual distributions for behavior may valuably expand the scope of
missing mass exercises and sharpen corresponding tests. When using a structural benchmark,
one need not rely (as is tradition) on a smooth counterfactual distribution through a point of
potentially changing incentives to identify missing mass. Further, one knows precisely the model
rejected when realized deviations are observed. Though these points are general, we believe that
specific behavioral applications in intertemporal choice could be readily implemented. Stopping
problems of the form examined here such as submitting applications, paying bills, changing
retirement plans or credit cards, and mortgage refinance abound, and corresponding behaviors are
often anecdotally linked to present-biased preferences. A valuable line of research could emerge
from precise structural investigation of the extent to which behavior deviates from exponential
benchmarks in these settings. While we show that our missing mass is compellingly rationalized
by a form of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, many alternative models exist. Future work should
investigate other models of time preferences and relax our critical assumption of naı¨vete´.
Second, the paper provides both a rationalization for the observed deviations from
exponential discounting and a corresponding out-of-sample validation exercise. Given that many
candidate theories can rationalize an observed deviation from a given model, such tests should
be viewed as a necessary step to exercises of this form. Different candidate theories could have
quite different predictions or welfare implications and so knowing the most appropriate one
becomes a critical input both for further study and policy discussion. We believe our exercise
shows a path forward particularly for exercises that ascribe behavioral motivations to findings of
missing mass. When candidate rationalizations include behavioral models with additional free
parameters, better in-sample fit should be viewed as relatively weak evidence of model success.
Third, our interpretation of present bias is bolstered in this paper by incentivized experi-
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mental measures. A prominent discussion in the behavioral literature has questioned the use of
monetary discounting measures, like ours, for the study of time preferences. In principle, the
fungibility of money renders such choices useless for informing researchers about consumption
preferences, unless subjects are liquidity constrained. Predicting individual differences in procras-
tination in the timing of tax-filing for a sample of likely constrained individuals — presumably a
consumption preference related to labor-leisure tradeoffs— highlights the possibility of using
such methods at times as a measure of preferences. Clearly, more research is needed to fully
understand how, when, and why monetary measures of discounting convey valuable information
on preferences.
Last, the paper can identify and quantify procrastination in the field for the low income
sample in question. Our results show that roughly seventy-one percent of filers in the last
week before the deadline are potential procrastinators. Though we cannot extrapolate from
this prevalence among low-income filers to the broader population, there may be reasons to be
interested in this population specifically. Low income individuals access a number of government
services in a similar way to our intertemporal filing problem. Benefits such as food stamps must
be signed up for initially and the spending of corresponding receipts is a secondary intertemporal
problem. If the level of present bias measured in our sample is indicative of behavior in accessing
and spending such benefits, policy makers may well be interested in altering the timing of costs
and benefits to achieve coverage and smoothing objectives. Such targeted policy discussions are
now equipped with a key observation on the potential extent of procrastination and present bias.
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Chapter 3
A Test for Risk-Averse Expected Utility
3.1 Introduction
The recent contribution of Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) provides a GARP-like test
for risk-averse expected utility maximization in a contingent-consumption environment. In an
environment with a single consumption good and finite states of the world, they establish an
acyclicity condition on observed data which is both necessary and sufficient for a finite list of
observed price and consumption pairs to be consistent with the hypothesis of expected utility
maximization. Thus, their paper provides a counterpart of the classical work of Afriat (1967)
with the added restriction that rationalizations be risk-averse expected utility.
As Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) note, their test is universal in nature, removing all
existential quantification. Their test amounts to verifying that the product of certain cycles
of risk-neutral prices be bounded above by one. Our aim in this note is to provide a different
universal test. Our test should be distinguished from the Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) test
in three ways. First, it applies to any finite number of consumption goods, whereas the test of
Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) only applies for a single consumption good. Secondly, our test is
intimately tied to the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of expected utility theory, and
thus has a simple economic intuition. On the other hand, our test involves universal quantification
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over a potentially infinite number of objects, while the test in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) can
be reduced to universal quantification over a finite set.
We emphasize that what we mean by test is a method for falsifying the model with directly
observable data. In other words, we say a model is testable if whenever data are inconsistent
with the model, they can be demonstrated to be inconsistent. In this sense of the term test, a
demonstration is distinct from an algorithm which would find this falsifying certificate. Hence, a
test in our sense is not intended to be useful from a computational perspective, and as far as we
can tell, ours is not in general. Indeed; there are already practical algorithms for determining
when the expected utility model is falsified in our context. Rather, such a test is important for
understanding the economic content of the model, by specifying a condition stated in terms
of data alone, which does not reference unobservable concepts such as utilities or marginal
rates of substitution. As a point of comparison, the work of Richter (1966) can be understood
as providing the testable restrictions of the preference maximization hypothesis; however, no
general algorithm would exist in Richter’s case either.1
Our test is perhaps most closely related to an early revealed preference test of expected
utility due to Fishburn (1975). Fishburn constructs a test for an abstract environment of choice
over lotteries with finite support. In his setting, one observes a finite set of binary comparisons;
some are weak, and some are strict. Fishburn provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
there to exist an expected utility ranking which extends the observed binary comparisons. Imagine
that we observe lottery lk weakly preferred to lottery l′k for k = 1, . . . ,g, and lk strictly preferred
to l′k for k = g+ 1, . . . ,K. Fishburn establishes that these observations are consistent with
expected utility maximization if there is no probability distribution over {1, . . . ,K} which puts
positive probability on {g+1, . . . ,K}, and for which the mixture of the lk’s under this probability
distribution is equal to the mixture of the l′k’s. Fishburn’s test can be viewed as claiming that the
smallest possible extension of the observed relations satisfying both independence and transitivity
1In the special case where budgets are given by linear inequalities and preference satisfies monotonicity, an
algorithm exists for Richter’s test, namely the Afriat test. Here we refer to the abstract budget environment.
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leads to no contradiction. We stress that Fishburn’s test also presents with no algorithm: no
recipe is given for finding the probability distribution.
In our case, we have n commodities, and a finite set of states Ω = {ω|1,2 . . . ,S}. We
observe a finite list of prices and contingent consumption bundles chosen at those prices
(xk, pk), k ∈ {1, . . .K}. Consumption in state ω at observation k is of the form xkω ∈ Rn+. Proba-
bilities over Ω are known and are given by the full support distribution pi .
We first ask: What could reveal a violation of the joint hypothesis of expected utility
and risk aversion in this context? There are only a finite set of states of the world, with known
probabilities, but if the choices were rationalizable by an expected utility preference, there would
be a natural extension to a preference over the set of all simple lotteries. One such violation
would look like the following: suppose that for each xk, there is some yk which is feasible at
prices pk. In other words, the induced lottery lxk is revealed preferred to the induced lottery
lyk . And suppose that there is some g for which y
g is strictly cheaper than xg at prices pg. In
other words, the induced lottery lxg is revealed strictly preferred to the induced lottery lyg . Now,
suppose we can find, for each k, a lottery l′k which is a mean-preserving spread of lyk . If the data
were rationalizable by a risk-averse expected utility preference, the lottery lxk would be preferred
to l′k for all k (and lxg would be strictly preferred to l
′
g).
We now have a set of K pairs of lotteries (lxk , l
′
k) which could be obtained in the preceding
fashion. These data can be tested with Fishburn’s condition. If, in fact, they violate Fishburn’s
condition, then we know that the original data cannot be expected utility rationalizable.
So far this is very simple. However, in the demand setting, for each observation (pk,xk),
there are usually infinitely many candidates for the above yk, and for each yk, an infinite number
of possible mean-preserving spreads l′k. This would result in an infinite number of possible
{(lxk , l′k)}Kk=1 sets. While the Fishburn condition is sufficient to ensure each {(lxk , l′k)}Kk=1 set
has its own preference extension, it has nothing to say about whether or not there is a single
preference extension for the infinitely many revealed preference relations.
In fact, what we show is the following: If the data are not risk-averse expected utility
64
rationalizable, then there exists at least one set, {(lxk , l′k)}Kk=1, as above, that violates Fishburn’s
condition. In addition, they can be chosen to violate Fishburn’s condition in a very stark way:
one must only test the uniform lottery over {1, . . . ,K}.
Moreover, the support of each l′k can be chosen to consist only of consumption that was
actually observed demanded at some state; i.e. the support can be chosen amongst elements
of the form xkω . This resonates with the idea from Polisson et al. (2015), who observe that in
order to rationalize data, it is both necessary and sufficient to maintain consistency on the set of
minimally extended “imaginary” data, constructed from those actually observed. However, while
Polisson et al. (2015) is concerned with developing Afriat-style algorithms (see Afriat (1967))
for testing decision models with money lotteries, our focus is developing universal statements
about data from lotteries of general consumption bundles, which provides direct falsification of
the expected utility model under risk aversion.
It is important to note that due to the infinite nature of our test, our contribution lies not
in providing a procedure to be implemented to check actual data; for such a test, the readers are
directed to the work by Green and Srivastava (1986). Instead, the main contribution of our test is
that it extends the intuition of the Fishburn test to demand-based observations: whenever the
smallest possible extension of the observed relations satisfying both independence and transitivity
leads to no contradiction, the data are rationalizable by risk-averse expected utility preference.
In addition, the test by Green and Srivastava involves theoretical objects that are not directly
observable, while our conditions directly characterize exactly which types of data are ruled out
by the hypothesis of expected utility maximization, and thus can be interpreted as its UNCAF
axiomatization, when observations are made in a demand-based framework.2
The idea of the proof is remarkably simple, and is a simple restatement of the dual set of
linear inequalities stemming from the Afriat-style inequalities of Green and Srivastava (1986) or
Varian (1983).
2UNCAF stands for universal negation of conjunction of atomic formulas. Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya
(2014) demonstrate that theories which make no non-empirical predictions are exactly those which have UNCAF
axiomatizations.
65
A host of other interesting papers have recently studied choice data in the context
of expected utility maximization. In particular, Echenique and Saito (2015) investigates the
subjective expected utility version of the model, which forms a kind of analogue of the Kubler,
Selden and Wei (2014) test. It would be interesting to propose a test of our structure in the
subjective expected utility framework. Epstein (2000) investigates the empirical content of the
notion of probabilistic sophistication (due to Machina and Schmeidler (1992)), providing a test
which can refute the hypothesis.
3.2 The Model
We assume that there is a finite state space Ω= {ω|1,2, . . . ,S} and a finite collection of
consumption goods, labeled 1,2, . . . ,N. The agent is given an objective probability distribution
over states pi ∈ ∆(Ω), where for all ω ∈ Ω, Pr(ω) = piω > 0. An observation is a pair (p,x),
where p ∈ RSN++ is a list of the prices of all N consumption goods under all S possible states, and
x ∈ RSN+ details the purchased amount of each consumption good under each state of the world.3
We assume that our data set D consists of a K tuple of (x, p) pairs, i.e. D = {(xk, pk)Kk=1}. K is
assumed finite.
In particular,
xk =

xk1
...
xkω
...
xkS

pk =

pk1
...
pkω
...
pkS

3As usual, R++ denotes the positive reals, and R+ the nonnegative reals.
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and
xkω =

xkω,1
...
xkω,N
 pkω =

pkω,1
...
pkω,N

where for all ω,k,n, xkω,n ≥ 0 and pkω,n > 0. Each xk is referred to as a contingent consumption
bundle, and xkω a state-specific consumption bundle. We use C = RNS+ to denote the set of all
contingent consumption bundles.
We say that D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable if there exists a concave,
continuous, and increasing u : RN+→ R for which for all k, xk solves
max
x∈RSN+
∑
ω
piωu(xω)
subject to pk · x≤ pk · xk.4
Given a data set D , we collect all the state-specific consumption bundles xkω observed in
the data:
X = {x ∈ RN+|x = xkω for some k and ωwhere (xk, pk) ∈D}.
Denote the set of all simple lotteries on RN+ with finite support by ∆s(RN+). Denote the set of all
lotteries onX by ∆(X ). Note that ∆(X )⊆ ∆s(RN+).
Any contingent consumption bundle xk ∈C induces an element lxk ∈ ∆(X ), which places
probability piω on xkω . As such, a pair of revealed preference relations C and C can be defined
on ∆(X ):
For x,y ∈ C, lx C ly if x = xk for some (xk, pk) ∈ D and pk · y ≤ pk · x. For x,y ∈ C,
lx C ly if x = xk for some (xk, pk) ∈ D and pk · y < pk · x. C is intended to represented a
revealed weak preference and C a revealed strict preference.
4We take increasing to mean that if x≥ y and x 6= y, then u(x)> u(y).
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Moreover, to test the hypothesis of risk aversion, it is natural to extend the above revealed
preference relations to ∆s(RN+). For example, suppose that lx C ly, and l ∈ ∆s(RN+) can be
obtained by a sequence of mean-preserving spreads of ly.5 If our decision maker’s behavior
is consistent with risk-averse expected utility maximization, it follows that lx should also be
preferred to l. These ideas motivate the following definitions.
For l, l′ ∈ ∆s(RN+), l m.p.s. l′ if l′ can be obtained by a series of mean-preserving spreads
of l. Define the pair of binary relations R and R on ∆s(RN+) by
l R l′′ if there exists l′ such that l C l′ m.p.s. l′′
and
l R l′′ if there exists l′ such that l C l′ m.p.s. l′′
If the agent’s behavior is consistent with risk-averse expected utility maximization,
the pair of relations R,R will necessarily satisfy Fishburn’s condition on ∆s(RN+); i.e. if
lk R l′k for k = 1, . . . ,g, and lk R l′k for k = g+1, . . . ,K, then there are no {µi}Ki=1 ⊆ RK+, with
∑Kk=g+1 µk > 0, and∑
K
1 µklk =∑
K
1 µkl′k. As we show in our main result, it turns out that a sufficient
condition for the data D to conform with risk aversion and expected utility maximization is that
the restriction of R,R to ∆(X ) satisfies Fishburn’s condition.
For every data set D = {(xk, pk)Kk=1}, the following are equivalent:
I For any {l′k}Kk=1 ⊆ ∆(X ) for which lxk R l′k for all k, there is no {µk}Kk=1 ⊆RK+ for which
∑{k:lkRl′k} µk > 0 and ∑
K
1 µklxk = ∑
K
1 µkl′k.
II Suppose that for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ω ∈Ω, Skω : {1, . . . ,K}×Ω→ R+ is a function,
5That is, if there exists a random variable ε such that l d= ly + ε with E(ε|ly) = 0. “ d=” here means “has the
same distribution as”. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) for more details.
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such that for all k,ω , ∑g,τ Skω(g,τ) = piω = ∑g,τ S
g
τ(k,ω). If, in addition, for all k,
pk · xk ≥ pk ·
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
then there is no k for which pk · xk > pk ·
(
∑g∑τ Skω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
.6
III For all ω,τ ∈ Ω and k,g ∈ {1, ...,K} there exist ukw,ugτ ≥ 0 and λk,λg > 0 s.t. ukω ≤
ugτ +λg
pgτ
piτ · (xkω − x
g
τ).7
IV Data set D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable.
Before proceeding, we comment on cases I and II, which are our contribution. Case I
considers the smallest possible preference extension “consistent” with the data, risk-aversion,
and the expected utility hypothesis. It claims that if this extension is meaningfully defined; in
that we cannot derive that a lottery l is strictly preferred to itself, then the data are expected
utility rationalizable. Importantly, we only need to consider lotteries whose support are actual
observed consumption bundles. This can be seen as a natural analogue of Fishburn’s condition
as applied to lxk and l
′
k.
Case II demonstrates a dual system of linear inequalities to the inequalities of case III,
which was derived previously by Green and Srivastava (1986). The interpretation of the terms
Skω is as a system of probability weights. To obtain some intuition on Case II, suppose that the
inequalities therein are satisfied, then one can find a contradiction as follows: For each k, by
demand behavior, the inequalities in Case II imply that the lottery lyk induced by the contingent
consumption bundle
(
∑g∑τ Skω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
is revealed weakly worse than the lottery lxk induced
6
(
∑g∑τ Skω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
=
(
∑g∑τ Sk1(g,τ)x
g
τ
pi1
, . . . ,
∑g∑τ SkS(g,τ)x
g
τ
piS
)
i.e. ∑g∑τ S
k
ω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω is the consumption in state ω .
7Green and Srivistava’s proof of this statement assumes the non-emptyness of u’s superdifferential over Rn+;
however, it is easy to modify their proof even with empty superdifferential on the boundary. Essentially, whenever xg
is known to be a utility maximizer, we can always find ∇u(xgτ) in the superdifferential of u for which ∇u(x
g
τ) = λg
pgτ
piτ
(see Theorem 28.3 in Rockafellar (1997)). So ukω ≤ ugτ +∇u(xgτ) · (xkω − xgτ) = ugτ +λg p
g
τ
piτ · (xkω − x
g
τ).
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by xk, with strict preference for at least one k. Observe that lyk is a lottery that places probability
piω on
∑g∑τ Skω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω . Since ∑g,τ S
k
ω(g,τ) = piω , simple algebra (included in the proof) shows that
the lottery l′k, which places probability weight S
k
ω(g,τ) on x
g
τ , is a mean-preserving spread of lyk .
If the data were really consistent with the hypothesis of risk-averse expected utility maximization,
transitivity would imply that for each k, the lottery l′k should be worse than the lottery lxk , strictly
so for at least one k. We now have in total K revealed preference relations between the pairs of
lotteries lxk and l
′
k. As we demonstrate in the proof, the condition ∑g,τ S
g
τ(k,ω) = piω then allows
us to find a violation by applying the condition from Fishburn (1975) on the lotteries lxk and l
′
k
across all k.
The following example illustrates the theorem.
Example 1 Consider the case k ∈ {1,2}, Ω = {1,2} and N = 2: There are 2 observations,
each consisting of the price and purchased quantity for the consumptions good under 2 possible
states of the world. Suppose each of the two states are equally likely; pi1 = pi2 = .5. Suppose we
observe:
(x1, p1) =


0
0
10
5

,

5
10
5
10


(x2, p2) =


4
2
6
3

,

4
8
5
10


In this case there is no violation of GARP. However, since the hypothesis of risk-averse
EU preference is stronger than than GARP, we show that this case still violates our conditions.
Violation of Statement I: The induced lotteries by x1 and x2 are lx1 =
((10,5),1/2;(0,0),1/2) and lx2 = ((4,2),1/2;(6,3),1/2), respectively. To see that this is a
violation of statement I, consider contingent consumption bundles y1 = y2 = ((5,2.5);(5,2.5))
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which induce ly1 = ly2 = ((5,2.5),1). Clearly p
1 · x1 ≥ p1 · y1, and p2 · x2 > p2 · y2. So by
definition lx1 C ly1 and lx2 C ly2 .
Observe that the lottery l′1 = ((4,2),1/2;(6,3),1/2) is a mean-preserving spread of ly1
and the lottery l′2 = ((10,5),1/2;(0,0),1/2) is a mean-preserving spread of ly2 . By definition
lx1 R l′1 and lx2 R l′2. However,
1
2
lx1 +
1
2
lx2 =
1
2
l′1+
1
2
l′2
This constitutes a violation of Statement I.
Violation of Statement II:
Set S11(2,1) = S
2
1(1,1) =
1
5 , S
1
1(2,2) = S
2
2(1,1) =
3
10 , S
1
2(2,1) = S
2
1(1,2) =
3
7 , and
S12(2,2) = S
2
2(1,2) =
1
14 .
To solve:

0
0
10
5

·

5
10
5
10

> 2 ·

5
10
5
10

·

S11(2,1)∗4+S11(2,2)∗6
S11(2,1)∗2+S11(2,2)∗3
S12(2,1)∗4+S12(2,2)∗6
S12(2,1)∗2+S12(2,2)∗3


4
2
6
3

·

4
8
5
10

≥ 2 ·

4
8
5
10

·

S21(1,1)∗0+S21(1,2)∗10
S21(1,1)∗0+S21(1,2)∗5
S22(1,1)∗0+S22(1,2)∗10
S22(1,1)∗0+S22(1,2)∗5

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S11(2,1)+S
1
1(2,2) = S
1
2(2,1)+S
1
2(2,2) =
1
2
A couple of observations are in order. It can be shown that both (I) and (II) of our
properties imply GARP. Suppose by means of contradiction that GARP is violated, i.e. that
there are contingent consumption bundles zk1, . . . ,zkm such that pk1 · zk1 ≥ pk1 · zk2 , pk2 · zk2 ≥
pk2 · zk3, . . . , pkm · zkm > pkm · zk1 , where without loss we may assume there is no repetition in the
cycle. This implies lzk1 C lzk2 C . . .C lzkm C lzk1 .
To see that (I) implies GARP, observe that since C implies R and C implies R, we
have lzk1 R lzk2 R . . . lzkm R lzk1 . Let lxi = lzki and l′i = lzki+1 as in property (I), then a uniform
distribution µ over the indices i = 1,2, ...m constitutes a violation of (I).
For (II), consider the following set of Skω(g,τ)’s in property II: For k = ki for some i (that
is, if k shows up in the cycle)
Skiω(g,τ) =

piω if g = ki+1 and τ = ω
0 otherwise
and for k 6= ki for any i (k not in the cycle)
Skω(g,τ) =

piω if g = k and τ = ω
0 otherwise
Then the cycle condition gives a violation of property (II), a contradiction.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the result is by no means a trivial consequence
of Fishburn (1975). In his paper, he also considers the issue of testing the consistency of
revealed preference relations with functional restrictions on the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index (as we wish to test for concavity and monotonicity). Specifically, he wants to
test when observed data are consistent with the utility index u belonging to some convex cone
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U . Again, he assumes a finite number of relations (which does not hold in our context). A
natural guess is that if lk is revealed weakly preferred to l′k for k = 1, . . . ,g and revealed strictly
preferred to l′k for k= g+1, . . . ,K, then if there is µ ∈ ∆(K) for which µ({g+1, . . . ,K})> 0 and
u · (∑k µkl′k)≥ u · (∑k µklk) for all u ∈U , then the observed data are inconsistent with expected
utility maximization with utility index u ∈U 8. In our case, for example, we would consider
the cone of concave, nondecreasing and locally non-satiated functions; the claim would then be
that ∑k µkl′k second order stochastically dominates ∑k µklk. Of course, the existence of such a µ
refutes the hypothesis of expected utility rationalization with u ∈U , but for technical reasons,
the converse statement need not hold in general (it would hold, for example, if the cone U were
polyhedral, which is not the case here). However, we are able to show that owing to the special
structure of linear pricing, a converse statement along the lines of this idea does in fact hold
in the demand-based environment. In fact, it holds even though observed revealed preference
relations are infinite.
Proof.
(III⇔ IV)
The equivalence of III and IV is due to Green and Srivastava (1986).
8Here we continue to use x and z for lotteries, and dot product for integration with respect to measures.
73
(II⇔ III)
We proceed to show that II and III are equivalent. To this end, observe that III does not
hold if and only if there is no solution to the following linear system.9 Ab≥ 0 and λ  0, where
b =

u11
u12
...
uKS
λ

λ =

λ1
...
λK

and A is equal to the top two quadrants of the matrix below:
T =

u11 ... u
k
ω ... u
g
τ ... uKS λ1 ... λk ... λK
η1,1,1,1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
ηk,ω,g,τ 0 . . . 1 . . . −1 . . . 0 0 . . . p
k
ω
pik
· (xgτ − xkω) . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
η ′k 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...

By construction of T and a standard theorem of the alternative (see for example Man-
gasarian (1994) p. 30), the nonexistence of b,λ such that Ab≥ 0 and λ  0, is equivalent to the
existence of η ≥ 0 such that T ′η ≤ 0, where
9Vector inequalities are x≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i and x y if xi > yi for all i.
74
η =

η1,1,1,1
...
ηK,S,K,S
η ′

η ′ =

η ′1
...
η ′K

such that at least one η ′k > 0.
This is equivalent to
∑
ω
∑
(g,τ)6=(k,ω)
ηk,ω,g,τ
pkω
piω
· (xgτ − xkω)≤ 0 ∀k (3.1)
with strict inequality for at least one k, and
∑
(g,τ)6=(k,ω)
ηk,ω,g,τ = ∑
(g,τ)6=(k,ω)
ηg,τ,k,ω ∀k,ω (3.2)
We claim that a solution to systems (3.1) and (3.2), implies the existence of γk,ω,g,τ ≥ 0
so that
∑
ω
∑
(g,τ)
γk,ω,g,τ
pkω
piω
· (xgτ − xkω)≤ 0 ∀k (3.3)
∑
(g,τ)
γk,ω,g,τ = ∑
(g,τ)
γg,τ,k,ω = piω ∀k,ω (3.4)
with at least one inequality in (3.3) being strict, effectively showing (3.3) and (3.4) are equivalent
to (3.1) and (3.2).
To see this, list the ηk,ω,g,τ ’s from systems (3.1) and (3.2) as in Figure 3.1 (Notice that
system (3.2) ensures that columns and rows passing through the same diagonal element, like
the column and row in red and blue boxes, sum up to the same number.) We now construct a
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
1,1 1,ω 1,S k,ω K,S
1,1 η1,1,1,1 · · · η1,1,1,ω · · · η1,1,1,S · · · η1,1,k,ω · · · η1,1,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
1,ω η1,ω,1,1 · · · η1,ω,1,ω · · · η1,ω,1,S · · · η1,ω,k,ω · · · η1,ω,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
1,S η1,S,1,1 · · · η1,S,1,ω · · · η1,S,1,S · · · η1,S,k,ω · · · η1,S,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
k,ω ηk,ω,1,1 · · · ηk,ω,1,ω · · · ηk,ω,1,S · · · ηk,ω,k,ω · · · ηk,ω,K,S
... . . .
... . . .
... . . .
... . . . · · ·
K,S ηK,S,1,1 · · · ηK,S,1,ω · · · ηK,S,1,S · · · ηK,S,k,ω · · · ηK,S,K,S

Figure 3.1: η matrix
new matrix, say, Λ, with generic element λk,ω,g,τ by raising all diagonal entries of the η matrix,
leaving all remaining entries the same, so that there is some M > 0 for which ∑(g,τ)ηk,ω,g,τ =
∑(g,τ)ηg,τ,k,ω =Mpiω .10 Since pkω · (xkω−xkω) = 0, and since the diagonal element shows up both
in the column and and row, the resulting η matrix satisfies (3.3) (with λ ’s in place of η’s), and
the first equality in system (3.4). Finally, the γ terms are constructed by dividing each element of
the matrix Λ by M.
Rearranging inequalities (3.3) gives
∑
ω
∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τ
pkω
piω
· (xgτ − xkω) =∑
ω
pkω ·
(
∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τx
g
τ
piω
−∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τxkω
piω
)
=∑
ω
pkω ·
(
∑
g
∑
τ
γk,ω,g,τx
g
τ
piω
− xkω
)≤ 0
with at least one strict inequality. The second equality follows from (3.4). This together with
(3.4) establishes the equivalence of II and III, by taking Skω(g,τ) = γk,ω,g,τ .
10One simple way of doing this is to pick M large enough so that minω piωM > maxω ∑(g,τ)6=(k,ω)ηk,ω,g,τ .
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(IV⇒ I)
That IV implies I is straightforward. Let u : RN+→ R be any concave, nondecreasing
and locally non-satiated utility function. For lottery l, let u · l denote the expected utility of l,
∑x∈l l(x)u(x).
Suppose that D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable by u, and suppose by means
of contradiction that statement I is not true
For all l′k ∈ ∆s(RN+), lxk R l′k implies u · · · lxk ≥ u · l′k, and lxk R l′k implies u · lxk > u · l′k.
Since expected utility is linear in lottery mixtures, we have that u · (∑K1 µklxk)> u · (∑K1 µkl′k), a
contradiction to ∑K1 µklxk = ∑
K
1 µkl′k.
(I⇒ II)
We now show that I implies II. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is a solution
to the system listed in II. We will show that this implies I is false. Let
yk =
(
∑g∑τ Skω(g,τ)x
g
τ
piω
)
ω∈Ω
By II, we have pk · xk ≥ pk · yk ∀k with > for at least one k. By definition of C, lxk C lyk , with
C for at least one k.
Next, observe that lyk places probability piω at
∑g∑τ Skω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω for each ω . Let l
′
k be the
lottery that puts probability ∑ω Skω(g,τ) on x
g
τ . Since ∑g,τ Skω(g,τ) = piω , l′k can be obtained
from lyk by spreading, for each ω , the probability piω placed on
∑g∑τ Skω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω to probabilities
Skω(g,τ)’s on x
g
τ ’s, (g,τ) ∈ {1, · · · ,K}×Ω. Moreover, ∑g∑τ S
k
ω (g,τ)x
g
τ
piω is a weighted average of
the xgτ ’s by weights Skω(g,τ)’s. So for each ω the spread described above is a mean-preserving
spread in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), and l′k can be obtained from lyk by a finite
number of mean-preserving spread.
By definition of R, we have obtained lotteries lxk and l′k such that lxk R l′k ∀k, with R
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for at least one k. In order to contradict I, it only remains now to find {µk}Kk=1 such that µk ≥ 0,
∑{k:lkRl′k} µk > 0 and ∑
K
1 µklxk = ∑
K
1 µkl′k. As it turns out, it suffices to take µk =
1
K for each k:
The lottery ∑Kk=1
1
K l
′
k places probability
1
K ∑k∑ω S
k
ω(g,τ) =
piτ
K on each x
g
τ , (g,τ) ∈
{1, · · · ,K}×Ω, while the lottery ∑Kk=1 1K lxk , places piτK on each xgτ . So ∑Kk=1 1K l′k = ∑Kk=1 1K lxk .
This constitutes a contradiction to I (in particular, the contradiction comes in the form of a
uniform distribution over the observations 1, . . . ,K).
3.3 Conclusion
We have developed a universal test for the risk-averse expected utility environment
with many commodities. Of interest for future research would be an analogous test in the
subjective expected utility context, following the work of Echenique and Saito (2015). The
difficulty inherent in this approach rests in the fact that the inequalities in III of Theorem 3.2 are
polynomial, rather than linear. While we have some conjectures on what might be an appropriate
test, these are very speculative.
A final remark is in order. Observe that when |Ω|= 1 (and hence piω = 1 for ω for which
Ω= {ω}), we are back to the environment of Afriat (1967). In such an environment, the function
S referenced in Theorem 3.2, condition II can be taken to be a function of {1, . . . ,K} alone. And
condition II in this case tells us that ∑k Sk(l) = ∑k Sl(k) = 1 for each l; in other words, viewing
S as a matrix, the matrix is bistochastic. Now, one of the contributions of Afriat (1967) is that
condition II is necessary and sufficient for concave rationalization when the matrix S is restricted
to be a permutation matrix; that is, a matrix consisting solely of zeroes and ones. Of course,
it is well-known that the permutation matrices are the extreme points of the set of bistochastic
matrices (this is the celebrated theorem of Birkhoff (1946) and von Neumann (1953)). A natural
conjecture is that a similar statement may hold here; that it is enough to check the extreme points
of the set of S functions satisfying condition II of Theorem 3.2.
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Appendix A
Social Comparisons in Peer Effects
A.1 Results
Notes: This figure shows that the difference in task choice between treatment and baseline arises from subjects
who were willing to do 20 or fewer tasks. Given the established correlation between choice and beliefs, this figure
suggests that the refined signal corrected beliefs so that more subjects believed the high signal and, consequently,
were wiling to do more tasks.
Figure A.1: Distribution of Task Choice by Treatment
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Table A.1: Distribution of Task
Choice by Treatment
DV: Tasks Choice
$5 3.234∗∗∗
(0.472)
$10 7.468∗∗∗
(0.741)
$15 11.270∗∗∗
(0.957)
$20 14.541∗∗∗
(1.185)
Treat x $2 0.559
(1.098)
Treat x $5 1.538
(1.293)
Treat x $10 2.433
(1.572)
Treat x $15 3.020∗
(1.779)
Treat x $20 4.537∗∗
(2.038)
Constant 6.450∗∗∗
(0.815)
R-Squared 0.212
Subjects 219
Observations 1095
Notes: This table individually presents
the results of Figure 1.5 for each do-
nation amount. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the subject level, presented
in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
81
Table A.2: Task Choice by Belief,
Signal, Treatment
DV: Task Choice
(1) (2)
High Belief 12.736∗∗∗ 11.931∗∗∗
(2.151) (2.599)
High Signal 1.420
(2.504)
Treatment 1.018
(2.642)
Constant 12.524∗∗∗ 11.596∗∗∗
(1.638) (1.673)
R-Squared 0.216 0.221
Observations 119 119
Notes: We regress task choice on an indicator
that the subject believes the high signal is
true. Robust standard errors presented in
parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.3: Effect of Treatment on
Likelihood of Choosing At Least
Twenty Tasks
DV: 1{Tasks≥ 20}
Treatment 0.212∗∗
(0.087)
Constant 0.516∗∗∗
(0.063)
R-Squared 0.047
Observations 119
Notes:We regress an indicator for choos-
ing to do 20 or more tasks on treatment.
Robust standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Quantile Regressions
DV: Task Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantiles 20th 40th 50th 60th 80th
Treatment 10.000∗∗∗ 10.000∗∗∗ 0.000 3.000 5.000
(2.434) (3.099) (3.045) (3.068) (6.612)
Constant 5.000∗∗∗ 10.000∗∗∗ 20.000∗∗∗ 20.000∗∗∗ 30.000∗∗∗
(1.864) (2.438) (2.365) (2.502) (3.523)
R-Squared 0.050 0.050 . 0.050 0.050
Observations 119 119 119 119 119
Notes: This table quantifies the distributional difference in task choice shown in Figure
A.1. Standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.5: Quantile Regressions
DV: Task Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantiles 10th 30th 50th 70th 90th
Treatment 8.000∗∗ 12.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 5.000
(3.761) (2.967) (3.045) (3.376) (6.777)
Constant 2.000 8.000∗∗∗ 20.000∗∗∗ 25.000∗∗∗ 40.000∗∗∗
(1.981) (2.046) (2.365) (2.621) (5.485)
R-Squared 0.050 0.050 . . 0.050
Observations 119 119 119 119 119
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Small Sample t-test:
Effect of High Signal on Task
Choice
Task Difference
High Signal 9.608∗∗
(3.357)
N High Signal 51
N Low Signal 4
N Overall 55
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.7: Effect of Treatment on Belief
of Received Signal
DV: 1{Believe Signal}
Treatment 0.341∗∗∗
(0.078)
Constant 0.531∗∗∗
(0.063)
R-Squared 0.135
Observations 119
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.2 Experiment Instructions
All experiment sessions were run using Otree. The instructions were shown on a step-by-
step basis with each feature of the experiment explained on a sequence of screens.
Instructions: Anticipation Experiment
Screen 1
Hello and welcome, today you will be participating in an experiment on economic
decision making. Funds for this experiment have been provided by the University of California.
You will be paid for your participation in this experiment. Your final payment will consist of a
fixed $5 show-up payment and a $10 completion bonus. You will be paid privately in cash after
the experiment has concluded. We ask that you please silence and put away all cell phones and
any other personal electronic devices now and for the remainder of the experiment.
In this experiment you will be presented with an opportunity to complete a task for
charity. For this project, we are partnering with Dr. James Rolfe – founder of the Afghan Dental
Relief Project – to bring modern dental care to the very poor in Afghanistan. The A.D.R.P. is
a charitable organization that provides free dental services and dental health education to the
poorest families and individuals in the city of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. 100% of the
donations that you generate from this experiment will be used to purchase dental supplies and
ship them to A.D.R.P.’s free dental clinic. Please take the time to carefully read the news article
below that details the work Dr. Rolfe and the A.D.R.P. have accomplished and can continue to
accomplish with your help.
Screen 2
Today, you will have the opportunity to complete tasks to generate donations to A.D.R.P.’s
free dental clinic. The task will be to transcribe captchas. For each task, you will be shown
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an image of text. Your objective is to correctly type the text that is shown to you in the space
provided. Each correctly transcribed captcha will be counted as one completed task. You will
have 3 chances to correctly transcribe each captcha. If you fail to correctly transcribe a captcha
within three tries you will simply be shown a different captcha. You will now be shown 5
captchas to transcribe so that you are familiar with the task. Please note that each captcha may
consist of both capital and lower case letters, the numbers 2-9, and special characters !, %, &, ?.
Screen 3
5 Sample Captchas
Screen 4: Tasks for Donations
For this experiment you will decide how many captchas you are willing to complete
in order to generate donations for the A.D.R.P.’s free dental clinic. That is, you will choose
the maximum number of captchas you are willing to do for donations of $2, $5, $10, $15, and
$20. You will be able to select between 0 and 50 tasks for each possible donation amount. For
example, if for a donation of $5 dollars you select 12 tasks, then you are indicating that you are
willing to do a maximum of 12 tasks in exchange for a $5 donation to the A.D.R.P.
After you have made your decisions we will randomly assign each person a donation
amount and a number of tasks. If the the number of tasks you are assigned is fewer than the
maximum number you selected for yourself, then you will complete your assigned number of
tasks and we will give the assigned donation to the A.D.R.P. If the randomly assigned number of
tasks is higher than your chosen number, then you will complete no tasks and no donation will
be given to the A.D.R.P.
For example, suppose that for a donation of $15 you choose to do at most 30 tasks. Then
if you are randomly assigned $15 and 20 tasks, then you will complete 20 tasks and $15 will be
given to the Afghan Dental Relief Project. On the other hand if you are randomly assigned $15
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and 40 tasks, then you will do 0 tasks and no donation will be given to the A.D.R.P.
Each person will be assigned their own number of tasks and their own donation amount.
No one will learn your assigned donation amount or number of tasks. Please note that the
randomization device is “fair” – all possible donation and task amounts will have equal probability
of being assigned. So it is in your best interest to treat each decision as if it is the one that counts.
You will be free to leave the experiment as soon as you complete your tasks. You will be
free to go immediately if you have no tasks to complete. Your completion bonus will be $10
regardless of the number of tasks you have to do.
Comprehension Questions
Suppose you choose to do a maximum of 30 tasks for a $10 donation. Under which of
the following conditions would you complete tasks for a $10 donation?
• If I am randomly assigned a $10 donation and 20 tasks.
• If I am randomly assigned a $10 donation and 40 tasks.
Suppose you are assigned a $10 donation and 21 tasks. How many tasks will you be asked to do?
• 21 if I choose more than 21 tasks for a $10 donation.
• 21 if I choose fewer than 21 tasks for a $10 donation.
Suppose you are assigned a $5 donation and 15 tasks. How many tasks will you be assigned to
do?
• 0 if I choose more than 15 tasks for a $10 donation.
• 0 if I choose fewer than 15 tasks for a $10 donation.
Screen 5: Guessing other’s choices
In addition to selecting how many tasks you are willing to do for each possible donation
amount, you will guess how your decisions compare to the decisions of previous participants.
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That is, you will guess what percent of previous participants were willing to do a larger number
of tasks than you for each possible donation. Specifically, you will say whether you believe that
at least 95%, 75%, 50%, 25%, or 0% of all previous participants were willing to do more tasks
than you.
As an example, suppose that for a donation of $5 dollars you choose to do a maximum of
12 tasks and think that at least 50%, but fewer than 75%, of previous participants were willing to
do more than 12 tasks for a $5 donation. Then you will indicate that you believe that at least 50%
of all previous experiment participants were willing to do more tasks than you for a $5 donation.
Comprehension Question
Suppose that you choose to do at most 10 tasks for a donation of $15 dollars and that
you believe that at least 75%, but fewer than 95%, of previous participants were willing to do
more than 10 tasks for a $15 donation. How would you answer the question “What percent of
previous participants were willing to do more tasks that you?”
• 95%
• 75%
• 50%
• 25%
• 0%
Screen 5B: Seeing other’s choices (Treatment Only)
Lastly, you will learn how your decisions actually compare to the decisions of all those
who participated in this experiment before you. After everyone has made their decisions and
guesses, you will open the yellow envelope on your desk. The contents of this envelope will
show you how many tasks at least 95%, 75%, 50%, 25% and 0% of all previous participants
willing to do. Therefore, you will learn the true proportion of previous participants that were
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willing to do more tasks than you. You will then verify that you understand this information by
answering a series of multiple choice questions. Please do not open these envelopes until you are
instructed to do so.
For example, suppose for a donation of $5 dollars you were willing to do 12 tasks. And
suppose that the information in the yellow envelope shows you that 50% of previous participants
were willing to do at least 15 tasks for a $5 donation and 75% were willing to do at least 10 tasks
for $5 donation. This would mean that at least 50%, but less than 75%, of previous participants
were willing to do more tasks than you for a $5 donation.
Comprehension Question
Suppose that you choose to do at most 35 tasks for a donation of $15 dollars. Also
suppose you learn from the information in the yellow envelope that 50% percent of other
participants were willing to at least 30 tasks for a $15 donation and 25% were willing to at least
40 tasks for $15 donation. Then what percent of previous experiment participants were actually
willing to do more tasks than you?
• 95%
• 75%
• 50%
• 25%
• 0%
Screen 6: Summary
To sum up, the experiment proceeds as follows.
Step 1 You will choose how many tasks you are willing to do for each possible donation
amount and you will guess what percent of people were willing to do more tasks than you for each
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of your decisions. You will do this with sliders and multiple choice questions as shown below. In
Baseline:In this session – as with 50% of all sessions – you will not learn any information on
what others actually chose. (In Treatment:In this session – as with 50% of all sessions – you will
learn any information on what others actually chose.)
Step 2 Each person will be randomly assigned a donation amount by drawing a ball out
of a jar. A random number generator will then assign you a number of tasks. If this number of
tasks is lower than the amount you were willing to do, then you will complete those tasks and
we will donate to the A.D.R.P. on your behalf. The experiment will conclude after you finish
your tasks (if any). We will hand you your show-up fee and completion bonus ($15) as you exit
the lab.
Instructions: Signal Extraction
Screen 1
Hello and welcome, today you will be participating in an experiment on economic
decision making. Funds for this experiment have been provided by the University of California.
You will be paid for your participation in this experiment. Your final payment will consist of a
fixed $5 show-up payment and a $10 completion bonus. You will be paid privately in cash after
the experiment has concluded. We ask that you please silence and put away all cell phones and
any other personal electronic devices now and for the remainder of the experiment.
In this experiment you will be presented with an opportunity to complete a task for
charity. For this project, we are partnering with Dr. James Rolfe – founder of the Afghan Dental
Relief Project – to bring modern dental care to the very poor in Afghanistan. The A.D.R.P. is
a charitable organization that provides free dental services and dental health education to the
poorest families and individuals in the city of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. 100% of the
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donations that you generate from this experiment will be used to purchase dental supplies and
ship them to A.D.R.P.’s free dental clinic. Please take the time to carefully read the news article
below that details the work Dr. Rolfe and the A.D.R.P. have accomplished and can continue to
accomplish with your help.
Screen 2
Today, you will have the opportunity to complete tasks to generate donations to A.D.R.P.’s
free dental clinic. The task will be to transcribe captchas. For each task, you will be shown
an image of text. Your objective is to correctly type the text that is shown to you in the space
provided. Only correctly transcribed captchas will be counted as completed tasks. You will have
3 chances per captcha. You will now be shown 5 captchas to transcribe so that you are familiar
with the task. Please note that each captcha may consist of both capital and lower case letters,
only the numbers 2-9, and special characters !, %, &, ?.
Screen 3
5 Sample Captchas
Screen 4: Tasks for Donations
For this experiment you will decide how many captchas you are willing to complete in
order to generate a donation for the A.D.R.P.’s free dental clinic. That is, you will choose the
maximum number of captchas you are willing to complete in exchange for a donation of $20.
You will be able to select between 0 and 50 tasks.
After you have made your decisions we will randomly assign each person a number
of tasks. If the the number of tasks you are assigned is fewer than the maximum number you
selected for yourself, then you will complete your assigned number of tasks and we will donate
to A.D.R.P. on your behalf. If the randomly assigned number of tasks is higher than your chosen
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number, then you will complete no tasks and no donation will be given to the A.D.R.P.
For example, suppose that you choose to do at most 25 tasks. Then if you are randomly
assigned 20 tasks, then you will complete 20 tasks and $20 will be given to the Afghan Dental
Relief Project. On the other hand if you are randomly assigned 40 tasks, then you will do 0 tasks
and no donation will be given to the A.D.R.P.
Each person will be assigned their own number of tasks. No one will learn your assigned
number of tasks. Please note that the randomization device is “fair” – all possible task amounts
will have equal probability of being assigned.
You will be free to leave the experiment as soon as you complete your tasks. You will be
free to go immediately if you have no tasks to complete. Your completion bonus will be $10
regardless of the number of tasks you have to do.
Identical Comprehension Questions for this section as the Anticipation Experiment
Screen 5: Seeing Other’s Choices
In addition to making your own choices, you will receive information about how your
decisions compare to the decisions of the over 200 UCSD students who have already participated
in this experiment. Before making your decisions, you will each draw an envelope at random. In
each of the envelopes will be one of the two following statements on how many tasks previous
participants were willing to complete in exchange for a $20 donation to the A.D.R.P. The
statements you could receive are:
• More than 50% of all previous participants were willing to do at least 20 tasks.
• Less than 25% of all previous participants were willing to do at least 20 tasks.
In Baseline: Only one of these statements is true. There are a total of 16 available
envelopes at the front of the room. 8 of these envelopes contain the true statement and 8
envelopes contain the false statement. Therefore, when you pick an envelope, there will be a
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50% chance that you will receive the true statement and a 50% chance that you will receive the
false statement.
In Treatment: Only one of these statements is true. There are a total of 16 available
envelopes at the front of the room. 15 of these envelopes contain the true statement and 1
envelope contains the false statement. Therefore, when you pick an envelope, there will be a
94% chance that you will receive the true statement and a 6% chance that you will receive the
false statement.
Comprehension Questions, Set A
If 8-out-of-16 (In Treatment:15-out-of-16) available envelopes contain the true statement,
which of the following is most likely going to happen?
• I will receive the true statement.
• I will receive the false statement.
• I will receive the true or false statement with equal probability.
Suppose that you receive the statement that “more than 50% of all previous participants
were willing to do at least 20 tasks.” What is the probability that this statement is TRUE and that
more than 50% of all previous participants were willing to do at least 20 tasks?
• 94%
• 50%
Suppose that you receive the statement that “more than 50% of all previous participants
were willing to do at least 20 tasks.” What is the probability that this statement is FALSE and
that less than 25% of all previous participants were willing to do at least 20 tasks?
• 50%
• 6%
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Comprehension Questions, Set B
If 8-out-of-16 (in treatment:15-out-of-16) available envelopes contain the true statement,
what is the probability you will receive a true statement?
• 94%
• 50%
If 8-out-of-16 (in treatment:15-out-of-16) available envelopes contain the true statement,
what is the probability you will receive a false statement?
• 50%
• 6%
If 8-out-of-16 (in treatment:15-out-of-16) available envelopes contain the true statement,
what is the maximum number of true statements 12 participants could pick?
• 8
• 12
If 8-out-of-16 (in treatment:15-out-of-16) available envelopes contain the true statement,
what is the maximum number of false statements 12 participants could pick?
• 8
• 1
We switched from comprehension question set B to A after the first few sessions of the
signal extraction experiment. We believed set A would be more revealing of subject comprehen-
sion. The sessions with question sets A and B are balanced across treatments, and we found no
difference in task choice dynamics between comprehension set A and B.
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A.3 News Article about the A.D.R.P.
Afghan Dental Relief Project Ready for Next Level1
By Kelsey Abkin
In 2003, Santa Barbara dentist James Rolfe came across an article about three women
going to Afghanistan to treat victims of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder). Instead of putting
the article down and going on with his day, Dr. Rolfe picked up the phone and asked to go along.
The poverty and vulnerability he saw upon arriving in Afghanistan affected him immediately.
Within a country of some 30 million people, Rolfe said he saw “resources in manpower and
[natural] resources but no infrastructure to really use it.” Eleven years later, thanks to Rolfe and
his Afghanistan Dental Relief Project, this is changing. The project started the Kabul Dental
Clinic and Training Center, which offers basic dental services, and Rolfe is on the verge of
expanding to a permanent dental clinic, hoping to extend nonbasic, often life-saving dental
procedures.
The mission began when Rolfe returned to Afghanistan, this time with a homemade,
portable dentists office and base camp. Before that, what passed for dental care in the war-torn
country often amounted to a barber ripping out sore teeth without anesthetics. With 90 percent
of Afghans having never seen a real dentist and 70 percent malnourished, dental problems were
extreme. Abscesses were not uncommon and often led to septicemia, which can be lethal without
antibiotics. Word that an American dentist had come offering free dental care spread fast among
rural communities, and soon Rolfe was helping more than 60 people a day. Many of the orphaned
boys whom Rolfe treated would become his assistants, thus leading to the Kabul School of
Dental Technology.
After a car bomb, two scams, 100,000 patients treated, and 11 years since the birth of the
1This is an abridged version of an article in the Santa Barbera Independent from 2014. This the the text that was
shown to subjects. The full-legnth article can be found here: https://www.independent.com/news/2014/jul/12/afghan-
dental-relief-project-ready-next-level/
95
Afghanistan Dental Relief Project, Rolfe is on the brink of taking it to a new level. He recently
worked with Afghanistans Ministry of Public Health to obtain permits to provide more complex,
nonbasic dental services to Afghans for a small fee, such as endodontic treatment or prosthetic
restorations. For non-Afghans, however, the fee is equivalent to what they would pay in Dubai,
and the treatment of only 16 non-Afghans covers the clinics entire monthly operating expenses.
Today, Rolfe can be found in his successful dentistry clinic near the Lobero Theatre.
His self-built office surrounds his patients with the sounds of nature and artifacts reminiscent
of a cultured life. He has managed to live a life performing dentistry for no cost in a Santa
Barbara commune and now helping thousands in Afghanistan that intertwines his passion to
help with his skills as a dentist. Rolfe, who is 75 years old, continues to work 115 hours a week
and lives well below the poverty line. Except for his basic needs, he gives all he makes to his
Afghanistan project, and hes nowhere near ready to slow down. In the future, he sees a first-rate
dental infrastructure providing Afghans with health care, jobs and education. “We need to be
more active,” Rolfe said. “If we feel something in our heart, we need to act on that, and that
needs to form the basis of our existence.”
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Appendix B
Procrastination in the Field
B.1 Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure B.1: Histogram of 2008 Stimulus Act Payments
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Table B.1: Summary statistics
Roxbury Filers Full
Experimental Non-Participating
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Age 1296 38.85 606 40.65 26228 37.80
(14.90) (16.22) (15.47)
AGI 1296 17452 606 18498 26248 16914
(13991) (15179) (13586)
Refund 1296 1317 606 1205 26248 1438
(1571) (1482) (1641)
Dependents 1296 0.505 606 0.418 26248 0.567
(0.838) (0.769) (0.90)
1Unemployed 1296 0.101 606 0.112 26247 0.095
(0.302) (0.316) (0.29)
Female 1217 0.644 557 0.636 19881 0.646
(0.479) (0.482) (22.03 )
Black 1211 0.761 556 0.781 19565 0.562
(0.426) (0.414) ( 0.49)
College 1180 0.138 534 0.133 18971 0.154
(0.345) (0.340) (0.36)
Days Until 1296 38.74 606 46.47 26248 43.07
Deadline (21.28) (24.00) (22.03 )
1Direct Dep 1296 0.444 606 0.398 26248 0.389
(0.497) (0.490) ( 0.49)
Table B.2: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.539 0.594 0.639 0.673 0.717 0.738
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.279 5 10 20 50 75
(0.028) - - - - -
# Observations 404191 404191 404191 404191 404191 404191
Log-Likelihood -26323.63 -27521.71 -35519.37 -53546.81 -101781.32 -137074.84
T −1 : T −7 Average
p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t) : 0.172 0.198 0.214 0.219 0.221 0.222
T −1 : T −7 Average
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t) : 0.0056 -0.0046 0.0057 0.0102 0.0111 0.0112
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ , and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation
for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is
the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability,
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of Table 2.2 but only uses 2007
data.
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Table B.3: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, µ = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.534 0.600 0.642 0.675 0.719 0.739
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 2.829 5 10 20 50 75
(0.016) - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -65463.96 -70339.45 -91413.34 -135908.46 -253558.83 -339385.71
T −1 : T −7 Average
p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t) : 0.131 0.173 0.191 0.196 0.201 0.202
T −1 : T −7 Average
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t) : 0.0096 -0.0043 0.0061 0.0104 0.0113 0.0116
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ , and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation for
years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is
the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability,
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of Table 2.2 with location
parameter µ = 0 (as opposed to µ =−γ)
Table B.4: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, k = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.99999 0.9999999 0.999999 0.999999 0.999999 0.999999
(0.000004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 2698.49 5 10 20 50 75
(1397.35) - - - - -
# Observations 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387 1010387
Log-Likelihood -66180.702 -66182.362 -66182.361 -66182.359 -66182.352 -66182.346
T −1 : T −7 Average
p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t) : -0.015 -0.018 -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0190 -0.0190
T −1 : T −7 Average
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t) : -0.0078 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0025
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ , and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation for
years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is the average
excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t),
over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of Table 2.2 with no delay in refund arrival (k = 0).
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Table B.5: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, Paper Check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.631 0.701 0.743 0.770 0.803 0.818
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.459 5 10 20 50 75
(0.030) - - - - -
# Observations 623282 623282 623282 623282 623282 623282
Log-Likelihood -40689.023 -41397.661 -47599.246 -63972.131 -110885.69 -145574.88
T −1 : T −7 Average
p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t) : 0.154 0.166 0.187 0.196 0.205 0.207
T −1 : T −7 Average
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t) : 0.0044 -0.0095 -0.0015 0.0093 0.0131 .0135
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ , and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation for
years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is the average
excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability, q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t),
over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of Table 2.2 with only those who receive their refunds via
paper checks.
Table B.6: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, Direct Deposit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.515 0.588 0.634 0.669 0.714 0.734
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.16 5 10 20 50 75
(0.033) - - - - -
# Observations 387105 387105 387105 387105 387105 387105
Log-Likelihood -24652.468 -25507.62 -30975.57 -44183.668 -81480.071 -109392.39
T −1 : T −7 Average
p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t) : 0.164 0.176 0.187 0.194 0.202 0.205
T −1 : T −7 Average
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t) : 0.0040 -0.0047 -0.0003 0.0045 .0067 0.0071
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ , and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation
for years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is
the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability,
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of Table 2.2with only those who
receive their refunds via direct deposit.
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Table B.7: Aggregate Parameter Estimates 2005 — 2007, Exclude Last 7 Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δˆ 0.527 0.590 0.638 0.673 0.717 0.738
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cˆ 3.410 5 10 20 50 75
(0.018) - - - - -
# Observations 916368 916368 916368 916368 916368 916368
Log-Likelihood -62214.02 -64532.95 -82175.01 -122525.93 -230511.93 -309418.03
T −1 : T −7 Average
p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t) : 0.131 0.173 0.191 0.196 0.201 0.202
T −1 : T −7 Average
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t) : 0.0096 -0.0043 0.0061 0.0104 0.0113 0.0116
Notes: Structural estimates of exponential discounting, δˆ , and filing costs, cˆ, obtained via Maximum Likelihood Estimation for
years 2005-2007. Columns (2) - (6) restrict costs to be between 5 and 75. Standard errors in parentheses. Also reported is
the average excess conditional filing probability, p˜(1t |1t)− pˆ(1t |1t), and the average excess unconditional filing probability,
q˜(1t |1t)− qˆ(1t |1t), over the seven days prior to the tax deadline. This table is a reproduction of Table 2.2 while dropping the
last 7 days prior to the dealine.
Figure B.2: Predicted Filing Times Using 1-Period-Ahead Observed Probabilities
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Figure B.3: Filing Times and Refund Values (Paper Check Only)
Figure B.4: Filing Times and Refund Values (Direct Deposit Only)
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Figure B.5: Filing Times and Refund Values (δ Heterogeneous by Race)
Figure B.6: Filing Times and Refund Values (Present Biased, Paper Check Only)
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Figure B.7: Filing Times and Refund Values (Present Biased, Direct Deposit Only)
Figure B.8: Filing Times and Refund Values 2008 (Exponential)
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Figure B.9: Filing Times and Refund Values 2008 (Present Biased)
Table B.8: Difference-in-Difference Effect of Stimulus Payments (Placebo)
Linear Regression Quantile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Day Completed Day Completed Day Completed Day Completed
1Stimulus Payment > 0 -1.0031 -0.6341 -0.9228 -0.6009
(0.7062) (0.7276) (1.1911) (1.1570)
1Year = 2007 1.0079 0.9760 2.2275 2.2980
(1.0067) (1.0075) (1.8180) (1.7438)
Interaction -0.3734 -0.5533 -0.2586 -0.4975
(1.0505) (1.0512) (1.8638) (1.7892)
Constant 31.2434*** 31.2478*** 28.1119*** 28.0560***
(0.6427) (0.6463) (1.1218) (1.0675)
Stimulus Determinants No Yes No Yes
# Observations 15972 15972 15972 15972
Notes: This table demonstrates the relationship between when one filed (Day Completed) and whether one received
a 2008 Stimulus Payment. This is placebo test of the interaction between 1Year = 2007 and 1Stimulus Payment > 0. Standard
errors are clustered by individual.
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Figure B.10: Predicted and Actual Filing Behavior by Present Bias (Un-smoothed)
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B.2 Tax Filing as Dynamic Discrete Choice
We detail the methodology we implement which follows from Hotz and Miller (1993)
and Arcidiciano and Ellickson (2011).
Recall that are N individual tax filers, indexed by i. Time is discrete, indexed by t, with
T denoting the period of the tax deadline. In each period, tax filers take actions ait . They either
decide to postpone filing (ait = 0) or to file (ait = 1). Let fit denote the individual’s filing status
in period t such that fit = 1 if the individual has not yet filed by period t−1 and fit = 0 if the
individual has filed by period t−1. We assume that each individual will receive a positive refund,
bi, constant through time and known to the researcher and the filer. This refund is to be received
in a fixed number of periods, k, after filing. The state variables known to the researcher are
xit = ( fit ,bi), which is is Markov.
We assume that the cost of filing consists of a fixed component c and and time-varying
idiosyncratic shocks εit . These shocks are contemporaneously observed by the filer but unob-
served to the researcher. These shocks may depend on the choice of filing and hence we write
ε(ait). We assume ε(ait) is independent and identically distributed over time.
Filer utility is additively separable. The utility of filing in period t is
δ kbit− c+ ε(1)
when ait = 1 and fit = 1. The variable δ k is a k period exponential discount factor homogeneous
in the population of filers. Utility is ε(0) if ait = 0 and fit = 1. As such, the flow utility can be
written
u(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait) = ait fit(δ kbi− c)+ εit(ait).
With these flow utilities, the filer maximizes the present discounted value of filing-related utilities
by choosing α∗i , a set of decision rules for all possible realizations of observed and unobserved
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state variables in each time period. That is,
α∗i = arg maxαiEαi
T
∑
t=1
δ t−1[u(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait)].
The corresponding value function at time t can be defined recursively as
Vit(xit ,εit) = maxait [u(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait)+δE [Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,εi,t+1)|xit ,ait ]]
We define the ex-ante value function, V it(xit), obtained by integrating over the possible realiza-
tions of shocks as
V it(xit)≡
∫
Vit(xit ,εit)g(εit)dεit .
We additionally define the conditional value function vit(xit ,ait) as the present discounted value
(net of the shocks εit) of choosing ait and behaving optimally from period t+1 on as
vit(xit ,ait)≡ u(xit ,ait)+δ
∫
V i,t+1(xi,t+1) f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait)dxi,t+1.
The optimal decision rule at time t solves
αit(xit ,εit) = arg maxait vit(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait).
B.2.1 Type-1 Extreme Value Errors
Following the logic of static discrete choice problems, the probability of observing an
action ait conditional on xit is found by integrating out εit from the optimal decision rule.
p(ait |xit) =
∫
1[αit(xit ,εit) = ait ]g(εit)dεit
=
∫
1[arg maxait vit(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait) = ait ]g(εit)dεit
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Hence, if we are able to form the conditional value function vit(xit ,ait), standard methods can be
applied.
In order to obtain choice probabilities and other constructs in closed form, we assume a
type-1 extreme value distribution, fixing the location parameter equal to minus Euler’s constant,
−γ =−0.5772, and the scale parameter to 1.1 This leads to a dynamic logit model where the
probability of an arbitrary choice ait is given by
p(ait |xit) = exp(vit(xit ,ait))∑a′it exp(vit(xit ,a′it))
.
Or,
p(ait |xit) = 1∑a′it exp(vit(xit ,a′it)− vit(xit ,ait))
.
As in the standard logit, the probability of any action being taken is expressed in terms
of relative utility values or utility differences. Here, however, the relevant utility values are the
conditional value functions. The conditional value functions carry with them both the current
flow payoffs and discounted considerations of taking the prescribed action and then acting
optimally from then on.
Importantly, under the above distributional assumption we also have the ex-ante value
1The cumulative distribution function of a type-1 extreme value random variable, X , Prob(X ≤ x)=F(x;µ,λ )=
e−e−(x−µ)/λ , is summarized by location parameter, µ , and scale parameter, λ . The expectation is
E[X ] = µ+ γλ ,
such that fixing location µ =−γ and λ = 1 ensures the shocks are mean zero. In most situations, imposing mean
zero shocks is inconsequential as choices are driven by the difference between action-specific shocks. In period T ,
however, the individual must file if she has not yet, and so in period T −1 the individual forecasts only one relevant
shock in the subsequent period. Additionally, in all prior periods, choosing to file in the period stops the problem
and sets all future flow utilities to zero, while choosing not to file exposes the decisionmaker to future shocks. Under
the traditional assumption that µ = 0, such future shocks would yield additional option value to not filing in any
period. In Appendix Table B.3 we re-estimate the specifications of Table 2.2 with the traditional assumption of
µ = 0 and show that estimated discount factors and costs are both slightly reduced under this assumption. Note as
well, that the variance of a type-1 extreme value random variable is λ pi
2
6 , such that restricting λ = 1 also restricts
the variance of the shocks to be pi
2
6 . In section ?? we analyze behavior with alternate assumptions for λ , and ensure
that both our estimated model and simulations with µ =−γ and λ = 1 predict identical behavior.
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function in closed form:
V it(xit) = ln
∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit ,a′it))
 .
A powerful observation by Hotz and Miller (1993) recognizes that
V it(xit) =−ln[p(a∗it |xit)]+ vit(xit ,a∗it)
for some arbitrary action taken at time t, a∗it . This expresses the ex-ante value of being at a given
state as the conditional value of taking an arbitrary action adjusted for a penalty that the arbitrary
action might not be optimal. We can substitute this in to our equation for the conditional value
function to obtain
vit(xit ,ait) = u(xit ,ait)+ δ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1,a∗i,t+1)− ln[p(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1)]) f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait)dxi,t+1
The components of the conditional value function are contemporaneous flow pay-
offs, u(xit ,ait), the one period ahead conditional value function for the arbitrary action,
vi,t+1(xi,t+1,a∗i,t+1), conditional choice probabilities for the arbitrary action p(a
∗
i,t+1|xi,t+1), and
state transition probabilities, f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait). These constructs are obtainable in the following
ways:
Formulating Contemporaneous Flow Payoffs: The flow payoffs are established as δ kbi− c if
a person enters period t without having filed and files in that period. The flow payoffs are 0
otherwise. The refund value noted in Table 2.1, provides the value bi. This refund will be
received in k periods with the assumptions that for direct deposit filers, k = 14 while for paper
check filers k = 21.2 The parameters to estimate are the discount factor, δ , and filing costs, c.
Outside of the estimated discount factor and filing costs, the contemporaneous flow
payoffs are driven by refund values and direct deposit status. Our estimation strategy takes these
2We follow the IRS refund cycle charts for 2005-2008 to arrive at these values of k.
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values as exogenous and does not model the choice of refund value or payment method. We do
not have access to a potential instrument for direct deposit choice (e.g., variation in local bank
services) or refund values (e.g., variation in refundability of tax credits). As such, we provide
separate estimates for individuals with and without direct deposit and find qualitatively similar
results (see Tables B.5 and B.6 for further detail). For refund values we provide out-of-sample
examination of the 2008 Stimulus Payments which provided plausibly exogenous variation in
refund values and timing. Failure to account for endogenous refund choice in estimation should
lead to substantial mis-prediction out-of-sample, while we show the predictions closely match
behavior for our preferred specification (see section 2.4.2 for details).
Obtaining Conditional Choice Probabilities: We wish to have an estimated probability for ait
given the state vector xit . Our states are the benefit amount, bi, and whether someone has not
already filed, fit . These can be calculated with simple bin estimators.
p˜(ait |xit) = ∑
N
i=1 1(ait = at ,xit = xt)
∑Ni=1 1(xit = xt)
Obtaining State Transition Probabilities: Our only states are the benefit amounts bi and the
filing status fit . The benefit amount is unchanging through time, and conditional upon fit and the
the choice ait , fi,t+1 can be known with certainty. Hence, all the state transition probabilities are 1.
Obtaining Arbitrary Action Payoff from Terminating Actions: Our setup is such that there exist
terminating actions. Once a filer files, no further choice can be made. The decision problem is no
longer dynamic. This is important because if we think of this terminating action of filing as the
arbitrary action, a∗i,t+1, then the remaining analysis is dramatically simplified. The terminating
action makes all future payoffs zero and makes future shocks irrelevant. Filling in a∗i,t+1 = 1 as
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the arbitrary action, we know that the t+1 conditional value function will be
vi,t+1(1,bi,1) = δ ki bi− c
if fi,t+1 = 1. Otherwise, the individual has already filed, fi,t+1 = 0, and this along with all future
values are deterministically zero.
B.2.2 Likelihood Formulation
Our primary equation for the value of a given action given a particular state is
vit(xit ,ait) = u(xit ,ait)+ δ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1,a∗i,t+1)− ln[p(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1)]) f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait)dxi,t+1
The critical case for our estimator is xit = ( fit ,bi) = (1,bi). The individual has not yet filed their
taxes and decides between filing today and not filing today. Filing today yields immediate costs
and discounted benefits. It also transitions the future filing state to fi,t+1 = 0, such that all future
flow payoffs and the future ex-ante value function is zero. Together these yield
vit(1,bi,1) = δ kbi− c+ δ
∫
0
vit(1,bi,1) = δ kbi− c
Now, consider the individual who chooses to not file. Filing today yields zero costs and zero
benefits. It advances time, but the state in the future will be xi,t+1 = (1,bi,t+1) with probability 1.
Given this state and the arbitrary action that the individual files, the value of this option is simply
calculated as well.
vit(xit ,ait) = u(xit ,ait)+ δ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1,1)− ln[p(1|xi,t+1)]) f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait)dxi,t+1
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vit(1,bi,0) = 0+δ [δ kbi− c]−δ ln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
vit(1,bi,0) = δ k+1bi−δc−δ ln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
We can evaluate the difference between these two conditional value functions as:
vit(1,bi,0)− vit(1,bi,1) =[
δ k+1bi−δc−δ ln[p(1|xi,t+1)])
]
−
[
δ kbi− c
]
=
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(p(1|1,bi)).
Under the error distribution, we have:
p(ait |xit) = 1∑a′it exp(vit(xit ,a′it)− vit(xit ,ait))
.
Or,
p(1it |1it ,bi) = 11+ exp[(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))] .
This represents the likelihood contribution of observation t for individual i given the decision
maker has not filed yet. Note that we only need to consider those periods up until the time when
the person files. Once they file, the utility consequences of filing are eliminated and the likelihood
contribution is zero for such observations. Let Di be the filing date of a given individual. The
grand log likelihood is written as
L =
N
∑
i=1
[
Di
∑
t=1
ln[p(1it |1it ,bi)]
]
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B.3 Refund Arrival Delay and Identification
B.3.1 Starting and Limiting Values
We start with the following conditional filing probabilities.
pT−t−1 =
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pT−t)
]
pT−1 =
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c
] .
Now, suppose that 0 < pT−t−1 < pT−t ≤ 1 then:
pT−t−2 =
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pT−t−1)
]
<
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pT−t)
] = pT−t−1
Therefore, we know pT−t−2 < pT−t−1 for all t – i.e. pT−t is monotonically decreasing
in t since t may equal 1. Further suppose 0 < pT−t ≤ 1 and 0 < δ < 1, then
0 <
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pT−t)
] = pT−t−1∀t
.
Which tells us the sequence is bounded below by 0. Therefore, we may solve for the
limit:
pL =
1
1+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pL)
]
⇐⇒ 1 = pL+ exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pL)
]
pL
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⇐⇒ ln
(
1− pL
pL
)
= (δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c−δ ln(pL)
⇐⇒ (1− pL)pδ−1L = exp[(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c]
But this means that
p−1T−1−1 = exp
[
(δ k+1−δ k)bi− (δ −1)c
]
which implies
(1− pL)pδ−1L = p−1T−1−1
B.3.2 Single Coincidence
Let pt represent the conditional probability of filing in period t under parameters (δ ,c)
and p˜t represent the conditional probability of filing in period t under parameters (δ˜ , c˜). WLOG
let δ > δ˜ . We will show that either pT−1 ≤ p˜T−1 and pT−t < p˜T−t for all t > 1, or that
pT−1 > p˜T−1 and that if there exists some tˆ for which pT−tˆ < p˜T−tˆ then there either exists t ′
such that pT−t < p˜T−t for all t > t ′ and pT−t > p˜T−t for all 0 < t < t ′.
Case 1: Suppose pT−1 ≤ p˜T−1. Then we know that
1
1+ e(δ−1)(δ kb−c)
≤ 1
1+ e(δ˜−1)(δ˜ kb−c˜)
.
⇐⇒ (δ −1)(δ kb− c)≥ (δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)
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Now consider any pT−t and p˜T−t such that 0 < pT−t ≤ p˜T−t < 1. But δ > δ˜ , therefore
we know that
(δ −1)(δ kb− c)−δ ln(pT−t)> (δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t)
⇐⇒ 1
1+ exp((δ −1)(δ kb− c)−δ ln(pT−t)) <
1
1+ exp((δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t))
So we know that pT−t−1 < p˜T−t−1. But t was arbitrary and pT−1 ≤ p˜T−1 by assumption.
Therefore, pT−t < p˜T−t for all t.
Case 2: Suppose that pT−1 > p˜T−1 and that pT−t > p˜T−t for all 0 < t < t ′. Let pT−t ′ ≤
p˜T−t ′ . Then we know that:
1
1+ exp((δ −1)(δ kb− c)−δ ln(pT−t ′+1))
≤ 1
1+ exp((δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t ′+1))
⇐⇒ (δ −1)(δ kb− c)−δ ln(pT−t ′+1)≥ (δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t ′+1)
⇐⇒ (δ −1)(δ kb− c)− (δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)≥ δ ln(pT−t ′+1)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t ′+1)
Now suppose that pT−t ′−n < p˜T−t ′−n for some n > 0. Then we know that pT−t ′−n−
p˜T−t ′−n < pT−t ′+1− p˜T−t ′+1. Further, we know pT−t ′−n < pT−t ′+1 and p˜T−t ′−n < p˜T−t ′+1.3
3This comes from the fact that if 0 < pT−t−1 < pT−t ≤ 1 then pT−t−2 < pT−t−1 (shown above in B.3.1) and
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Therefore, since δ > δ˜ we know that:
δ ln(pT−t ′+1)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t ′+1)> δ ln(pT−t ′−n)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t ′−n)
=⇒ (δ −1)(δ kb− c)− (δ˜ −1)(δ˜ kb− c˜)> δ ln(pT−t ′−n)− δ˜ ln(p˜T−t ′−n)
=⇒ pT−t ′−n−1 < p˜T−t ′−n−1
But n was arbitrary, so we know pT−t < p˜T−t for all t > t ′ and pT−t > p˜T−t for all
0 < t < t ′.
B.3.3 Level Curve Simulations
We first address the importance in identification of k > 0. Recall that the likelihood
expression of observation t for individual i is:
p(1it |1it ,bi) = 11+ exp[δ k(δ −1)b− (δ −1)c−δ ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))] .
If we let k = 0 then the likelihood expression becomes:
p(1it |1it ,bi) = 11+ exp [(δ −1)b− (δ −1)c−δ ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))] .
Note that when k = 0, b and c must be weighted equally in the likelihood expression. This
presents a problem in identification. Since (δ − 1)b− (δ − 1)c = (δ − 1)(b− c), the level
sets of p(1it |1it ,bi) in the (δ ,c) plane coincide across time periods when solving p(1it |1it ,bi)
recursively. This is illustrated in Figure B.11. Figure B.11 displays the level sets of p(1it |1it ,bi) –
the fact that pT−2 < pT−1 and p˜T−2 < p˜T−1 necessarily.
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assuming δ = 0.535, c = 10, refund = 50 – over time periods t = 61, 62, 63, and 64 in the (δ ,c)
plane. We observe that the levels sets separate over different time periods when k = 14, but find
no such separation when k = 0.
In our identification, we take p(1it |1it ,bi), p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi), and b as given, and we
estimate δ and c via maximum likelihood. We know by observation that p(1it |1it ,bi) ∈ (0,1],
ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))∈ [−6.59,0] and that the mean refund is $1419. As such, for any 0< δ < 1
and reasonable cost parameter c, exp [(δ −1)b− (δ −1)c−δ ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))] ≈ 0 =⇒
p(1it |1it ,bi) = 11+exp[(δ−1)b−(δ−1)c−δ ln(p(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))] ≈ 1. That is, for reasonable values of c,
p(1it |1it ,bi) is computationally 1. However, if k > 0 the relative size of the refund does not
necessitate that p(1it |1it ,bi) = 1. This point is illustrated in Figure B.12. Figure B.12 recreates
figure B.11 but assumes refund = 1400. We observe that the levels sets separate over different
time periods when k = 14. However, when k = 0, p(1it |1it ,bi) = 1 for all c when fixing any δ .
As such, the level sets not only coincide over all time periods, but coincide over (δ ,c) within a
time period. Unsurprisingly, when running our estimator under the assumption k = 0 we find a
flat likelihood over all values of c – see Figure B.4. In Figure B.13 we see further separation of
level curves between time periods when increasing k to 21. Hence, differential direct deposit use,
which generates differences in k, delivers additional identifying variation.
118
k = 14, refund = 50
Delta
Co
sts
/2
0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
t= 64
t=63
t=62
t=61
k = 0, refund = 50
Delta
Co
sts
/2
0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
t= 64
t=63
t=62
t=61
Figure B.11: Conditional Probability Level Curves assuming δ = 0.535,c = 10
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Figure B.12: Conditional Probability Level Curves assuming δ = .535,c = 10
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Figure B.13: Conditional Probability Level Curves assuming δ = 0.535,c = 10
B.4 Naive β −δ derivation
Recall the formulation for the exponential agent:
Vit(xit ,εit) = maxait [(δ
kb− c)ait + εit(ait)+δE [Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,εi,t+1)|xit ,ait ]]
Since, the naive present-biased agent believes he will act exponentially in all future periods we
may write his current value function as:
Wit(xit ,εit) = maxait [(βδ
kb− c)ait + εit(ait)+βδE [Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,εi,t+1)|xit ,ait ]],
where the expected future value function Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,εi,t+1) is that of the exponential agent.
Define the conditional naive present-biased value function, wit(xit ,ait), as the present discounted
value (net of the shocks εit) of choosing ait and behaving optimally (under the belief of exponen-
120
tial) from period t+1 on as
wit(xit ,ait)≡ (βδ kb− c)ait +βδ
∫
V i,t+1(xi,t+1) f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait)dxi,t+1,
where V i,t+1(xi,t+1), is
V i,t+1(xi,t+1)≡
∫
Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,εi,t+1)g(εi,t+1)dεi,t+1.
The optimal decision rule at time t solves
αit(xit ,εit) = arg maxait wit(xit ,ait)+ εit(ait).
Under the assumed Type-1 extreme value distribution, the probability of an arbitrary
choice ait is given by
pβδ (ait |xit) =
1
∑a′it exp(wit(xit ,a
′
it)−wit(xit ,ait))
.
As before we have the exponential ex-ante value function in closed form.
V it(xit) = ln
∑
a′it
exp(vit(xit ,a′it))
 .
V it(xit) =−ln[pn(a∗it |xit)]+ vit(xit ,a∗it),
for some arbitrary action taken at time t, a∗it . This expresses the ex-ante value of being at a given
state as the conditional value of taking an arbitrary action adjusted for a penalty that the arbitrary
action might not be optimal, now under the naive belief of exponential behavior, pn. We can
substitute this in to our equation for the conditional value function to obtain
wit(xit ,ait) = (βδ kb− c)ait +βδ
∫
(vi,t+1(xi,t+1,a∗i,t+1)− ln[pn(a∗i,t+1|xi,t+1)]) f (xi,t+1|xit ,ait)dxi,t+1
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Recognizing that
wit(1,bi,1) = βδ kbi− c
wit(1,bi,0) = βδ k+1bi−βδc−βδ ln[pn(1|xi,t+1)]),
we obtain
pβδ (1it |1it ,bi) =
1
1+ exp
[
β (δ k+1−δ k)b− (βδ −1)c−βδ ln(pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi))
] .
In effect, pn(1i,t+1|1i,t+1,bi) constructed with a given δ and c replaces the rational expectations
bin estimates of future filing probabilities. The remaining parameter to estimate is β in a
likelihood formulation that is altogether similar to that provided for an exponential agent.
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B.5 IRS Announcement of H.R. 5140
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
IRS
Notice 1377 (February 2008)
Catalog Number 51255B
Dear Taxpayer:
Economic Stimulus Payment Notice
www.irs.gov
We are pleased to inform you that the United States Congress passed and President George W.
Bush signed into law the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which provides for economic stimulus
payments to be made to over 130 million American households. Under this new law, you may be
entitled to a payment of up to $600 ($1,200 if filing a joint return), plus additional amounts for each
qualifying child.
We are sending this notice to let you know that based on this new law the IRS will begin sending
the one-time payments starting in May. To receive a payment in 2008, individuals who qualify will
not have to do anything more than file a 2007 tax return. The IRS will determine eligibility, figure the
amount, and send the payment. This payment should not be confused with any 2007 income tax
refund that is owed to you by the federal government. Income tax refunds for 2007 will be made
separately from this one-time payment.
Individuals who qualify may receive as much as $600 ($1,200 if married filing jointly). Even if you
pay no income tax but have a total of $3,000 or more in earned income, Social Security benefits,
and/or certain veterans’ payments, you may receive a payment of $300 ($600 if married filing
jointly).
In addition, individuals eligible for payments may also receive an additional amount of $300 for
each child qualifying for the child tax credit.
To qualify for the payment, an individual, spouse, and any qualifying child must have a valid Social
Security number. In addition, individuals cannot receive a payment if they can be claimed as a
dependent of another taxpayer or they filed a 2007 Form 1040NR, 1040NR-EZ, 1040-PR, or
1040-SS.
All individuals receiving payments will receive a notice and additional information shortly before the
payment is made. In the meantime, for additional information, please visit the IRS website at
www.irs.gov.
For individuals who normally do not have to file a tax return, the new law provides for payments to
individuals who have a total of $3,000 or more in earned income, Social Security benefits, and/or
certain veterans’ payments. Those individuals should file a tax return for 2007 to receive a payment
in 2008.
For taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) of more than $75,000 (or more than $150,000 if
married filing jointly), the payment will be reduced or phased out completely.
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B.6 Excerpts from Technical Explanation of H.R. 5140
B.6.1 Explanation of Provision
B.6.2 In general
The provision includes a recovery rebate credit for 2008 which is refundable. The credit
mechanism (and the issuance of checks described below) is intended to deliver an expedited
fiscal stimulus to the economy.
The credit is computed with two components in the following manner.
B.6.3 Basic credit
Eligible individuals receive a basic credit (for the first taxable year beginning) in 2008
equal to the greater of the following:
• Net income tax liability not to exceed 600(1,200 in the case of a joint return).
• 300(600 in the case of a joint return) if: (1) the eligible individual has qualifying income of
at least 3,000;or(2)theeligibleindividualhasanetincometaxliabilityo f atleast1 and gross
income greater than the sum of the applicable basic standard deduction amount and one
personal exemption (two personal exemptions for a joint return).
An eligible individual is any individual other than: (1) a nonresident alien; (2) an estate
or trust; or (3) a dependent. For these purposes, “net income tax liability” means the excess of
the sum of the individual?s regular tax liability and alternative minimum tax over the sum of
all nonrefundable credits (other than the child credit). Net income tax liability as determined
for these purposes is not reduced by the credit added by this provision or any credit which is
refundable under present law. Qualifying income is the sum of the eligible individual’s: (a)
earned income; (b) social security benefits (within the meaning of sec. 86(d)); and (c) veteran’s
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payments (under Chapters 11, 13, or 15 of title 38 of the U. S. Code). The definition of earned
income has the same meaning as used in the earned income credit except that it includes certain
combat pay and does not include net earnings from self-employment which are not taken into
account in computing taxable income.
B.6.4 Qualifying child credit
If an individual is eligible for any amount of the basic credit the individual also may be
eligible for a qualifying child credit. The qualifying child credit equals $300 for each qualifying
child of such individual. For these purposes, the child credit definition of qualifying child applies.
B.6.5 Limitation based on gross income
The amount of the credit (i.e., the sum of the amounts of the basic credit and the
qualifying child credit) is phased out at a rate of five percent of adjusted gross income above
certain income levels. The beginning point of this phase-out range is $75,000 of adjusted gross
income ($150,000 in the case of joint returns).
Examples of rebate determination
Example 1. - The amount of the credit (i.e., the sum of the amounts of the basic
credit and the qualifying child credit) is phased out at a rate of five percent of adjusted
gross income above certain income levels. The beginning point of this phase-out range is
75,000o f ad justedgrossincome(150,000 in the case of joint returns).
Example 6. - A married taxpayer filing jointly has $175,000 in earned income, two
qualifying children, and a net tax liability of $31,189 (the taxpayer’s actual liability after the
child credit also is $31,189 as the joint income is too high to qualify). The taxpayer meets the
qualifying income test and the net tax liability test. The taxpayer will, in the absence of the
rebate phase-out provision, receive a rebate of $1,800, comprising $1,200 (greater of $600 or
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net tax liability not to exceed $1,200), and $300 per child. The phase-out provision reduces
the total rebate amount by five percent of the amount by which the taxpayer?s adjusted gross
income exceeds $150,000. Five percent of $25,000 ($175,000 minus $150,000) equals $1,250.
The taxpayer’s rebate is thus $1,800 minus $1,250, or $550.
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B.7 Instructions
2008 BOSTON EITC CAMPAIGN                 
RAFFLE QUESTIONS
The following questions are asked for research purposes only. We will never share your 
personal  information  with  any  organization  or  its  representatives.  Please  note  that  any 
winnings may be taxable. 
• Use a No. 2 pencil only. 
• Do not use ink, ballpoint or felt tip pens.
• Make solid marks that fill the oval completely
• Erase cleanly any marks you wish to change
• Make no stray marks on this form
• Do not fold, tear or mutilate this form
As a tax filer at this Volunteer Income Tax Assistance site you are automatically entered in a 
raffle in which you could win up to $50. Just follow the directions below:
How It Works:
In the boxes below you are asked to choose between smaller payments closer to today and larger payments further in the 
future. For each row, choose one payment: either the smaller, sooner payment or the later, larger payment. When you  
return this completed form, you will receive a raffle ticket. If you are a winner, the raffle ticket will have a number on it  
from 1 to 22. These numbers correspond to the numbered choices below. You will be paid your chosen payment. The 
choices you make could mean a difference in payment of more than $35, so … CHOOSE CAREFULLY!!! 
RED BLOCK (Numbers 1 through 7) :        Decide between payment today and payment in one month
BLACK BLOCK (Numbers 8 through 15):  Decide between payment today and payment in six months
BLUE BLOCK (Numbers 16 through 22):   Decide between payment in six months and payment in seven months 
Rules and Eligibility: 
For each possible number below, state whether you would like the earlier, smaller payment or the later, larger payment.  
Only completed raffle forms are eligible for the raffle.
All prizes will be sent to you by normal mail and will be paid by money order. One out of ten raffle tickets will be a  
winner. You can obtain your raffle ticket as soon as your tax filing is complete. You may not participate in the raffle if  
you are  associated  with the  EITC campaign (volunteer,  business  associate,  etc.)  or  an  employee (or  relative  of  an 
employee) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.
TODAY VS. ONE MONTH FROM TODAY
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 1 AND 7?
Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure today   or the larger payment for sure in 
one   month ?  Please answer for each possible number (1) through (7) by filling in one box for each possible number. 
Example: If you prefer $49 today in Question 1 mark as follows:               $49 today or  $50 in one month 
If you prefer $50 in one month in Question 1, mark as follows:  $49 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (1): Would you like to receive  $49 today or  $50 in one month
If you get number (2): Would you like to receive  $47 today or  $50 in one month
If you get number (3): Would you like to receive  $44 today or  $50 in one month
If you get number (4): Would you like to receive  $40 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (5): Would you like to receive  $35 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (6): Would you like to receive  $29 today or  $50 in one month 
If you get number (7): Would you like to receive  $22 today or  $50 in one month 
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TODAY VS. SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 8 AND 15?
Now, decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure today or the larger payment for 
sure in six   months ?  Please answer each possible number (8) through (15) by filling in one box for each possible 
number.
If you get number (8): Would you like to receive  $49 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (9): Would you like to receive  $47 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (10): Would you like to receive  $44 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (11): Would you like to receive  $40 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (12): Would you like to receive  $35 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (13): Would you like to receive  $29 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (14): Would you like to receive  $22 today or  $50 in six months 
If you get number (15): Would you like to receive  $14 today or  $50 in six months 
SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY VS. SEVEN 
MONTHS FROM TODAY
WHAT WILL YOU DO IF YOU GET A NUMBER BETWEEN 16 AND 22?
Decide for each possible number if you would like the smaller payment for sure in six months   or the larger payment for 
sure in seven  months ?  Please answer for each possible number (16) through (22) by filling in one box for each possible 
number. 
If you get number (16): Would you like to receive  $49 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (17): Would you like to receive  $47 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (18): Would you like to receive  $44 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (19): Would you like to receive  $40 in six months or  $50 in seven months 
If you get number (20): Would you like to receive  $35 in six months or  $50 in seven months
If you get number (21): Would you like to receive  $29 in six months or  $50 in seven months 
If you get number (22): Would you like to receive  $22 in six months or  $50 in seven months
128
References
Afriat, Sidney N. 1967. “The construction of utility functions from expenditure data.” Interna-
tional economic review, 8(1): 67–77.
Aguirregabiria, Victor, and Pedro Mira. 2007. “Sequential estimation of dynamic discrete games.”
Econometrica, 75(1): 1–53.
Akerlof, George A. 1980. “A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one
consequence.” The quarterly journal of economics, 94(4): 749–775.
Akerlof, George A, and Rachel E Kranton. 2000. “Economics and Identity*.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(3): 715–753.
Allen, Eric J., Patricia M. Dechow, Devin G. Pope, and George Wu. Forthcoming. “Reference
Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Marathon Runners.” Management Science.
Alpizar, Francisco, Fredrik Carlsson, and Olof Johansson-Stenman. 2008. “Anonymity, reci-
procity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa
Rica.” Journal of Public Economics, 92(5): 1047–1060.
Andreoni, James, and Charles Sprenger. 2012. “Estimating Time Preferences with Convex
Budgets.” American Economic Review.
Andreoni, James, and Douglas B. Bernheim. 2009. “Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A
Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects.” Econometrica, 77(5): 1607–
1636.
Arcidiciano, Peter, and Paul B. Ellickson. 2011. “Practical Methods for Estimation of Dynamic
Discrete Choice Models.” Annual Review of Economics, 3: 363–394.
Ariely, Dan, and Klaus Wertenbroch. 2002. “Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment.” Psychological Science, 13(3): 219–224.
Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin. 2006. “Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence
from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
129
121(1): 635–672.
Augenblick, Ned, and Matthew Rabin. 2016. “An Experiment on Time Preference and Mispre-
diction in Unpleasant Tasks.” Working Paper.
Augenblick, Ned, Muriel Niederle, and Charles Sprenger. 2015. “Working Over Time: Dynamic
Inconsistency in Real Effort Tasks.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3): 1067–1115.
Bajari, Patrick, C Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin. 2007. “Estimating dynamic models of
imperfect competition.” Econometrica, 75(5): 1331–1370.
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul. 2010. “Social Incentives in the Workplace.”
The Review of Economic Studies, 77(2): 417–458.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. 1992. “A simple model of herd behavior.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107(3): 797–817.
Be´nabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior.” The American
Economic Review, 96(5): 1652–1678.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2011. “Laws and norms.” National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Benjamin, Daniel, James Choi, and Joshua Strickland. 2010. “Social Identity and Preferences.”
American Economic Review, 100(4).
Benzarti, Youssef. 2015. “How Taxing is Filing? Leaving Money on the Table Because of Hassle
Costs.” Working Paper.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. 1994. “A Theory of Conformity.” Journal of Political Economy,
102(5): 841–877.
Bernheim, B Douglas, and Christine L Exley. 2015. “Understanding conformity: an experimental
investigation.” Working Paper.
Birkhoff, Garrett. 1946. “Tres observaciones sobre el a´lgebra lineal.” Univ. Nac. Tucuma´n Rev.
Ser. A, 5: 147–151.
Bisin, Alberto, and Kyle Hyndman. 2014. “Present-Bias, Procrastination and Deadlines in a
Field Experiment.” Working Paper.
Brown, Jeffrey R., and Allessandro Previtero. 2014. “Procrastination, Present-Biased Preferences,
and Financial Behaviors.” Working Paper.
130
Brown, Jeffrey R., Anne M. Farrell, and Scott J. Weisbenner. 2016. “Decision-making approaches
and the propensity to default: Evidence and Implications.” Journal of Financial Economics,
121: 477–495.
Burks, Stephan, Jeffrey Carpenter, Lorenz Goette, and Aldo Rustichini. 2009. “Cognitive skills
affect economic preferences, strategic behavior, and job attachment.” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Science, 106(19): 7745–7750.
Bursztyn, Leonardo, and Robert Jensen. 2017. “Social Image and Economic Behavior in the
Field: Identifying, Understanding and Shaping Social Pressure.” Annual Review of Economics,
9.
Bursztyn, Leonardo, Florian Ederer, Bruno Ferman, and Noam Yuchtman. 2014. “Understand-
ing Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Financial
Decisions.” Econometrica, 82(4): 1273–1301.
Bursztyn, Leonardo, Georgy Egorov, and Robert Jensen. 2017. “Cool to be Smart or Smart to be
Cool? Understanding Peer Pressure in Education.” The Review of Economic Studies.
Carvalho, Leandro, Stephan Meier, and Stephanie Wang. 20016. “Poverty and Economic
Decision-Making: Evidence from Changes in Financial Resources at Payday.” American
Economic Review, 106(2): 260–284.
Chabris, Christopher F., David Laibson, and Jonathon P. Schuldt. 2008. “Intertemporal Choice.”
In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. , ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Larry Blume.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chambers, Christopher P., Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya. 2014. “The axiomatic structure
of empirical content.” American Economic Review, 104(8): 2303–2319.
Chen, Yan, F Maxwell Harper, Joseph Konstan, and Sherry Xin Li. 2010. “Social comparisons
and contributions to online communities: A field experiment on movielens.” The American
economic review, 100(4): 1358–1398.
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Tore Olsen, and Luigi Pistaferri. 2011. “Adjustment Costs,
Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax
Records.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2): 749–804.
Coller, Maribeth, and Melonie B. Williams. 1999. “Eliciting individual discount rates.” Experi-
mental Economics, 2: 107–127.
Cubitt, Robin P., and Daniel Read. 2007. “Can Intertemporal Choice Experiments Elicit Prefer-
ences for Consumption.” Experimental Economics, 10(4): 369–389.
131
Dahl, Gordon B, Katrine V Løken, and Magne Mogstad. 2014. “Peer Effects in Program
Participation.” American Economic Review, 104(7): 2049–2074.
Dana, Jason, Roberto A. Weber, and Jason Xi Kuang. 2007. “Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room:
Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness.” Economic Theory, 33(1).
Dean, Mark, and Anja Sautmann. 2016. “Credit Constraints and the Measurement of Time
Preferences.” Working Paper.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2006. “Paying Not to Go to the Gym.” American
Economic Review, 96(3): 694–719.
DellaVigna, Stefano, Attila Lindner, Balazs Reizer, and Johannes F. Schmieder. Forthcoming.
“Reference-Dependent Job Search: Evidence from Hungary.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde. 2006. “Dynamic inconsistency
predicts self-control problems in humans.” Working Paper.
Duflo, Esther, and Emmanuel Saez. 2002. “Participation and investment decisions in a retirement
plan: the influence of colleagues’ choices.” Journal of Public Economics, 85(1): 121–148.
Echenique, Federico, and Kota Saito. 2015. “Savage in the market.” Econometrica, 83(4): 1467–
1495.
Efron, Bradley, and Robert J. Tibshirani. 1994. An Introduction to the Bootstrap. Chapman and
Hall.
Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein, and Paul Schrimpf. 2016. “Bunching at the kink: implications for
spending responses to health insurance contracts.” Journal of Public Economics.
Epstein, Larry G. 2000. “Are probabilities used in markets?” Journal of Economic Theory,
91(1): 86–90.
Exley, Christine L. 2016. “Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk.” The
Review of Economic Studies, 83(2): 587–628.
Falk, Armin, and Andrea Ichino. 2006. “Clean evidence on peer effects.” Journal of Labor
Economics, 24(1): 39–57.
Fang, Hamming, and Dan Silverman. 2009. “Time-inconsistency and welfare program participa-
tion: Evidence from the NLSY.” International Economic Review, 116(2): 1043–1077.
Fang, Hanming, and Yang Wang. 2015. “Estimating Dynamic Discrete Choice Models with
Hyperbolic Discounting, with an Application to Mammography Decisions.” International
132
Economic Review, 56(2): 565–596.
Festinger, Leon. 1954. “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes.” Human relations, 7(2): 117–
140.
Fishburn, Peter C. 1975. “Separation theorems and expected utilities.” Journal of Economic
Theory, 11(1): 16–34.
Foster, Andrew D, and Mark R Rosenzweig. 1995. “Learning by Doing and Learning from
Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture.” Journal of Political Economy,
103(6): 1176–1209.
Frakes, Michael D., and Melissa F. Wasserman. 2016. “Procrastination in the Workplace: Evi-
dence from the U.S. Patent Office.” NBER Working Paper No. 22987.
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue. 2002. “Time discounting and time
preference: A critical review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2): 351–401.
Frey, Bruno S, and Stephan Meier. 2004. “Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: Testing”
conditional cooperation” in a field experiment.” The American Economic Review, 94(5): 1717–
1722.
Gine, Xavier, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman. 2010. “Put Your Money Where Your Butt
Is: A Commimtent Contract for Smoking Cessation.” American Economic Journal - Applied
Economics, 2(4): 213–235.
Goette, Lorenz, David Huffman, and Stephan Meier. 2006. “The Impact of Group Membership
on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social
Groups.” The American Economic Review, 96(2): 212–216.
Green, Richard C., and Sanjay Srivastava. 1986. “Expected utility maximization and demand
behavior.” Journal of Economic Theory, 38(2): 313–323.
Harrison, Glenn W., Morten I. Lau, and Melonie B. Williams. 2002. “Estimating individual
discount rates in Denmark: A field experiment.” American Economic Review, 92(5): 1606–
1617.
Harrison, Glenn W., Morten I. Lau, Elisabet E. Rutstrom, and Melonie B. Williams. 2005.
“Eliciting risk and time preferences using field experiments: Some methodological issues.” In
Field experiments in economics. Vol. Vol. 10 (Research in Experimental Economics), , ed.
Jeffrey Carpenter, Glenn W. Harrison and John A. List. Greenwich and London:JAI Press.
Heffetz, Ori, Ted O’Donoghue, and Henry S. Schneider. 2016. “Forgetting and Heterogeneity in
Task Delay: Evidence from New York City Parking-Ticket Recipients.” Working Paper.
133
Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” The American
Economic Review, 92(5): 1644–1655.
Hotz, V. Joseph, and Robert A. Miller. 1993. “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation
of Dynamic Models.” The Review of Economic Studies, 60(3): 497–529.
Hoxby, Caroline. 2000. “Peer effects in the classroom: Learning from gender and race variation.”
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ifcher, John, and Homa Zarghamee. 2011. “Happiness and Myopia: Evidence from a Random-
Assignment Experiment.” American Economic Review, 101(7): 3109–3129.
Jacobson, Sarah, and Ragan Petrie. 2009. “Learning from Mistakes: What Do Inconsistent
Choices Over Risk Tell Us?” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 38(2).
Jones, Stephen R G. 1984. The economics of conformism. Blackwell.
Katz, Michael L, and Carl Shapiro. 1986. “Technology adoption in the presence of network
externalities.” Journal of political economy, 94(4): 822–841.
Kaur, Supreet, Michael Kremer, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2010. “Self-Control and the De-
velopment of Work Arrangements.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,
100(2): 624–628.
Kennan, John, and James R Walker. 2011. “The effect of expected income on individual migration
decisions.” Econometrica, 79(1): 211–251.
Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1960. “Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience.” Econometrica,
28(2): 287–309.
Krupka, Erin, and Roberto a Weber. 2009. “The focusing and informational effects of normas on
pro-social behavior.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(3): 307–320.
Krupka, Erin L, and Roberto A Weber. 2013. “Identifying social norms using coordination games:
Why does dictator game sharing vary?” Journal of the European Economic Association,
11(3): 495–524.
Kubler, Felix, Larry Selden, and Xiao Wei. 2014. “Asset demand based tests of expected utility
maximization.” American Economic Review, 104(11): 3459–3480.
Laibson, David. 1997. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 112(2): 443–477.
Laibson, David. 2015. “Why Don’t Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments.” American
134
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 105(5): 267–272.
Laibson, David, Peter Maxted, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman. 2017. “Estimating
discount functions with consumption choices over the lifecycle.” Working Paper.
Machina, Mark J., and David Schmeidler. 1992. “A more robust definition of subjective probabil-
ity.” Econometrica, 60(4): 745–780.
Magnac, Thierry, and David Thesmar. 2002. “Identifying Dynamic Discrete Decision Processes.”
Econometrica, 70(2): 801–816.
Mahajan, Aprajit, and Alessandro Tarozzi. 2011. “Time Inconsistency, Ecpectations and Tech-
nology Adoption: The Case of Insecticide Treated Nets.” Working Paper.
Mangasarian, Olvi L. 1994. Nonlinear Programming. Classics in Applied Mathematics, Society
for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
Mas, Alexandre, and Enrico Moretti. 2009. “Peers at Work.” The American Economic Review,
99(1): 112–145.
McClure, Samuel, David Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan Cohen. 2004. “Separate
neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards.” Science, 306: 503–507.
Meier, Stephan, and Charles Sprenger. 2010. “Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card
Borrowing.” American Economic Journal - Applied Economics, 2(1): 193–210.
Meier, Stephan, and Charles Sprenger. 2015. “Temporal Stability of Time Preferences.” Review
of Economics and Statistics, 97(2): 273–286.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 1999. “Doing it Now or Later.” American Economic
Review, 89(1): 103–124.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 2001. “Choice and Procrastination.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116(1): 121–160.
Polisson, Matthew, , John Quah, and Ludovic Renou. 2015. “Revealed preference tests over risk
and uncertainty.” working paper.
Rees-Jones, Alex. 2013. “Loss Aversion Motivates Tax Sheltering: Evidence from US Tax
Returns.” Working Paper.
Richter, Marcel K. 1966. “Revealed preference theory.” Econometrica, 34(3): 635–645.
Rockafellar, Tyrrell. 1997. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press.
135
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1970. “Increasing risk: I. A definition.” Journal of
Economic theory, 2(3): 225–243.
Rust, John. 1994. “Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes.” In Handbook of
Econometrics Vol. 4. , ed. Robert Engle and Daniel McFadden, 3081–3143. Amsterdam: New
Holland.
Sacerdote, Bruce I. 2001. “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth
Roommates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2): 681–704.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1937. “A Note on Measurement of Utility.” The Review of Economic Studies,
4(2): 155–161.
Shang, Jen, and Rachel Croson. 2009. “A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact
of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods.” The Economic Journal,
119(540): 1422–1439.
Shapiro, Jesse. 2005. “Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition
cycle.” Journal of Public Economics, 89(2-3): 303–325.
Shue, Kelly. 2013. “Executive Networks and Firm Policies: Evidence from the Random Assign-
ment of MBA Peers.” The Review of Financial Studies, , (6): 1401–1442.
Slemrod, Joel, Charles Christian, Rebecca London, and Jonathan A. Parker. 1997. “April 15
Syndrome.” Economic Inquiry, XXXV: 695–709.
Souleles, Nicholas S. 1999. “The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds.”
American Economic Review, 89(4): 947–958.
Sprenger, Charles. 2015. “Judging Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency.” American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 105(5): 280–285.
Tanaka, Tomomi, Colin Camerer, and Quang Nguyen. 2010. “Risk and time preferences: Experi-
mental and household data from Vietnam.” American Economic Review, 100(1): 557–571.
Varian, Hal R. 1983. “Nonparametric tests of models of investor behavior.” Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 18(3): 269–278.
von Neumann, John. 1953. “A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal
assignment problem.” Contributions to the Theory of Games, 2: 5–12.
Zimmerman, David J. 2003. “Peer effects in academic outcomes: Evidence from a natural
experiment.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1): 9–23.
136
